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 Chartist Trading in Exchange
Rate Theory
Carina SelanderAbstract
This thesis consists of four papers, of which paper 1 and 4 are co-written with Mikael
Bask. Paper [1] implements chartists trading in a sticky-price monetary model for
determining the exchange rate. It is demonstrated that chartists cause the exchange
rate to ￿overshoot the overshooting equilibrium￿ of a sticky-price monetary model.
Chartists base their trading on a short-long moving average. The importance of tech-
nical trading depends inversely on the time horizon in currency trade. The exchange
rate￿ s perfect foresight path near long-run equilibrium is derived and it is demonstrated
that the shorter the time horizon, the greater the exchange rate overshooting.
The aim of Paper [2] is to see how the dynamics of the basic target zone model
changes when chartists and fundamentalists are introduced. Chartists use technical
trading and the relative importance of technical and fundamental analyses depend on
the time horizon in currency trade. The model also includes realignment expectations,
which increase with the weight of chartists. The introduction of chartists may signi￿-
cantly reduce and reverse, the so-called "honeymoon e⁄ect" of a fully credible target
zone. Further, chartists may cause the correlation between the exchange rate and the
instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential to become either positive or negative.
Using a chartist-fundamentalist set-up, Paper [3] derives the e⁄ects on the current
exchange rate of central bank intervention. Fundamentalists have rational expecta-
tions and chartists use so called support and resistance levels in their trading. This
technique results in chartists having both bandwagon expectations and regressive ex-
pectations. Chartists may enhance or suppress the e⁄ect of intervention depending on
their expectations. The results indicate that a chartist channel exists.
The aim of Paper [4] is threefold; (i) to investigate if there is a unique rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) in a new Keynesian macroeconomic model augmented
with technical trading, (ii), to investigate if the unique REE is adaptively learnable
and, (iii), to investigate if this unique and adaptively learnable REE is desirable in
an in￿ ation rate targeting regime. The monetary authority is using a Taylor rule
when setting the interest rate. A main conclusion is that a robust Taylor rule implies
that the monetary authority should increase (decrease) the interest rate when the CPI
in￿ ation rate increases (decreases) and when the currency gets stronger (weaker).
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1 Introduction
Should foreign exchange models focus on the observed behavior of exchange
rates or that of currency traders? As one of the main purposes of economic
theory is to develop models that can explain observed regularities, there is an
obvious advantage with taking the ￿rst point of departure. However, in order to
develop an economic theory of exchange rate movements, one cannot, disregard
the behavior of those who actually trade in the foreign exchange market. This
is the premise on which the ￿rst paper in this thesis starts and it is the common
theme running through the subsequent papers. Put simply the ambition of this
thesis is to make a contribution to the further development of the theory of
exchange rates by focusing on the observed behavior of currency traders.
Recent surveys of the foreign exchange market has shown the extensive use
of chartism, i.e., technical analysis, on the foreign exchange market. Along with
this ￿nding, theoretical models of the exchange rate has been developed. One
area of exchange rate models have focused on heterogenous expectations and
technical trading, i.e., the behavior of foreign exchange traders. Technical trad-
ing involves the study of past exchange rates and extrapolating techniques are
used to form expectations of future exchange rates. It refers to trading based
on time charts of exchange rates. This has led to it being known as "chartism".
The implementation of chartist trading into theoretical models for the ex-
change rate potentially alters the basic results of these models and give rise to
di⁄erent dynamics for the exchange rate. Frankel and Froot [27] were the ￿rst to
implement a chartist fundamentalist set-up in a traditional ￿ exible price mon-
etary model. They showed that chartists survived on the market and that the
behavior of chartists could well explain the dynamics of exchange rates. In the
footsteps of Frankel and Froot [27], di⁄erent types of chartist-fundamentalist
set-ups have been implemented into a wide range of di⁄erent exchange rate
models.
This introduction provides some insights into technical trading in the for-
eign exchange market as well as a theoretical background for the papers that
follow. The four papers in this thesis incorporate heterogeneous expectations
and technical trading into various theoretical models for the exchange rate.2 Introduction and summary of papers
Section 2 is based on survey results describing foreign exchange traders￿
beliefs and behavior in the foreign exchange market. It aims to introduce the
reader to technical analysis, what it is, how and by whom it is used, and what
type of market expectations chartists may generate. Section 3 presents a short
literature survey of the more recent theoretical work within exchange rate theory
that incorporates chartism in exchange rate modeling. It includes chartists in
traditional sticky price models; in target zone models; in models of central bank
intervention; and in new Keynesian models with Taylor rules. The purpose is to
give the reader a background and an introduction to the type of models covered
in this thesis. In Section 4 all four papers are summarized individually.
2 Chartism in reality
This section is based primarily on surveys conducted in the foreign exchange
market and focuses in particular on chartism. Section 2.1 starts with a brief
presentation of the di⁄erent trading strategies used in the foreign exchange
market. Section 2.2 continues with the relationship between the time horizon
in currency trade and the use of chartism compared to other trading strategies.
Section 2.3 focuses on where and by whom chartism is used, i.e., an analysis
of whether there are any di⁄erences between trading locations and types of
traders that use chartism. Finally, Section 2.4 discusses the relationship between
chartism and exchange rate variability.
2.1 Chartism and other trading strategies
Traders in the foreign exchange market use di⁄erent trading strategies. The
surveys conducted in the foreign exchange markets de￿ne four di⁄erent types
of strategies used by traders: technical analysis, fundamental analysis, ￿ ow
analysis, and jobbing. This section will brie￿ y describe these di⁄erent trading
strategies, with particular focus on technical analysis, i.e., chartism. The de-
scription of the di⁄erent tools within technical analysis that follow are mainly
derived from Ludden [42], Neely [50], Osler [53] and Pring [54].Introduction and summary of papers 3
Technical analysis Technical analysis, i.e., chartism, does not rely on any un-
derlying economic or fundamental analysis. Instead, technical analysis involves
the study of past exchange rate movements, traded volumes, and the volatility
of exchange rates. Chartists are traders who employ technical analysis to make
forecasts and trading decisions about foreign exchange rates.
Technical trading includes a huge variety of di⁄erent tools. However, most
of these may be described as one of two types; trend or oscillating indicators.
Both types of indicators are used to extract trends and predict trend reversals in
the exchange rate. Oscillating indicators consist of an oscillator combined with
so-called oversold and overbought limits, which indicate that the currency is
undervalued or overvalued. A trend indicator is often comprised of a smoothed
version of the exchange rate combined with so-called support and resistance
levels to identify trend reversals. Alternatively, the trend indicator is comprised
of two di⁄erently smoothed time series of the exchange rate, where crossovers
between the two helps identify trend reversals.
Both types of indicators may be used when the market is trending or ranging.
However, oscillating indicators are considered more suitable when the market is
ranging and trend indicators when it is trending. When the market is trending,
exchange rates move either downwards with lower and lower peaks and troughs,
or upwards with higher and higher peaks and troughs. On the other hand when
the market is ranging, exchange rates oscillate, with no clear up- or downward
trend.
Trend indicators generally involve the use of some type of moving average. A
moving average is a weighted average of past exchange rates, which smooths the
exchange rate and makes it easier to detect a trend. One way to detect trends
and trend reversals is to compare two moving averages of di⁄erent lengths. The
comparison of long- and short-period moving averages gives buy and sell signals
according to the following; when the short-period moving average falls below
(rises above) the long-period moving average, it is a signal of a falling (rising)
exchange rate. Hence, it is a signal to sell (buy) the foreign currency. Another
way to detect trends and trend reversals is to use the so-called support and
resistance lines together with the time path of the exchange rate or a moving
average of the exchange rate. These lines may, for example, be constructed4 Introduction and summary of papers
by drawing a line between two (or more) previous troughs and two (or more)
previous peaks, respectively. When the moving average falls outside the interval
created by the support and resistance lines, it is a signal of a trend reversal.
Thus, when the resistance (support) line is crossed it is a signal to buy (sell)
the foreign currency.
The oscillating indicators include momentum, volume and volatility oscilla-
tors. Momentum oscillators are the same as so-called oversold and overbought
signals. They measure the speed of exchange rate change. Some of the most
common momentum oscillators are the Momentum, the Rate of Change (ROC),
and the Relative Strength Index (RSI). The momentum is the simplest and
measures the rate of change in closing rates for the currency (i.e., the di⁄erence
between the closing price of one currency in terms of another, over a selected
period of time). It is used to detect trend weaknesses and likely trend rever-
sals. High momentums occur when the exchange rate is strongly trending. The
momentum is positive when the exchange rate rises, and negative when it falls.
A low and/or rising momentum is a buy signal and a high and/or falling mo-
mentum is a sell signal. The ROC is constructed using the momentum, and the
oscillator gives buy and sell signals in the same way as the RSI below.
The RSI is constructed as an index that oscillates between 0 and 100. It
compares upward movements in closing rates to downward movements in closing
rates over a selected period of time. Thus, if the exchange rate has been mainly
rising over the selected period of time, the RSI goes to 100 and if it has been
mainly falling the RSI goes to zero. The way in which this oscillator is designed
enables ￿xed oversold and overbought limits to be constructed. Usually, if the
market is trending (ranging) the overbought and oversold limits are set at 80
(70) and 20 (30), respectively. Transgression of the oversold (overbought) limits
by the oscillator constitutes buy (sell) signals for the foreign currency.
Volume and volatility oscillators are based on the traded volume or volatil-
ity of the exchange rate, and are used in conjunction with other indicators to
con￿rm the signals given by the trend indicators or momentum oscillators. The
idea is that di⁄erent signals given by trend or oscillating indicators, or di⁄erent
chart patterns, are con￿rmed if they appear together with certain changes in
traded volume and/or volatility. These indicators are, therefore, mainly used inIntroduction and summary of papers 5
conjunction with the trend and oscillating indicators. They may also be used
together for the purpose of strengthening each others signals.
Fundamental analysis Fundamental analysis focuses exclusively on macro
economic indicators such as interest rates, trade de￿cits, in￿ ation rate, GDP,
unemployment and other macroeconomic variables in predicting the exchange
rate. Accordingly, fundamentalists are traders who predict the exchange rate
and make trading decisions with the help of underlying economic fundamentals
and the use of macroeconomic models (Taylor and Allen [65]).
Flow analysis Flow analysis, i.e., customer orders or order ￿ ows, describe a
trading style in which the trader looks at who is doing what on the market, i.e.,
what orders exist on the market, and their size and source. The idea is that
order ￿ ows contain private information. Identifying who is behind the order,
and which orders contain most information, help traders to decipher underlying
information. Thus, ￿ owtists are traders who base their trading decisions upon
the existing orders in the foreign exchange market (Lyons [44]).
Jobbing Jobbing describes a trading style in which the trader continuously
buys and sells at high frequency in order to make many small pro￿ts. This type
of trading is undertaken under very short time horizons. The strategy may be
described as speculation at a very high frequency (Cheung and Chinn [12]).
2.2 How common is the use of chartism among traders?
There is a possibility that technical analysis is self-eliminating. In order to
check for this Menkho⁄ [46] tested both whether professionals preferring tech-
nical analysis were younger than other traders in the survey, and whether they
failed to reach senior positions as often as other traders. However, he found
no statistical evidence for this. Menkho⁄ [46] also examined whether technical
analysis could be considered an inferior strategy. He did this by testing whether
those professionals who preferred technical analysis worked in smaller institu-
tions and had a lower level of education. He found no evidence to support this
idea.6 Introduction and summary of papers
Further, Menkho⁄ [47] found no di⁄erence in the use of technical analysis
between the three groups; chief foreign exchange dealers, other foreign exchange
dealers and fund managers that deal with foreign exchange. Menkho⁄ [47]
discovered that foreign exchange dealers trade under signi￿cantly shorter time
horizons than fund managers, and that the latter are more inclined to rely
on fundamentals than foreign exchange dealers. Lui and Mole [43] argue that
traders with the largest trading limits consider technical analysis to be less useful
than traders with smaller trading limits, and Cheung and Chinn [12] suggest
that the choice of trading technique is related to the type of business that traders
employ; interbank or customer business. Traders for whom customer business
accounts for a larger share of their foreign exchange transactions, tend to base
their trading on fundamental analysis and customer orders (i.e., order ￿ ows).
Oberlechner￿ s [52] results di⁄er from those of Cheung and Chinn [12] but are in
line with those of Lui and Mole [43]. Thus, Oberlechner [52] does not ￿nd that
the choice of trading technique is related to the type of business that traders
employ; interbank or customer business. His results show, however, that traders
with smaller trading limits are prone to a more chartist approach than traders
with larger trading limits.
In testing the relevance of trading location, Oberlechner [52] compares the
smaller trading locations (i.e., Vienna and Zurich) with larger trading locations
(i.e., Frankfurt and London) and ￿nds that for shorter time horizons, traders
from larger trading centres use a signi￿cantly more fundamental approach than
traders from smaller trading centres.
The general result is that chartism seem widespread among foreign exchange
traders and that the position, age or education of traders does not seem to
in￿ uence the choice to use chartism. In contrast, trading volume, trading limit
and also trading location may be of some importance but the results regarding
these determinants are mixed.
2.3 The time horizon in chartism
Taylor and Allen [65] conducted a questionnaire survey for the Bank of England
in the foreign exchange market in London, in November 1988. This survey wasIntroduction and summary of papers 7
the ￿rst to ask speci￿cally about the use of technical trading among traders.
The results of the survey were striking, with 90 percent of the respondents
reporting using some form of chartist analysis in forming their expectations
about the future exchange rate on time horizons, ranging from an intraday to
a one week horizon. Two percent of the respondents reported that they never
used fundamentals in forming their expectations about the exchange rate, for
any time horizon. 60 percent of the respondents reported chartism to be at least
as important as fundamentals for the time horizon of intraday to one week. For
longer time horizons, the importance of fundamentals became more pronounced.
When it came, for example, to a time horizon of one year or longer, 30 percent
of the respondents relied purely on fundamentals, while 85 percent considered
fundamentals to be more important than chartism.
Menkho⁄ [46] con￿rms the common use of technical analysis for short term
forecasts in the German foreign exchange market in 1992, as do Lui and Mole [43]
for the Hong Kong foreign exchange market in 1995. Oberlechner [52], whose
survey includes the Frankfurt, London, Vienna and Zurich foreign exchange
markets, also con￿rms the use of chartism. He also ￿nds that his sample of
traders consider chartism to be more important at every time horizon than was
the case for the traders in the Taylor and Allen [65] survey. Cheung and Chinn
[12] con￿rm the use of chartism in the U.S. foreign exchange market and point
out that technical trading has become more important over the ￿ve year period
prior to their survey of the U.S. foreign exchange market in 1998.
However, both in the survey by Cheung and Chinn [12] and that by Menkho⁄
[46], the percentage of traders using technical analysis is lower. It seems that,
when other trading strategies are included, such as customer orders (i.e., order
￿ ows) and jobbing, technical trading is given less weight than in surveys where
these trading strategies are not included. In the Cheung and Chinn [12] sur-
vey, for example, the respondents could choose between four di⁄erent strategies
describing their trading techniques; technical analysis, customer order, funda-
mental analysis, and jobbing.
The results of these surveys also indicate that technical trading is not only
used for short term forecasting but also plays a signi￿cant role in the medium,
as well as, in the long-run. In the Oberlechner [52] survey, more than half of8 Introduction and summary of papers
the respondents used a trading pattern where chartism dominates the short
term trading and fundamentals become more pronounced as the time horizon
increases. However, Oberlechner [52] also detected a group of respondents who
constantly used a more chartist approach when trading, regardless of the time
horizon, as well as, a group that actually increased their use of chartism when
their time horizon increased.
The general conclusion is that technical analysis is most important at shorter
time horizons but that it still plays a signi￿cant role when the time horizon
increases.
2.4 Traders beliefs about chartism and the exchange rate
Cheung and Chinn [12] and Cheung and Wong [13] ￿nd that traders believe
technical trading to be a major determining factor of exchange rate variability
up to a time horizon of six months. In the case of time horizons longer than six
months, a small proportion of the respondents still believe that technical trad-
ing is a signi￿cant decision factor. Short term variability in the exchange rate
is not only attributed to technical trading, but also to other non-fundamental
forces like speculation, over-reaction to news and bandwagon e⁄ects. News are
interpreted as innovations in macroeconomic variables. In the medium-run, ex-
change rate movements are believed to depend on economic fundamentals, tech-
nical trading, and speculative forces. In the long-run, most of the respondents
believed that exchange rate variability is determined almost solely by economic
fundamentals.
Lui and Mole [43] examine the importance attached by traders to di⁄erent
types of fundamental factors in￿ uencing the exchange rate. They ￿nd that
interest rates and related factors such as monetary aggregates and bond prices
are considered to be the most important determining factors for the exchange
rate at time horizons of intraday to one month. Whereas for time horizons
above one month, greater importance is attached to balance of payments related
factors. Lui and Mole [43] compare the perceived importance of fundamental
factors with those of di⁄erent technical analysis techniques, and ￿nd that traders
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factors at the intraday time horizon in determining the exchange rate.
It would seem that traders believe that interest rates and technical trad-
ing are important determinants of the exchange rate and its variability in the
short-run, and that technical trading may still be an important determinant of
exchange rate variability in the medium-run. The general belief among traders
about the long-run variability of the exchange rate seems to be that it re￿ ects
fundamental variability. These beliefs coincide well with the reported behav-
ior of traders with regard to their choice of trading technique, i.e., traders use
mainly technical analysis in the short-run and fundamental analysis in the long-
run.
2.5 Chartism and exchange rate expectations
As technical trading is supposed to have a destabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange
rate, some surveys have tried to asses the type of expectations held by chartists.
Three surveys that examine traders￿expectations in a more formal way are
Allen and Taylor [1], Frankel and Froot [26] and Ito [34].
The type of expectations studied in Allen and Taylor [1] and Frankel and
Froot [26] include static, bandwagon, extrapolative, adaptive and regressive




where s is de￿ned as the domestic price of foreign currency and the superscript
e denotes expectations. Bandwagon expectations mean that traders expect that
the exchange rate will continue to move in the same direction as it did in the
prior period, but more strongly, and thus the most recent trend is extracted.
Bandwagon expectations are de￿ned as
￿se
t+1 = ￿￿st;
where ￿ > 1 and ￿se
t+1 = se
t+1 ￿ st and ￿st = st ￿ st￿1. Extrapolative ex-
pectations imply that traders believe that the expected future exchange rate is
the weighted average of the current observed spot rate and the lagged exchange
rate. Extrapolative expectations are de￿ned as10 Introduction and summary of papers
se
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)st + ￿st￿1;
where 0 < ￿ < 1. In the case of adaptive expectations, the expected future
spot exchange rate is formed adaptively by traders as a weighted average of
the current observed spot rate and the lagged expected spot rate. Adaptive
expectations are de￿ned as
se
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)st + ￿se
t;
where 0 < ￿ < 1. Regressive expectations mean that traders expect the ex-
change rate to regress to its long-run equilibrium value. Regressive expectations
are de￿ned as
￿se
t+1 = ￿￿ (st ￿ st);
where ￿ > 0, and s is the long-run equilibrium value of the exchange rate, often
based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Bandwagon expectations are explosive
and have a destabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange rate. Extrapolative, adaptive,
regressive and static expectations are, contrary to bandwagon expectations, non-
explosive.
Allen and Taylor [1] found that chartists in the London foreign exchange
market have a tendency to "underpredict" the exchange rate when the market
is rising and to "overpredict" it when the market is falling. According to the
authors, these results can be interpreted as an average elasticity of expecta-
tions that is less than unity, i.e., that expectations are stabilizing. However,
the tendency to "overpredict" when the market is falling, i.e., to expect a larger
change than the one that occurs, may be interpreted as an indication of band-
wagon expectations. The results of the Allen and Taylor [1] survey also indicate
extrapolative expectations among chartists. Frankel and Froot [26] conclude
that expectations seem to be either adaptive or regressive, and that for longer
horizons (6-12 months), expectations seem to be regressive to a greater extent.
The general result in both Allen and Taylor [1] and Frankel and Froot [26] is
that chartists￿expectations do not seem to overreact systematically to changes
in the exchange rate. However, it is unclear whether traders￿expectations may
be destabilizing in the sense that they cause the exchange rate to move away
from its fundamental value.Introduction and summary of papers 11
While the results of the Frankel and Froot [26] study were based on the
median responses, the study made by Ito [34] was based on individual responses,
which may be more appropriate, since Frankel and Froot [26] also conclude that
expectations appear to be heterogenous. Ito [34] actually tested for individual
e⁄ects. He found expectations to be heterogenous, of bandwagon type in the
short-run, and stabilizing in the long-run.
3 Chartism in theory
This section presents a number of di⁄erent examples of theoretical exchange
rate articles that take chartism into account when modeling the exchange rate.
Here the focus will mainly be on the di⁄erent ways in which chartists and funda-
mentalists are introduced in the di⁄erent exchange rate models. The di⁄erent
areas of exchange rate modeling covered in this short survey are, in Section
3.1, traditional monetary models augmented with heterogeneous expectations
and chartist traders; in Section 3.2, di⁄erently augmented target zone models
developed from the basic Krugman model [37]; and in Section 3.3, models for
sterilized central bank interventions that incorporate chartist trading. Finally,
in Section 3.4, the new Keynesian macroeconomic models with Taylor rules that
incorporate an exchange rate target, are presented.
The literature survey is limited to these areas because the papers in this the-
sis fall within these categories. The following sections will give some background
and hopefully some insight into these four areas of exchange rate theory.
3.1 Chartism in monetary models
Since the early eighties, when Meese and Rogo⁄ [45] showed that exchange rate
dynamics could be as well described by a random walk, as other exchange rate
models, new ideas about exchange rate behavior have been developed. A major
topic has been to develop ideas on how to model the apparent heterogeneity
among traders in the foreign exchange market. Frankel and Froot [27] were ￿rst
to suggest a type of model in which the heterogeneity of market participants is
taken into account according to a chartist-fundamentalist set-up. They use a12 Introduction and summary of papers
￿ exible price monetary model with three actors; chartists, fundamentalists and
portfolio managers. The fundamentalists￿expectations are of the regressive type
(i.e., the exchange rate will regress to its fundamental value) and the chartists￿
expectations are of the random walk type. The fundamentalists￿and chartists￿
views are weighted by portfolio managers, who are the actual traders in this
model, and the weight function evolves according to the previous success of
the chartists￿and fundamentalists￿predictions. A whole literature of chartist-
fundamentalist models has developed in the footsteps of Frankel and Froot [27].
De Grauwe and Dewachter [14] and [15] develop a model similar to that
of Frankel and Froot [27]. Chartists￿and fundamentalists￿views are weighted
endogenously, and the baseline model is the exchange rate overshooting model
developed by Dornbusch [20]. The deviation of the exchange rate from its fun-
damental value determines the weight of chartists and fundamentalists. As in
the Frankel and Froot [27] model, chartists￿expectations are destabilizing be-
cause of the extrapolative nature of their expectations, and fundamentalists￿
expectations are stabilizing because of the regressive nature of their expecta-
tions. When the exchange rate is close to its fundamental value, the weight
of chartists is high, and as the exchange rate deviates from this value, the
weight of fundamentalists increases. De Grauwe and Dewachter [14] and [15]
show, via simulations of their model, that the speculative dynamics added to
the Dornbusch [20] exchange rate overshooting model create chaotic behavior
in the exchange rate.
Levin [40] develops two models in his paper, which are both based on the
Dornbusch [20] overshooting model. In the ￿rst model, there are two types
of asset holders. These are chartists with extrapolative expectations and fun-
damentalists with regressive expectations. The dynamic behavior of the ￿rst
model is that of the Dornbusch [20] model with exchange rate overshooting in
the short-run, due to sticky prices, and convergence in the long-run to a new
equilibrium. The second model, where there is one type of asset holder, who
simultaneously has both chartist and fundamentalist expectations, is not neces-
sarily stable, and gives rise to either a saddle path or an unstable path. In the
case of a saddle path, the dynamics of the exchange rate are the same as in the
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dynamics of the exchange rate give rise to a bubble.
Hommes [31] developed a model called adaptive belief systems (ABS). This is
a standard asset pricing model derived from mean-variance maximizing agents,
extended to incorporate heterogenous beliefs among agents (developed with
Brock in a series of papers: [6], [7], [8], [9]). The ABS is a deterministic,
non-linear system that exhibits chaos. This makes it a suitable tool for exam-
ining ￿nancial markets where asset prices are persistent (have, or are close to
having a unit root), asset returns are unpredictable (with no or little autocor-
relation), trading volume is persistent, and there is positive cross correlation
between volatility and volume. The ABS involves an evolutionary competition
between trading strategies, in Hommes [31] between chartists and fundamental-
ists. The ABS was primarily developed for the stock market, but the results
are easily transferable to the foreign exchange market and show that, in most
cases, fundamentalists fail to drive chartists out of the market.
The set-up of Westerho⁄ [68] is a model with fundamentalists who have re-
gressive expectations, where the perceived fundamental value of the exchange
rate follows a jump process and changes with the arrival of news. Fundamen-
talists can, on average, determine the fundamental value but do make mistakes.
Chartists form their expectations according to a moving average, and a random
component designed to account for other technical trading tools that chartists
may use. The decision of which trading rule to follow depends on the expected
future performance possibilities, and the fundamentalist trading rule becomes
more popular the more the spot rate deviates from its expected future value.
There is, however, a minimum fraction of agents who are always fundamental-
ists. Simulations of the model give rise to bubbles, display unit roots in the
exchange rates, fat tails of returns and volatility clustering, i.e., quite realistic
exchange rate dynamics.
3.2 Chartism in target zone models
Along with the development of the EMS, the EMU and in the aftermath of the
currency crisis in the international ￿nancial markets during the 1990s, questions
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on speculative attacks, central bank interventions and currency crisis where
reinvigorated. For example, the e⁄ectiveness of target zones as a means of
achieving exchange rate stability has become an actively debated issue and
spurred new research within this area of exchange rate modeling.
A target zone implies setting a central parity around which the exchange rate
is allowed to ￿ uctuate within an interval. When the exchange rate approaches
the limits of the interval, the monetary authority intervenes in the domestic
monetary market and prevents the exchange rate from deviating outside the in-
terval. The ERM II (the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary
System) is an example of a broad target zone. Most of the more recent papers
within this area of exchange rate modeling are based on the seminal work of
Krugman [37], which ￿rst circulated in 1988.
Krugman [37] assumes a perfectly credible target zone, defended by authori-
ties with in￿nitesimal interventions at the edges of the zone. The exchange rate
is a function of monetary fundamentals that follow a Wiener process and the
model is de￿ned over fundamentals. The Krugman [37] model may be solved
explicitly. Modelling interventions in this way and assuming perfect credibility,
causes the exchange rate curve to bend at the edges of the zone, so that it forms
a sigmoid shaped curve. The S-shaped curve is ￿ atter than the 45-degree line
(representing the free ￿ oat exchange rate), i.e., the exchange rate in a target
zone is less sensitive to changes in fundamentals than a free ￿ oating exchange
rate. Hence, the target zone has a stabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange rate. A
comparison of the S-shaped curve, representing the target zone exchange rate,
with the linear 45-degree line representing the free-￿ oat exchange rate, demon-
strates what Krugman called the "honeymoon e⁄ect". Although innovative and
highly in￿ uential, Krugman￿ s [37] model has some empirical implications that
have been rejected by data from the ERM, the Bretton Woods system and the
Gold standard, see for example, Flood et al. [25].
The literature following Krugman [37] has tried, in various ways, to develop
this basic model to ￿t data better. Tristani [66] and Werner [67], for example,
include realignment expectations as dependant on the level of the exchange rate
within the zone in their models. This improves the empirical ￿t of the model
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support empirically (Flood et al. [25]). Including realignment expectations as
depending on the level of the exchange rate within the zone, makes the slope of
the exchange rate curve steeper than the 45-degree line, and completely erases
the "honeymoon e⁄ect".
Bertola and Caballero [3] and Bertola and Svensson [4], for example, not
only relax the assumption of a fully credible target zone but also introduce
actual realignments in their models. This also increases the mean reversion
in the exchange rate creating a hump-shaped distribution, which is another
empirical characteristic of a target zone exchange rate. Beetsma and Van Der
Ploeg [5] and Lindberg and S￿derlind [41] introduce intramarginal interventions
by central banks into the Krugman [37] model. Empirical data suggests that
interventions may be both marginal and intramarginal. Because of the increased
mean reversion, intramarginal interventions also create a hump-shaped exchange
rate distribution. Miller and Weller [48] and Neely et al. [51] introduce price
rigidity which also increases mean reversion and causes a hump-shaped exchange
rate distribution.
Dri¢ ll and Sola [21] extend the target zone model by allowing for changes
in the stochastic process driving fundamentals, i.e., monetary policy alternates
between a broad and narrow target zone. Allowing for these policy changes cre-
ates a better empirical ￿t with regard to the exchange rate distribution and the
correlation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate within
the band.
However, these extensions of the Krugman [37] model have continued to
assume homogeneity among traders, although, heterogeneity among traders in
the foreign exchange market has been well established in the surveys conducted
in the foreign exchange market. Heterogeneity among traders has been intro-
duced into target zone models in the form of stop-loss trading by Krugman and
Miller [38] and Kempa and Nelles [36]. There are very few target zone mod-
els that include chartist behavior and most theoretical papers on target zones
have focused on other issues when developing new models. However, Reitz et
al. [56] have a di⁄erent approach and combine target zone type interventions
with an empirical exchange rate model that has a chartist-fundamentalist set-
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(overvalued) currency when the distance between the exchange rate and its fun-
damental value exceeds a critical threshold value" (p 453). The purpose of their
paper is to see whether this type of interventions are e⁄ective in stabilizing the
exchange rate. Through simulations of their model Reitz et al. [56] ￿nd that
these types of interventions have a stabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange rate which
is prolonged by the trade of both chartists and fundamentalists. However, they
do not use a theoretical target zone model of the type described above, and to
our knowledge, there has been no attempt to try and theoretically implement a
chartist-fundamentalist set-up within a target zone model with the purpose of
attaining an explicit solution for the exchange rate.
3.3 Chartism in models of sterilized central bank inter-
ventions
After the break down of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, a period
of ￿ oating exchange rates arose. The question of how to stabilize the exchange
rate without a system of ￿xed exchange rates spurred new research. Speci￿cally,
the question of sterilized central bank interventions as an independent exchange
rate policy tool received much attention.
Sterilized intervention is most easily described as central banks buying (sell-
ing) domestic currency on the foreign exchange market, and at the same time,
making an o⁄setting sell (buy) of domestic currency on the domestic monetary
market, leaving the monetary base unchanged. The two traditional theories that
explain why sterilized interventions have an e⁄ect on the exchange rate level,
although monetary fundamentals remain unchanged, are the signalling theory
and the portfolio balance theory. The signalling hypothesis was ￿rst proposed
by Mussa [49] and, according to this hypothesis, sterilized intervention is a sig-
nal of future monetary policy. Thus, assuming that expectations about the
future spot exchange rate a⁄ect the current spot exchange rate, and that the
market believes in the central bank￿ s intervention signal, sterilized interventions
have an e⁄ect on the spot exchange rate. This is because it alters the foreign
exchange market￿ s expectations about the future spot exchange rate, which
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balance channel suggests that, if foreign and domestic bonds are considered im-
perfect substitutes and that portfolio managers are risk averse and choose their
optimal portfolio according to a mean-variance behavior, sterilized intervention
will a⁄ect the exchange rate when portfolio managers readjust their portfolios
according to changes in the relative supply of foreign and domestic bonds.
The empirical support for the signaling and portfolio balance channels are
mixed. Neither Humpage [32] nor Kaminsky and Lewis [35] ￿nd support for
the signaling channel, and Gosh [30] ￿nds no support for the portfolio balance
channel. However, fairly strong support for the portfolio balance channel has
been presented by Dominguez and Frankel [19], and Evans and Lyons [24] have
found support for a portfolio balance price e⁄ect on the exchange rate market.
They claim that the results are also applicable to sterilized covert central bank
interventions.
Another channel through which sterilized intervention could have an e⁄ect
on the exchange rate has been proposed by Hung [33]; the noise trading chan-
nel, or the chartist channel. Hung [33] concludes that the presence of non-
fundamentalist traders, i.e., noise traders, whose behavior is more or less pre-
dictable constitutes a channel through which sterilized intervention can be ef-
fective. Hung [33] does not formally derive a model for this proposed channel.
Instead Hung [33] argues that, on the basis of noise trader behavior, central
banks can, by means of covert intervention, manage the exchange rate. If the
central bank uses covert sterilized intervention and a "leaning with the wind
strategy" (i.e., buy if the currency is appreciating and sell if the currency is
depreciating), they can cause noise traders to believe in a trendreversal (i.e., to
push the exchange rate just enough to hit a buy or sell signal for noise traders)
and make them act accordingly. The trading behavior that Hung [33] describes
here is consistent with chartists trading rules. Henceforth, this channel will be
referred to as the chartist channel.
Hung [33] tested whether or not sterilized intervention has resulted in in-
creased volatility in the exchange rate, indicating the use of a "leaning with
the wind strategy" and found supportive empirical evidence for this hypothe-
sis during parts of the sample period. Dominguez [18], although not testing
the same hypothesis, also found that covert central bank intervention increased18 Introduction and summary of papers
volatility. These results could also be interpreted as supportive of the chartist
channel. In addition, Dominguez [17] shows that covert sterilized interventions
a⁄ect both the volatility and the level of the exchange rate. This speaks against
the signalling channel and for the chartist channel.
Sarno and Taylor [58] were the ￿rst to suggest a coordination channel. They
suggested that sterilized intervention may be e⁄ective through its role in coor-
dinating fundamentalist traders￿reentrance in the market and correct the ex-
change rate misalignment. However, Sarno and Taylor [58] call their proposed
channel the coordination channel but do not formally derive a model for it. In
testing the e⁄ectiveness of intervention, Reitz and Taylor [55] and Taylor [64]
￿nd supportive evidence for this channel using, in the former case, a Markow-
switching model, and in the latter, a non-linear microstructural analysis in the
form of a STAR GARCH model for the real exchange rate.
There are a few papers that adopt a chartist-fundamentalist set-up in model-
ing central bank interventions. However, they rely more on a type of fundamen-
talist channel than on the chartist channel proposed by Hung [33] or the coor-
dination channel proposed by Sarno and Taylor [58]. De Grauwe and Grimaldi
[16] derive a chartist-fundamentalist model where the sterilized central bank
intervention strategy is known to the market and implemented by fundamen-
talists in their trading strategy. When fundamentalists implement central bank
behavior, they increase the mean reversion in the exchange rate and thereby
cause chartist trading strategies to become less pro￿table. The weight between
chartists and fundamentalists depends on the pro￿tability in trading strategies
and, hence, the weight of chartists will decrease with intervention. In this way,
intervention becomes e⁄ective in reducing misalignments and decreasing volatil-
ity, as it is conducted according to a "leaning against the wind" strategy (i.e.,
to sell (buy) if the currency is appreciating (depreciating)). Kubelec [39] uses
a similar model to that of De Grauwe and Grimaldi [16] where central bank
interventions are sterilized and follows a "leaning against the wind" strategy.
However, Kubelec [39] uses of the evolutionary ￿tness measure, developed by
Brock and Hommes ([6], [7], [8], [9]) based on the pro￿tability of the di⁄erent
trading strategies for determining the weight between chartists and fundamen-
talists. Thus, in both of these papers, the central bank does not explicitly tryIntroduction and summary of papers 19
to exploit chartists, instead their intervention strategies lessen the pro￿tability
of chartist trading strategies and, hence, drive chartists out of the market.
Schmidt and Wollmersh￿user [59] also model sterilized interventions in a set-
ting with both chartists and fundamentalists. In their model, the weight between
chartists and fundamentalists is ￿xed and divided equally. They assume that
the central bank tries to exploit chartists through covert intervention. They test
di⁄erent strategies that the central bank can use for their interventions. These
strategies are: a targeting strategy, a trend reverting strategy, and a smoothing
strategy. The targeting strategy involves intervening when the exchange rate
deviates from its fundamental value, the trend reverting strategy uses a moving
average rule which means to sell (buy) when the exchange rate is above (below)
the moving average. The smoothing strategy involves going against the wind
on an everyday basis. The moving average strategy proves to be most e⁄ective
followed by the targeting strategy. Schmidt and Wollmersh￿user [59] ￿nd that
their results support the existence of a chartist channel.
3.4 Chartism in new Keynesian models with Taylor rules
During the last two decades, a new paradigm in monetary policy has evolved.
This concerns independent central banks, openness and in￿ ation rate targeting.
In other words, monetary policy is conducted by the central bank, without
political in￿ uence, with the purpose of creating price-stability and credibility in
order to avoid the time inconsistency problem. Monetary policy is conducted
through interest rate management with an explicit target for the in￿ ation rate.
The success of this type of monetary policy rule hinges on the central bank￿ s
ability to shape market expectations of future interest rates, in￿ ation rates and
income levels. It is, therefore, important for the central bank to commit to the
rule, to be as transparent as possible in its decision making, and to make the
right policy decisions as often as possible.
This practise is nowadays well established among central banks of the in-
dustrialized countries and the literature within this area is ￿ ourishing. Much of
the literature regarding interest rate targeting has been in￿ uenced by the work
of Taylor [61]. In 1993, John B. Taylor [61] suggested that the monetary policy20 Introduction and summary of papers
of the Federal Reserve could be described by a fairly simple interest rate rule,
where the central bank sets the interest rate in response to changes in in￿ a-
tion and the output gap (i.e., the di⁄erence between actual GDP and potential
GDP). This rule has been the center of attention within the monetary policy
literature since it was presented and is often referred to as a Taylor rule. Since
Taylor presented this rule as descriptive of how the Federal Reserve conducts
monetary policy, a literature has evolved regarding whether or not this type of
interest rate rule, which does not incorporate a target path for the monetary
aggregates, can control the price level and create price-stability.
It is well-known that models in economics and ￿nance, in which agents have
rational expectations regarding some of the variables in the model, may exhibit
a multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria (REE). This is problematic.
For instance, without imposing additional restrictions into such a model, it can
not be known in advance whether agents will coordinate on an REE and, if
so, which REE they will coordinate on. One way to reduce the number of
equilibria attainable, is to focus on those REE that are possible results of an
adaptive learning process for the agents.
The assumption of rational expectations among agents in an economy has
long been criticized for being too strong. Rational expectations imply that
agents often have an outstanding capacity when it comes to deriving equilib-
rium outcomes of variables in a model. This assumption has, therefore, in the
more recent literature, been complemented by an analysis of the possible con-
vergence to REE. For example, Evans and Honkapohja [22] suggest that market
participants learn a model by continuously updating their expectations about
the future. It can be assumed that the agents￿expectations are formed by a cor-
rectly speci￿ed model, i.e., a model that corresponds to the REE, but without
having perfect knowledge about the parameters in the model. Using past and
current values of the variables in the model, the parameters are learned over
time since the beliefs are revised as new information is gained, according to a
recursive least squares technique.
Recursive learning have been introduced, for example, by Bullard and Mitra
[10] in the context of a new Keynesian model with Taylor rules. The model used
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from an optimizing micro framework by Rotemberg and Woodford [57]. Bullard
and Mitra [10] ￿nd that when the monetary authority uses a Taylor rule that
includes contemporaneous data for the output gap and in￿ ation rate, there are
parameter regions that give rise to a unique stable REE that is characterized
by recursive least squares learnability. Moreover, the same result holds when
the monetary policy rule reacts to contemporaneous expectations for the output
gap and in￿ ation rate. However, the same desirable properties do not hold for
Taylor rules based on lagged data or on forward looking expectations for the
output gap and in￿ ation rate. Evans and McGough [23] investigate which types
of Taylor rules, generating stable sunspot equilibria (i.e., an equilibrium that
depends on an intrinsic random variable or sunspots that matters only because
the market believes so), are learnable. Like Bullard and Mitra [10], they ￿nd
that Taylor rules based on forward looking variables may well generate sunspot
equilibria.
Gal￿ and Monacelli [29] provide an optimizing framework for the same type of
model but for a small open economy and without including learning. However,
the Taylor rule in Gal￿ and Monacelli [29] does not include an exchange rate
variable. Taylor [63] points out that it is likely that current models understates
the exchange rate e⁄ects in small open economies, and in Taylor [62] he ￿nds
that monetary policy rules that react directly to the exchange rate work better
for a few countries in Europe than policy rules that react indirectly. Ball [2]
and Svensson [60] also investigate the e⁄ects of including the exchange rate in
the Taylor rule. The general suggestion from these papers is that there might
be a small improvement from including the exchange rate.
Bullard and Schaling [11] derive the conditions under which a worldwide
equilibrium in a two country model is determinate and learnable with the use
of Taylor rules. One of the conclusions is that when monetary authorities re-
spond to international variables (including the foreign output gap and the real
exchange rate) in the Taylor rule, determinacy and learnability conditions for
worldwide equilibrium are met.
However, none of these papers include heterogeneous expectations among
traders in the foreign exchange market, and thus, do not take chartist trading
into account. Nor do they combine the search for Taylor rules that are associ-22 Introduction and summary of papers
ated with a unique and adaptively learnable equilibrium, as well as a desirable
equilibrium evaluated with a loss function for the monetary authority.
4 Summary of papers
Paper [1].
Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
This paper introduces a chartist-fundamentalist set-up in a sticy-price mone-
tary based exchange rate model, due originally to Dornbusch [20]. As in Frankel
and Froot [27] portfolio managers are the actual traders in this paper. Portfolio
managers use both chartist and fundamentalist trading techniques. The weight
between chartists and fundamentalists depends on the traders￿time horizon
which is largely supported by the empirical surveys presented in this introduc-
tion. For shorter time horizons, more weight is placed on technical analysis,
while in the case of longer time horizons, more weight is placed on fundamental
analysis. Chartists use a moving average technique in forming their expecta-
tions and fundamentalists have regressive expectations where the fundamental
value of the exchange rate is the PPP value of the exchange rate.
The time horizon is determined endogenously in the model and thus, the
portfolio managers choose to use chartism as well as fundamentalism. Note
that fundamentalists do not have rational expectations and that only in the
long-run do their expectations conform to rational expectations.
It is demonstrated that the exchange rate ￿overshoots the overshooting equi-
librium￿when chartists are introduced into a sticky-price monetary model. The
￿overshooting equilibrium￿refers, of course, to Dornbusch [20]. The exchange
rate￿ s perfect foresight path near long-run equilibrium is derived. It is also
demonstrated that the shorter the time horizon is, the larger the magnitude
of exchange rate overshooting. Finally, the e⁄ects on the exchange rate￿ s time
path of changes in the model￿ s structural parameters are derived. The extent
of the exchange rate overshooting, given perfect foresight, is smaller the more
￿ exible the price of goods. With regard to changes in the other structural para-
meters in the model, the e⁄ect on the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting
is ambiguous.Introduction and summary of papers 23
Paper [2].
Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
This paper develops a target zone model that follows the Krugman [37]
approach, but introduces heterogeneity in the market in the form of two di⁄erent
types of traders, chartists and fundamentalists. Empirical surveys have revealed
the vast use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market, and that the
relative importance of technical and fundamental analysis depends on the time
horizon in currency trade. This is implemented in the model. The weight of
chartists and fundamentalists is determined by the length of the time horizon
in currency trade (i.e., the length of time that traders intend to trade). The
Krugman [37] model is also augmented with realignment expectations where
these depend on the weight of chartists in the market. When the time horizon
in trade is in￿nitely long, i.e., when the weight of chartists is zero, the model
is equivalent to the Krugman [37] model. Thus, the augmented model will nest
that of Krugman [37].
The introduction of both chartist and fundamentalist traders in the Krug-
man [37] model does create a better empirical ￿t with regard to the empirically
observed correlation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate,
the exchange rate volatility and the expectations of realignments. However, due
to the use of in￿nitesimal marginal interventions in the model, the relation-
ship between the exchange rate and fundamentals is still, even with the market
completely dominated by chartists, somewhat S-shaped and the exchange rate
distribution is still strongly U-shaped. The "honeymoon e⁄ect" does not com-
pletely disappear in the model when the market is completely dominated by
chartists, but it is diminished for larger deviations of the fundamentals and has
a reversed e⁄ect for fundamentals equal to central parity.
The paper also contains an attempt to produce a more explicit and re￿ned
mathematical derivation of the solution for the exchange rate path within the
target zone than the one o⁄ered by Krugman [37]. In particular, the mathe-
matical derivations of the solution for the model suggest another notation for
the expected depreciation of the exchange rate than the one commonly used in
the literature on this subject. The typical interpretation of this term as the ex-
pected depreciation the exchange rate may also be misleading. It should instead24 Introduction and summary of papers
be interpreted as a "deterministic measure of the expected depreciation of the
exchange rate".
Paper [3].
Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
This paper develops a theoretical model for central bank intervention in
which it is possible to explicitly derive the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of inter-
ventions on the current exchange rate in the case of both homogeneous and
heterogeneous expectations (i.e., without and with chartists), and to compare
the e⁄ects of intervention on the current exchange rate in the di⁄erent cases.
The heterogeneous expectations model takes a portfolio balance framework ap-
proach and incorporates a chartist channel into a monetary model for the foreign
exchange market. The portfolio balance approach is, in this context, necessary
to theoretically derive any e⁄ects of sterilized intervention through a chartist
channel.
Traders in the benchmark model have rational expectations, whereas in the
heterogeneous expectations model, they are based on fundamental and techni-
cal analysis. Using a chartist-fundamentalist set-up, the e⁄ects on the current
exchange rate of central bank intervention are derived. Fundamentalists have
rational expectations and chartists use a technical trading strategy which in-
volves the use of so-called support and resistance levels for the exchange rate.
The chartists￿trading technique results in them having two di⁄erent types of
expectations; bandwagon and regressive expectations. These give rise to a vari-
ety of e⁄ects on the current exchange rate when the central bank intervenes in
the foreign exchange market. Chartists may enhance or suppress the e⁄ects of
intervention depending on their expectations.
The results indicate that there is a chartist channel which central banks may
be able to exploit when intervening in the foreign exchange market. However,
the stability restrictions on the model, in the heterogeneous expectations case,
dampen the e⁄ect of chartists. Although they may indeed enhance or suppress
the e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the current exchange rate, they cannot
reverse the e⁄ect of intervention. The e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the cur-
rent exchange rate may be greater in the heterogeneous expectations model thanIntroduction and summary of papers 25
in the benchmark model when chartists act to reinforce the e⁄ect of interven-
tion, i.e., when chartists have bandwagon expectations. The e⁄ect of sterilized
intervention on the current exchange rate may also be less in the heterogeneous
expectations model than in the benchmark model when chartists act to oppose
intervention, i.e., when chartists have regressive expectations.
Paper [4].
Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy with Heterogeneous Ex-
pectations
The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which monetary policy is
a⁄ected when currency trade is partly driven by technical trading. Speci￿cally,
we augment the small open economy model in Gal￿ and Monacelli [29] with
technical trading in the form of extrapolation of trends, where the determinacy
and learnability of the rational expectations equilibriums are in focus. In the
present paper, we assume that expectations are formed by a correctly speci￿ed
model, i.e., a model that nests the REE, but without perfect knowledge about
the parameter values in the model. However, by using past and current values
of all variables in the model, the parameter values are learned over time. This
is because the beliefs are revised as new information is gained.
We use the analysis in Bullard and Mitra [10] as our benchmark and investi-
gate whether the results in their paper still hold in our augmented model. The
monetary authority uses a Taylor rule when setting the nominal interest rate,
and we investigate the properties of the model developed numerically. Speci￿-
cally, we investigate whether there is a unique REE in the augmented Gal￿ and
Monacelli model [29]. We also investigate whether the unique REE is adaptively
learnable in a recursive least squares sense, and ￿nally whether it is desirable
in the sense that a low and not too variable CPI in￿ ation rate is achieved.
Since the model developed in this paper is too complicated for theoretical
policy analysis, we provide a numerical illustration of our ￿ndings and contrary
to what Taylor [63] claims, we ￿nd an interest rate rule with desirable properties
that includes the change in an exchange rate index. Moreover, this rule does
not include the output gap, which might be an advantage as it comes closer
to the reality of central banking. Thus, the value of the currency is a better26 Introduction and summary of papers
response variable than the output gap in the most desirable parametrization of
the interest rate rule.
To ￿nd a robust Taylor rule, we would like the rule to be relatively indepen-
dent of the proportion of technical trading in the foreign exchange market as the
extent to which technical trading is used at each moment in time is not obvious
even though questionnaire surveys reveal that it is extensively used in the for-
eign exchange market. We conclude that in order to have a rule that is robust
with respect to the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange market
the, monetary authority should increase (decrease) the interest rate when the
CPI in￿ ation rate increases (decreases) and when the currency gets stronger
(weaker).Introduction and summary of papers 27
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Abstract
It is demonstrated in this paper that the exchange rate ￿overshoots the
overshooting equilibrium￿ when chartists are introduced into a sticky-
price monetary model due originally to Dornbusch [5]. Chartists are in-
troduced since questionnaire surveys reveal that currency trade to a large
extent is based on technical trading, where moving averages is the most
commonly used technique. Moreover, the surveys also reveal that the
importance of technical trading depends inversely on the time horizon in
currency trade. Implementing these observations theoretically, and deriv-
ing the exchange rate￿ s perfect foresight path near long-run equilibrium,
it is also demonstrated in this paper that the shorter the time horizon is,
the larger the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting. Finally, the ef-
fects on the exchange rate￿ s time path of changes in the model￿ s structural
parameters are derived.
JEL codes: F31; F41.
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1 Introduction
Should foreign exchange models focus on observed behavior of exchange rates,
or should the focus be on observed behavior of currency traders? Since a main
purpose of economic theory is to develop models that can explain observed
regularities, there is an obvious advantage of the ￿rst point of departure. Nev-
ertheless, in order to develop an economic theory of exchange rate movements,
one cannot disregard the behavior of those who actually trade in the foreign
exchange market. Modeling observed behavior of foreign exchange traders is,
however, not su¢ cient in order to obtain an economic theory since one must
also explain why traders act as they do. The level of ambition in the present
paper is to take a ￿rst step towards developing an economic theory of exchange
rate movements by taking into account observed behavior of currency traders.
In November 1988, Taylor and Allen [14] conducted a questionnaire survey
for the Bank of England on the foreign exchange market in London. The survey
covered 353 banks and ￿nancial institutions, with a response rate of over 60
per cent, and was among the ￿rst to ask speci￿cally about the use of techni-
cal analysis, or chartism, among currency traders. The results of the survey
were striking, with two per cent of the respondents reported never to use funda-
mental analysis in forming their exchange rate expectations, while 90 per cent
reported placing some weight on technical analysis at the intraday to one week
horizon. At longer time horizons, however, Taylor and Allen [14] found that
the importance of technical analysis became less pronounced. For a theoretical
description of technical trading techniques used in the foreign exchange market,
the reader can turn to Neely [11].
That technical analysis is extensively used in currency trade has also been
con￿rmed by Menkho⁄ [10], who conducted a survey in August 1992 on the
German market, by Lui and Mole [9], who conducted a survey in February 1995
on the Hong Kong market, by Oberlechner [12], who conducted a survey in the
spring 1996 on the markets in Frankfurt, London, Vienna and Zurich, and, as
a ￿nal example, by Cheung and Chinn [1], who conducted a survey between
October 1996 and November 1997 on the U.S. market. A general observation
in these surveys is that a skew towards reliance on technical, as opposed to fun-2 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
damental, analysis at shorter time horizons was found, which became gradually
reversed as the length of the time horizon considered was increased. See also
Oberlechner [13], who explores the psychology of the currency market from a
variety of perspectives. Oberlechner [13] is based on surveys conducted in the
European and in the North American markets.
Frankel and Froot [6] were the ￿rst to use a chartist-fundamentalist setup in
a foreign exchange model, where the heterogeneous behavior of currency traders
was taken into account. In their model, a bubble in the exchange rate takes o⁄
and collapses since the portfolio managers1 learn more slowly about the model
than they are changing it by revising the weights given to the chartists￿and
fundamentalists￿exchange rate expectations. A chartist-fundamentalist model
is also developed by De Grauwe and Dewachter [3], where the weights given to
the chartists￿and fundamentalists￿expectations depend on the deviation of the
exchange rate from its fundamental value. Speci￿cally, more (less) weight is
given to the chartists￿expectations when the exchange rate is close to (far away
from) its fundamental value. Related references are De Grauwe and Dewachter
[2], and De Grauwe et al. [4], where a factor in common in all these references
is a chaotic behavior of the exchange rate. See also Hommes [8], a chapter
in a forthcoming volume in the Handbook of Computational Economics, for an
excellent survey of the literature on heterogeneous agent models in economics
and ￿nance.
The speci￿c purpose of this paper is to implement theoretically, the afore-
mentioned observation that the relative importance of technical versus funda-
mental analysis in the foreign exchange market depends on the time horizon in
currency trade. For shorter time horizons, more weight is placed on technical
analysis, while more weight is placed on fundamental analysis for longer time
horizons. In the model developed, technical analysis is based on moving av-
erages since it is the most commonly used technique among currency traders
using chartism (e.g., Taylor and Allen [14], and Lui and Mole [9]). Further, fun-
damental analysis is based on a sticky-price monetary foreign exchange model
1 Without a⁄ecting the theoretical results in this paper, we assume that it is the chartists and
fundamentalists, and not the portfolio managers, who trade in currencies. Therefore, we leave
the portfolio managers out of account in the model.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 3
due originally to Dornbusch [5].
The main questions in focus are: how is the dynamics of the exchange rate af-
fected when technical analysis is introduced into a sticky-price monetary model?
Speci￿cally, will the exchange rate ￿overshoot the overshooting equilibrium￿ ?
This phrase was coined by Frankel and Froot [7] when discussing possible expla-
nations to the dramatic appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the mid-1980￿ s. The
￿overshooting equilibrium￿ refers, of course, to Dornbusch [5]. Further, how
is the time horizon and the overshooting e⁄ect a⁄ected when market expecta-
tions are characterized by perfect foresight, where market expectations are the
weighted average of the chartists￿and fundamentalists￿expectations2? It should
be emphasized that perfect foresight is assumed in the derivations throughout
the whole paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The benchmark model
and the expectations formations are presented in Section 2. The formal analysis
of the model is carried out in Section 3, and Section 4 contains a short concluding
discussion of the main results in this paper.
2 Theoretical framework
The benchmark model is presented in Section 2.1, and the expectations forma-
tions are formulated and discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Benchmark model
Basically, the model is a two-country model with a money market equilibrium
condition, an international asset market equilibrium condition, a price adjust-
ment mechanism since goods prices are assumed to be sticky, and market ex-
pectations that are formed by the relative weights given to the chartists￿and
fundamentalists￿exchange rate expectations. The formal structure of the model
is presented below, where Greek letters denote positive structural parameters.
The money market is in equilibrium when
2 That is, in a model with portfolio managers, like in Frankel and Froot [6], market expectations
coincide with the portfolio managers￿expectations. See also footnote 1.4 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
m[t] ￿ p[t] = y ￿ ￿i[t]; (1)
where m, p, y and i are (the logarithm of) the relative money supply3, (the
logarithm of) the relative price level, (the logarithm of) the relative real in-
come, and the relative nominal interest rate, respectively. Moreover, m and y
are exogenously given4. Thus, according to (1), real money demand depends
positively on real domestic income and negatively on nominal domestic interest
rate. The money market is assumed to be permanently in equilibrium, i.e., dis-
turbances are immediately intercepted by a perfectly ￿ exible domestic interest
rate.
The international asset market is in equilibrium when
i[t] = se [t + 1] ￿ s[t]; (2)
where s is (the logarithm of) the spot exchange rate, which is de￿ned as the
domestic price of the foreign currency. Moreover, the superscript e denotes
expectations. The equilibrium condition in (2), also known as uncovered in-
terest rate parity, is based on the assumption that domestic and foreign assets
are perfect substitutes, which only can be the case if there is perfect capital
mobility. Since the latter is assumed, only the slightest di⁄erence in expected
yields would draw the entire capital into the asset that o⁄ers the highest ex-
pected yield. Thus, the international asset market can only be in equilibrium if
domestic and foreign assets o⁄er the same expected yield. According to (2), a
positive (negative) relative nominal interest rate means that the exchange rate
is expected to depreciate (appreciate). The equilibrium condition is maintained
by the assumption of a perfectly ￿ exible exchange rate.
The price adjustment mechanism is
p[t + 1] ￿ p[t] = ￿ (s[t] ￿ p[t]); (3)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and s ￿ p is (the logarithm of) the real spot exchange rate.
According to (3), goods prices are assumed to be sticky. Thus, goods prices
3 That is, the di⁄erence between the domestic and foreign money supplies. The other macro-
economic variables in the model are de￿ned in a similar way.
4 In the simulations of the model in Section 3.5, m will follow a stochastic process.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 5
respond to market disequilibria, but not fast enough to eliminate the disequi-
libria instantly. Two extremes are obtained by setting ￿ = 0, which is the case
of completely rigid goods prices, and by setting ￿ = 1, which is the case of
perfectly ￿ exible goods prices.
2.2 Expectations formations
According to questionnaire surveys (see cited references in Section 1), the rela-
tive importance of technical versus fundamental analysis in the foreign exchange
market depends on the time horizon in currency trade. For shorter time hori-
zons, more weight is placed on technical analysis, while more weight is placed
on fundamental analysis for longer time horizons. In the present paper, we
formulate this observation as
se [t + 1] = ! (￿)se
f [t + 1] + (1 ￿ ! (￿))se
c [t + 1]; (4)
where se, se
f and se
c denote market expectations and expectations formed by
fundamental analysis and chartism, respectively. Moreover, ! (￿) is a weight
function that depends on the time horizon, ￿
! (￿) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿): (5)
The speci￿c choice of functional form of the weight function in (5) is made to
simplify the formal analysis of the model. Of course, other functions may be
used as long as ! (0) = 0 and lim￿!1 ! (￿) = 1.
Technical analysis, or chartism, utilizes past exchange rates in order to detect
patterns that are extrapolated into the future. Focusing on past exchange rates
is not considered as a shortcoming for currency traders using this technique
since a primary assumption behind chartism is that all relevant information
about future exchange rate movements is contained in past movements. Fur-
ther, fundamental analysis is based on a model that consists of macroeconomic
fundamentals only, which in the present paper is a sticky-price monetary foreign
exchange model due originally to Dornbusch [5] (see the benchmark model in
Section 2.1).6 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
The most commonly used technique among currency traders using chartism
is the moving average model (e.g., Taylor and Allen [14], and Lui and Mole [9]).
According to this model, buying and selling signals are generated by two moving
averages; a short-period moving average and a long-period moving average,
where a buy (sell) signal is generated when the short-period moving average
rises above (falls below) the long-period moving average. In its simplest form,
the short-period moving average is the current exchange rate and the long-period
moving average is an exponential moving average of past exchange rates.
Thus, when chartism is used, it is expected that the exchange rate will in-
crease (decrease) when the current exchange rate is above (below) an exponential
moving average of past exchange rates
se
c [t + 1] = s[t] + ￿ (s[t] ￿ MA[t]); (6)
where MA is an exponential moving average of past exchange rates, i.e., the
long-period moving average. Moreover, the long-period moving average can be
written as
MA[t] = (1 ￿ exp(￿￿))
1 X
k=0
exp(￿k￿)s[t ￿ k]; (7)








Finally, when fundamental analysis is used, it is expected that the exchange
rate will adjust to its fundamental value according to a regressive adjustment
scheme
se
f [t + 1] = s[t] + ￿ (s ￿ s[t]); (9)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and s is (the logarithm of) the spot exchange rate in long-run
equilibrium, i.e., the exchange rate￿ s fundamental value. Note that when ￿ = 1,
it is expected that the exchange rate will be in long-run equilibrium the next
time period.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 7
3 Formal analysis of the model
The long-run e⁄ects in the model are derived in Section 3.1. Thereafter, in
Section 3.2, the exchange rate overshooting phenomenon is investigated. Specif-
ically, we will examine whether the exchange rate ￿overshoot the overshooting
equilibrium￿ , i.e., if the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting in the present
model is larger than in the Dornbusch [5] model? The adjustment path to
long-run equilibrium, when market expectations are characterized by perfect
foresight, is derived in Section 3.3, and the perfect foresight time horizon and
the perfect foresight overshooting e⁄ect are scrutinized in Section 3.4.
It should again be emphasized that all results in Sections 3.2-3.5 also holds
for the perfect foresight time horizon, ￿ = ￿pf, even if it is only in Section 3.4
that it is highlighted in the notations. The reason for the latter is that the time
horizon￿ s dependence on the model￿ s structural parameters is in focus in Section
3.4.
Since the long-period moving average in (7)-(8) is a function of all past
exchange rates, the model is not easy to analyze formally. But by assuming
that the economy has, for a long time, been in long-run equilibrium before a
monetary disturbance occurs, the moving average in (7)-(8) is (approximately)
equal to the long-run equilibrium exchange rate








The assumption in (10) simplify the analysis considerably, but will be relaxed in
Section 3.5, where a small simulation study is accomplished in order to illustrate
the behavior of the model.
3.1 Long-run equilibrium
Since it is assumed in this section that the exchange rate is in long-run equilibrium,
s[t] = s: (11)8 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
Substituting (10) (assuming equality in the equation) and (11) into the expec-
tations formation in (6), the expectations formed by technical analysis become
se
c [t + 1] = s + ￿ (s ￿ s) = s; (12)
i.e., it is expected that the exchange rate is in long-run equilibrium. Moreover,
substituting (11) into the expectations formation in (9), the expectations formed
by fundamental analysis become
se
f [t + 1] = s + ￿ (s ￿ s) = s; (13)
i.e., it is expected that the exchange rate is in long-run equilibrium. Then,
substitute the expectations formations in (12)-(13) into market expectations in
(4)
se [t + 1] = ! (￿)s + (1 ￿ ! (￿))s = s; (14)
i.e., the market expects that the exchange rate is in long-run equilibrium. Recall
that the results in (12)-(14) are based on the assumption that the economy has,
for a long time, been in long-run equilibrium before a monetary disturbance
occurs.
(The logarithm of) the relative price level5 in long-run equilibrium, p, can be
solved for by using the equations that describe the money and the international
asset markets in equilibrium, i.e., (1)-(2)
p = m[t] ￿ y; (15)
since, according to (11) and (14),
s[t] = se [t + 1] = s: (16)





5 Henceforth, it will not be emphasized that a macroeconomic variable is expressing the di⁄er-
ence between, for example, the domestic and foreign price levels.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 9
Moreover, since (16) as well as
p[t] = p[t + 1] = p; (18)
hold in long-run equilibrium, the price adjustment mechanism in (3) reduces to
s = p: (19)




Finally, the quantity theory of money and purchasing power parity, i.e., (17)










which is the long-run e⁄ect on the exchange rate of a change in money supply.
It should be stressed that the quantity theory of money and purchasing power
parity results are dependent on the simplifying assumption that the economy
has, for a long time, been in long-run equilibrium before a monetary disturbance
occurs6. But even if the quantity theory of money and purchasing power parity
hold in the long-run, given this simplifying assumption, there are short-run
deviations from these one-to-one relationships. This is demonstrated in the
next section on exchange rate overshooting.
3.2 Exchange rate overshooting
Using (10) (assuming equality in the equation) in the expectations formation in
(6), and substituting the resulting equation as well as the expectations formation
in (9) into market expectations in (4), we have that
se [t + 1] = ! (￿)(s[t] + ￿ (s ￿ s[t])) + (22)
(1 ￿ ! (￿))(s[t] + ￿ (s[t] ￿ s))
= s[t] + ￿ (s[t] ￿ s) + ! (￿)(￿ + ￿)(s ￿ s[t]):
6 This is because, in general, se
c [t + 1] 6= s when s[t] = s. To see this, substitute (11) into (6).10 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
Then, combine the equations that describe the money and the international
asset markets in equilibrium, i.e., (1)-(2), and substitute market expectations
in (22) into the resulting equation
m[t] ￿ p[t] = y ￿ ￿
 
s[t] + ￿ (s[t] ￿ s)+
! (￿)(￿ + ￿)(s ￿ s[t]) ￿ s[t]
!
(23)
= y ￿ ￿(￿ (s[t] ￿ s) + ! (￿)(￿ + ￿)(s ￿ s[t])):
Di⁄erentiating (23) with respect to m[t], s[t] and s gives
dm[t] = ￿￿(￿ (ds[t] ￿ ds) + ! (￿)(￿ + ￿)(ds ￿ ds[t])); (24)








￿(! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿)
= 1 + o(￿): (25)
The current price level is held constant when deriving (25) since it is assumed to
be sticky. Thus, (25) is the short-run e⁄ect on the exchange rate, near long-run
equilibrium, of a change in money supply. A sticky price level also means that
the quantity theory of money, i.e., (17), does not hold in the short-run since
the price level is not a⁄ected by a monetary disturbance. Moreover, purchasing
power parity, i.e., (20), does not either hold in the short-run since the exchange
rate is a⁄ected by a monetary disturbance while the price level is not.
In order to have exchange rate overshooting, it must be true that
o(￿) =
1
￿(! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿)
> 0; (26)








where the weight function in (5) is utilized in the derivation. Thus, in the
short-run, before goods prices have time to react, the exchange rate will rise
(fall) more than money supply, and, consequently, more than is necessary to
bring the exchange rate to long-run equilibrium. It will turn out in the nextHeterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 11
two sections that (27) is also the stability condition for the model when it is
assumed that market expectations are characterized by perfect foresight.
By letting ￿ ! 1 in (25), an equation describing exchange rate overshooting











(28) corresponds to Dornbusch [5] since, by letting ￿ ! 1 in (4)-(5), market
expectations coincide with the expectations formed by fundamental analysis. In
this case, the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting depends on the nominal
interest rate response of real money demand (￿), and the expected adjustment
speed of the exchange rate according to fundamental analysis (￿).
Moreover, the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting depends inversely











￿2 (! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ exp(￿￿) ￿ 0; (29)
i.e., for shorter time horizons, more weight is placed on technical analysis, and
since technical analysis is a destabilizing force7 in the foreign exchange market,
the extent of exchange rate overshooting depends inversely on the time horizon.
This also means that the magnitude of overshooting is even larger in this model











i.e., the exchange rate ￿overshoots the overshooting equilibrium￿ .
Finally, the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting depends on the struc-
tural parameters ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿ in the following way8
7 Technical analysis is a destabilizing force since chartists expect that the exchange rate will
diverge from long-run equilibrium. To see this, substitute (10) into (6).
8 The time horizon in currency trade (￿) is given below in (31)-(34), but is endogenously deter-
mined when market expectations are characterized by perfect foresight. See the corresponding








! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿
￿2 (! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿)
2 < 0; (31)















￿(! (￿) ￿ 1)
￿2 (! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿)










￿2 (! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ 0: (34)
Thus, the extent of exchange rate overshooting is larger, the less sensitive real
money demand is to changes in the nominal interest rate (￿), the faster the
expected adjustment speed of the exchange rate is according to technical analy-
sis (￿), and the slower the expected adjustment speed of the exchange rate is
according to fundamental analysis (￿). The magnitude of exchange rate over-
shooting is not a⁄ected by changes in the degree of stickiness of goods prices
(￿).
3.3 Adjustment path to long-run equilibrium
To see how the exchange rate and the price level adjust to long-run equilibrium
after a monetary disturbance, it is necessary to incorporate the price adjustment
mechanism in (3). In order to do this, start with de￿ning the expected change
of the exchange rate as
￿es[t] ￿ se [t + 1] ￿ s[t]; (35)
and, then, substitute market expectations in (22) into the de￿nition in (35)
￿es[t] = ￿ (s[t] ￿ s) + ! (￿)(￿ + ￿)(s ￿ s[t]) (36)
= (￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))(s[t] ￿ s):
(36) means that the market expect that the exchange rate will adjust to long-run
equilibrium, ifHeterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 13
￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿) < 0; (37)
which reduces to (27), i.e., if it is expected that the exchange rate will adjust
to long-run equilibrium after a change in money supply, the exchange rate will
also overshoot its long-run equilibrium level in the short-run.
Then, combine the equations that describe the money and the international
asset markets in equilibrium, i.e., (1)-(2), and use the de￿nition in (35)
m[t] ￿ p[t] = y ￿ ￿￿es[t]: (38)





or, if (36) is substituted into (39),
s[t] = s +
p[t] ￿ p
￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))
: (40)
By using the relationship between the exchange rate and the price level in (40),
its long-run counterpart in (19), and the price adjustment mechanism in (3), we
can derive an equation that describes the adjustment path for the price level to
long-run equilibrium.
In order to do this, start with de￿ning the change of the price level as
￿p[t] ￿ p[t + 1] ￿ p[t]; (41)
and, then, substitute the de￿nition in (41) into the price adjustment mechanism
in (3)
￿p[t] = ￿ (s[t] ￿ p[t]): (42)
Thereafter, substitute the relationship between the exchange rate and the price




￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))
￿ ￿
￿
(p[t] ￿ p): (43)14 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
(43) means that the price level will adjust to long-run equilibrium, if
￿
￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))













where the weight function in (5) is utilized in the derivation. The second equa-
tion in (45) is the same as (27). Moreover, the ￿rst equation in (45) implies
that the market does not expect that the price level (nor the exchange rate) will
adjust to long-run equilibrium, because (37) is not satis￿ed, even if the price
level (and the exchange rate) will do that9. Consequently, this case is ruled out
when market expectations are characterized by perfect foresight.
The di⁄erence equation in (43) can be written as















if the de￿nition in (41) is utilized. Then, the solution of the di⁄erence equation
in (46) is




￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))
￿ ￿
￿t
(p[0] ￿ p); (47)
and, after twice substituting the relationship between the exchange rate and the
price level in (40)10 into (47), the exchange rate￿ s adjustment path is derived




￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))
￿ ￿
￿t
(s[0] ￿ s): (48)
9 There is no exchange rate overshooting after a monetary disturbance in this case. See (25) and
note that ￿1 < o(￿) < 0 since the ￿rst equation in (45) implies that ￿(! (￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿) <
￿1.
10(40) at time t is substituted ￿rst into (47), and then is (40) at time 0 substituted. Note that
since (40) holds at any point in time, it also holds at time 0.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 15
Thus, the exchange rate and the price level will adjust to long-run equilibrium









￿ < 1: (49)
Moreover, the adjustment process is oscillating, if
￿1 < 1 ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)exp(￿￿))
￿ ￿ < 0; (50)
and non-oscillating, if
0 < 1 ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)exp(￿￿))
￿ ￿ < 1; (51)
where the weight function in (5) is utilized in the derivations. For example,
since the expression within the inequalities in (50)-(51) is larger when the time
horizon is longer, the adjustment process of the exchange rate (and the price
level) to long-run equilibrium after a monetary disturbance is more likely to
be oscillating for shorter than for longer time horizons. Also recall that the
magnitude of exchange rate overshooting depends inversely on the time horizon.
Thus, which is an interesting characteristic of the model, a comparably short
time horizon in currency trade is consistent with a highly variable and oscillating
exchange rate.
3.4 Perfect foresight path
It is important that market expectations about future exchange rate movements
are not arbitrary, and, given the model, do not involve (persistent) prediction
errors. This is to say that the market should have perfect foresight, which means
that the ￿rst equation in (45) can be ruled out since it implies that the market
does not expect that the exchange rate will adjust to long-run equilibrium, even
if the exchange rate will do that. Thus, since the second equation in (45) is the
same as (27), (27) is both the stability condition for the model as well as the
condition for exchange rate overshooting.
In order to characterize the perfect foresight adjustment path to long-run
equilibrium, start with de￿ning the change of the exchange rate as16 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
￿s[t] ￿ s[t + 1] ￿ s[t]: (52)
Then, (48) evaluated one time period ahead is




￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))
￿ ￿
￿t+1
(s[0] ￿ s); (53)
















A(s[0] ￿ s): (54)




￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿))
￿ ￿
￿
(s[t] ￿ s); (55)
which, of course, is similar to the di⁄erence equation in (46).
Clearly, for the market to have perfect foresight, it must be true that
￿es[t] = ￿s[t]; (56)
or, according to (36) and (55),
￿ ￿ ! (￿pf)(￿ + ￿) =
￿
￿(￿ ￿ ! (￿pf)(￿ + ￿))
￿ ￿; (57)
where the left-hand side of (57) is the expected adjustment speed of the exchange
rate and the right-hand side of (57) is the actual adjustment speed of the ex-
change rate. Recall that ￿pf is the perfect foresight time horizon in currency
trade. The general solution of (57) is
￿pf = f (￿;￿;￿;￿): (58)
Thus, the perfect foresight time horizon is a function of the structural parame-
ters in the model, and, therefore, endogenously determined within the model.
Recall that as long as the perfect foresight time horizon is ￿nite, the magnitudeHeterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 17
of exchange rate overshooting is larger in this model than in the Dornbusch [5]
model, i.e., the exchange rate ￿overshoots the overshooting equilibrium￿ .
In order to derive how the perfect foresight time horizon is a⁄ected by
changes in the structural parameters ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿, de￿ne
x0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ! (￿pf)(￿ + ￿) = (￿ + ￿)exp(￿￿pf) ￿ ￿; (59)
where the weight function in (5) is utilized in the second step, which means that




























































+ ￿ < ￿ + ￿; (64)





















































































2 > 0; (67)





















2 < 0: (68)
The interpretation of (65)-(68) is that the perfect foresight time horizon is
longer, the less sensitive real money demand is to changes in the nominal in-
terest rate (￿), the more ￿ exible goods prices (￿) are, the faster the expected
adjustment speed of the exchange rate according to technical analysis (￿) is,
and the slower the expected adjustment speed of the exchange rate according
to fundamental analysis (￿) is.
Finally, the e⁄ect on the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting of a change
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where (29), (31)-(34) and (65)-(68) are utilized in the derivations. Of course,
(29) and (31)-(34) also hold for the perfect foresight time horizon. Thus, the
extent of exchange rate overshooting, given perfect foresight, is smaller the more
￿ exible goods prices (￿) are. Concerning changes in the other structural para-
meters in the model, the e⁄ects on the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting
are ambiguous.
It is important to distinguish between (31)-(34) and (69)-(72). The former
set of equations, i.e., (31)-(34), describes the direct e⁄ect on exchange rate
overshooting of a change in the structural parameters, while the latter set of
equations, i.e., (69)-(72), describes the total e⁄ect on exchange rate overshooting
of a change in the structural parameters. For example, the direct e⁄ect of an
increase in the nominal interest rate response of real money demand (￿) is
to decrease the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting (see the ￿rst term
on the right-hand side of (69)). However, the indirect e⁄ect of an increase in
this semi-elasticity is to increase the extent of exchange rate overshooting (see
the second term on the right-hand side of (69)), and this is because a shorter
perfect foresight time horizon (see (65)) increases the magnitude of exchange
rate overshooting (see (29)). Consequently, the total e⁄ect of an increase in this
semi-elasticity is ambiguous (see (69)).
3.5 Simulations of the model
The simplifying assumption that the economy has, for a long time, been in
long-run equilibrium before a monetary disturbance occurs, is not made in this
section, and this is because it is a bit restrictive. Thus, the long-period mov-
ing average in (7)-(8) is no longer necessarily equal to the long-run equilibrium
exchange rate as in (10). Instead, it is a function of all past exchange rates,
but since this complicates the formal analysis, a small simulation study is ac-
complished in order to illustrate the behavior of the model. Basically, the equa-
tions that are used in the simulations below are the equations that describe the
benchmark model, i.e., (1)-(3), the expectations formations, i.e., (4)-(9), and the
exchange rate in long-run equilibrium, i.e., (15) and (19). All these equations
are reduced to two equations, where (73) below is derived in the Appendix, and20 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
(74) below is (3) slightly rewritten. Thus, the ￿rst equation is
s[t] =
1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ exp(￿￿)
￿(￿ ￿ ￿ exp(￿￿) ￿ ￿ exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿))
￿ (m[t] ￿ y) ￿ (73)
1
￿(￿ ￿ ￿ exp(￿￿) ￿ ￿ exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿))
￿ p[t] ￿
￿ (exp(￿￿) ￿ exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿))





and the second equation is
p[t + 1] = ￿s[t] + (1 ￿ ￿)p[t]: (74)
Even if (8) is not explicitly utilized in the derivation of (73), the weights given
to current and past exchange rates are still constrained by (8).
In the previous sections, money supply was exogenously given. This assump-
tion is now replaced with the assumption that money supply follows a stochastic
process
8
> > > <
> > > :
m[t] = m[t ￿ 1] ￿ 1 with probability "
m[t] = m[t ￿ 1] with probability 1 ￿ 2"
m[t] = m[t ￿ 1] + 1 with probability ":
(75)
Of course, money supply may follow a more realistic stochastic process, like a
trend stationary AR(1) process. However, since the aim of the simulations is
not to mimic the actual behavior of exchange rates, we use a process that is as
simple as possible when illustrating the behavior of the model. Obviously, it is
not possible to illustrate the behavior of the model from all possible aspects.
Therefore, we restrict the illustrations to three cases; a change in the degree of
stickiness of goods prices (￿), a change in the time horizon in currency trade (￿),
and a change in the distribution of weights given to current and past exchange
rates (v). Speci￿cally, the degree of stickiness of goods prices is assumed to
be ￿ = 0:001 and ￿ = 0:5, respectively, the time horizon in currency trade
is assumed to be ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 100, respectively, and the parameter that
determines the distribution of weights given to current and past exchange rates
is assumed to be v = 0:001 and v = 100, respectively. In all three cases, theHeterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 21
same time path of money supply is used, where the probability of a change in
money supply is 2" = 0:2. See Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
The values of all other structural parameters in the model do not change in the22 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
simulations, and the number of time periods is 100. Thus, when deriving the
exchange rate￿ s time path in the simulations, the in￿nity symbol (1) in (73) is
replaced with 100. See Table 1 for the values of all structural parameters in the
simulations, and see Figures 2-9 for the time paths of the exchange rate.
Table 1: The values of the structural parameters in Figures 2-9
Figure ￿ ￿ v ￿ ￿ ￿
2 0.001 2 0.001 1 0.5 0.5
3 0.001 2 100 1 0.5 0.5
4 0.001 100 0.001 1 0.5 0.5
5 0.001 100 100 1 0.5 0.5
6 0.5 2 0.001 1 0.5 0.5
7 0.5 2 100 1 0.5 0.5
8 0.5 100 0.001 1 0.5 0.5
9 0.5 100 100 1 0.5 0.5
Note: ￿ is the stickiness of goods prices, ￿ is the time horizon in currency
trade, v is the parameter that determines the distribution of weights
given to current and past exchange rates, ￿ is the nominal interest rate
response of real money demand, ￿ is the expected adjustment speed
of the exchange rate according to technical analysis, and ￿ is the
expected adjustment speed of the exchange rate according to fundamental analysis.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 23
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Figure 5.
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Figure 7.
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Figure 9.
Firstly, by visual inspection of Figures 1-9, the exchange rate￿ s variability is
larger than the variability of money supply. This behavior of the model is
also consistent with the model￿ s behavior in the previous sections, where (10)
did hold (assuming equality in the equation), since the conditions for exchange
rate overshooting and stability were the same. Secondly, an increase in the
￿ exibility of goods prices (￿) has two e⁄ects on the exchange rate￿ s time path.
The ￿rst e⁄ect is a decrease in the exchange rate￿ s variability, and the second
e⁄ect is that the exchange rate￿ s adjustment path is non-oscillating when goods
prices are almost completely rigid and oscillating when they are less rigid (e.g.,
compare Figures 2 and 6). The ￿rst e⁄ect is rather intuitive since goods prices
absorb more of the monetary disturbance and, therefore, the exchange rate need
not adjust as much for the economy to reach long-run equilibrium. The second
e⁄ect is consistent with the model￿ s behavior in the previous sections (see the
discussion in connection with (50)-(51)).
Thirdly, a longer time horizon in currency trade (￿) decreases the exchange
rate￿ s variability (e.g., compare Figures 2 and 4), and this, of course, is be-
cause less weight is placed on technical analysis when forming market expecta-
tions. Fourthly, an increase in the parameter that determines the distributionHeterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 27
of weights given to current and past exchange rates (v) decreases the exchange
rate￿ s variability (e.g., compare Figures 2-3), and this is because an increase
in the parameter has the same e⁄ect, in principle, as a longer time horizon in
currency trade (compare ￿ and v in (73)).
The model￿ s behavior when the remaining structural parameters (i.e., ￿,
￿ and ￿) change is not discussed in this paper. Of course, changing these
parameters may also generate interesting results.
4 Concluding discussion
It was demonstrated in this paper that the exchange rate ￿overshoots the over-
shooting equilibrium￿when chartists were introduced into a sticky-price mon-
etary model due originally to Dornbusch [5]. Chartists were introduced since
questionnaire surveys reveal that currency trade to a large extent is based on
technical trading, where moving averages is the most commonly used technique.
Moreover, the surveys also reveal that the importance of technical trading de-
pends inversely on the time horizon in currency trade. By implementing these
observations theoretically, and deriving the exchange rate￿ s perfect foresight
path near long-run equilibrium, it was also demonstrated that the shorter the
time horizon is, the larger the magnitude of exchange rate overshooting.
The e⁄ects on the exchange rate￿ s time path of changes in the model￿ s struc-
tural parameters were also derived. To give one example of the predictions of the
model developed, consider a change in the degree of stickiness of goods prices
(￿). According to (70), there are two e⁄ects on the magnitude of exchange rate
overshooting; a direct e⁄ect and an indirect e⁄ect. More ￿ exible goods prices
will increase the perfect foresight time horizon, which in turn decreases the ex-
tent of exchange rate overshooting. This is the indirect e⁄ect of a change in the
structural parameter, and since there is no direct e⁄ect, the total e⁄ect of an
increased ￿ exibility of goods prices is a decrease in the magnitude of exchange
rate overshooting.
Thus, if we refer to the ￿rst paragraph in the introductory section of this
paper, a ￿rst step has been taken in developing an economic theory of exchange
rate movements by taking into account observed behavior of currency traders.28 Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model
Of course, the present paper is not the only paper that takes this step, but in
our opinion there are too few papers that use a chartist-fundamentalist setup in
a foreign exchange model. Moreover, the chartists￿expectations in those papers
are very simple with, for example, no consideration taken for the role of the time
horizon in currency trade. Therefore, more research within this area is needed,
where the chartists￿expectations are based on other technical trading techniques
than moving averages, and the fundamentalists￿expectations are based on other
macroeconomic models than the model used in this paper.Heterogeneous Beliefs in a Sticky-Price Foreign Exchange Model 29
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Appendix
Firstly, combine the equations that describe the money and the international
asset markets in equilibrium, i.e., (1)-(2), and solve for the exchange rate
s[t] = se [t + 1] +
m[t] ￿ p[t] ￿ y
￿
: (76)
Secondly, substitute the expectations formed by technical and fundamental
analyses, i.e., (6) and (9), into market expectations in (4)
se [t + 1] = ! (￿)(s[t] + ￿ (s ￿ s[t])) + (77)
(1 ￿ ! (￿))(s[t] + ￿ (s[t] ￿ MA[t]))
= (1 ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿) + ￿)s[t] + ! (￿)￿s ￿
(1 ￿ ! (￿))￿MA[t];
and, then, substitute the long-period moving average in (7) into (77)
se [t + 1] = (1 ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿) + ￿)s[t] + ! (￿)￿s ￿ (78)




= (1 ￿ ! (￿)(￿ + ￿) + ￿)s[t] + ! (￿)￿s ￿
(1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ (1 ￿ exp(￿￿))s[t] ￿




= (1 ￿ ! (￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ exp(￿￿))s[t] + ! (￿)￿s ￿




Thirdly, substitute (78) into (76)
s[t] = (1 ￿ ! (￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ exp(￿￿))s[t] ￿ (79)
(1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ (1 ￿ exp(￿￿))
1 X
k=1
exp(￿k￿)s[t ￿ k] +
! (￿)￿s +
m[t] ￿ p[t] ￿ y
￿
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and, then, solve for the exchange rate
s[t] =
￿! (￿)￿s + m[t] ￿ p[t] ￿ y
￿(! (￿)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ exp(￿￿))
￿ (80)
(1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ (1 ￿ exp(￿￿))





Fourthly, the exchange rate in long-run equilibrium, according to (15) and (19),
is
s = m[t] ￿ y; (81)
which is substituted into (80)
s[t] =
(1 + ￿! (￿)￿)(m[t] ￿ y) ￿ p[t]
￿(! (￿)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ exp(￿￿))
￿ (82)
(1 ￿ ! (￿))￿ (1 ￿ exp(￿￿))





Finally, substitute the weight function in (5) into (82), and (73) in Section 3.5
is derived.Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate
Target Zone Model
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Abstract
This paper develops a target zone model that takes into account that
traders, to a large extent, use technical trading techniques in currency
trade. Empirical surveys have revelaed that the relative importance of
technical and fundamental analyses depend on the time horizon in cur-
rency trade. This ￿nding has been incorporated in the model. The model
also includes realignment expectations, which increase with the weight of
chartists. The introduction of chartists may signi￿cantly reduce, what
Krugman [11] called, the "honeymoon e⁄ect" of a fully credible target
zone. Chartists may also reverse the "honeymoon e⁄ect". Further, in the
present model chartists may cause the correlation between the exchange
rate and the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential to become either pos-
itive or negative. This conforms to previous empirical ￿ndings.
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1 Introduction
Background A target zone implies setting a central parity around which the
exchange rate is allowed to ￿ uctuate within an interval. When the exchange
rate approaches the limits of the interval, the monetary authority intervenes
in the domestic monetary market and prevents the exchange rate from deviat-
ing outside the interval. The ERM II (the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the
European Monetary System) is an example of an existing target zone.
The seminal work of Krugman [11], which ￿rst circulated in 1988, has become
the standard way of modeling target zones, and has functioned as a starting
point for much of the subsequent literature. Krugman [11] assumes a perfectly
credible target zone, defended by monetary authorities who use in￿nitesimal
interventions at the edges of the zone. The model is de￿ned over fundamentals
and the exchange rate is a function of monetary fundamentals that follow a
Wiener process. By using Ito calculus, Krugman [11] attains an explicit solution
for the exchange rate path within the band.
Krugman￿ s target zone model [11], causes the exchange rate curve to bend
at the edges of the zone, so that it forms an S-curve. Thus, the ￿ uctuation band
for the exchange rate becomes narrower than that for fundamentals. This means
that the target zone has a stabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange rate. A comparison
of the S-shaped curve, representing the target zone exchange rate, with the
linear 45-degree line, representing the free-￿ oat exchange rate, demonstrates
what Krugman called the "honeymoon e⁄ect". The S-shaped curve is ￿ atter
than the 45-degree line, i.e., the exchange rate in a target zone is less sensitive
to changes in fundamentals than a free ￿ oating exchange rate. Target zones
would, in this way, have a stabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange rate without the
monetary authority actually having to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
Previous literature The literature following Krugman [11] has tried, in var-
ious ways, to modify his basic model so as to make it more realistic and to
￿t the data better. The major extensions of the basic target zone model have
focused on a few di⁄erent alternatives; Bertola and Caballero [2], Bertola and
Svensson [3], Neely et al. [19], Tristani [25] and Werner [26], for example, re-2 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
lax the assumption of a fully credible target zone and introduce expectations
of realignments and, in some cases, also include actual realignments. Beetsma
and Van Der Ploeg [4], Miller and Weller [17], and Neely et al. [19] introduce
price rigidity. Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg [4] and Lindberg and S￿derlind [13],
also introduce intramarginal interventions by central banks. Finally, Krugman
and Miller [12], and later Kempa and Nelles [10] introduce heterogeneity among
traders into target zone models in the form of stop-loss trading. These di⁄erent
ways of extending the Krugman model [11] have, for varying countries and pe-
riods, improved the ￿t of the target zone model to empirical data, mainly from
the ERM. The theoretical implications of the Krugman model [11], the empiri-
cal characteristics of the ERM exchange rates and the theoretical improvements
of the Krugman model [11] are discussed more thoroughly below.
Theoretical implications and empirical data Although innovative and
highly in￿ uential, Krugman￿ s [11] model has some empirical implications that
have been questioned by data from the ERM, the Bretton-Woods system and
the Gold Standard.
Firstly, the Krugman model [11] implies that the target zone is fully credible.
However, in the early periods of the ERM, realignments (i.e., a rede￿nition of
central parity and the bounds of the target zone) occurred quite frequently. The
ERM did, however, become more credible over time, in the sense that the periods
between realignments increased (Flood et al. [7]). Empirically, realignment
expectations have been found to depend on the level of the exchange rate within
the zone, the variability of the exchange rate or of previous realignments (see for
example Chen and Giovannini [5]). Tristani [25] and Werner [26], for example,
include realignment expectations as depending on the level of the exchange rate
within the zone, in their models. This improves the empirical ￿t of the model
with regard to the much debated "honeymoon e⁄ect", which has received little
support empirically (Flood et al. [7]). Including realignment expectations as
depending on the level of the exchange rate within the zone makes the slope
of the exchange rate steeper than the 45-degree line, and completely erases the
"honeymoon e⁄ect". Bertola and Caballero [2] and Bertola and Svensson [3] for
example, not only relax the assumption of a fully credible target zone but alsoChartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 3
introduce actual realignments in their models. In addition to correcting for the
empirical ￿ aws handled by Tristani [25] and Werner [26], this also increases the
mean reversion in the exchange rate and creates a hump-shaped distribution for
the exchange rate.
Secondly, the Krugman model [11] implies that central banks only engage in
marginal interventions in order to keep the exchange rate within the target zone.
However, empirical data suggests that interventions may also be intramarginal,
as, for example, in the case of the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden (Beetsma
and Van Der Ploeg [4], and Lindberg and S￿derlind [13]). Intramarginal inter-
ventions improve the empirical ￿t of the model not only with regard to when
the monetary authority intervenes but also with regard to the exchange rate
distribution, see below.
Thirdly, the Krugman model [11] implies via the S-shaped exchange rate
curve, a very distinct non-linear relationship between the exchange rate and the
fundamentals, which empirically, does not seem to be the case (Flood et al. [7]).
The S-shape of the exchange rate curve is due to the assumption of marginal
in￿nitesimal interventions used to defend the zone. There seem to exist some
non-linearities in this relationship, but they are not similar to those implied by
the Krugman model (Flood et al. [7]), indicating that there is no "honeymoon
e⁄ect". Although, the inclusion of realignment expectations that depend on the
level of the exchange rate within the band erases the "honeymoon e⁄ect", the
model, nevertheless, still implies an S-shaped exchange rate distribution. The
model in Bertola and Caballero [2], for example, implies an inverted S-shape for
the exchange rate curve. However, this non-linear relationship has received little
empirical support. Empirically, the relationship between the exchange rate and
fundamentals seem, in most cases, to be approximately linear (Flood et al. [7]).
Fourthly, the S-shaped exchange rate curve of the Krugman model [11] im-
plies a U-shaped distribution of the exchange rate within the band. This means
that the exchange rate is near the edges of the band most of the time. There is
weak evidence of U-shaped distributions among the currencies of some countries
within the ERM (Belgium, Denmark and France, see Flood et al. [7]). How-
ever, empirical ￿ndings show that the distribution of the exchange rate within
the band is often hump-shaped. This means that the exchange rate is, most of4 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
the time, around the middle of the band (Bertola and Caballero [2], Flood et al.
[7] and Lindberg and S￿derlind [14]). Including intramarginal interventions or
realignments in the model, creates mean reversion in the exchange rate causing
the distribution to become more hump-shaped.
Finally, assuming that UIP (i.e., uncovered interest rate parity) holds in the
Krugman model [11] implies that there is a negative correlation between the
expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate and the current exchange
rate within the zone. This in turn, implies a negative correlation between the
interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate within the zone. The negative
relationship between the exchange rate and its expected depreciation is also
an e⁄ect of the assumption of a fully credible zone. The use of in￿nitesimal
interventions at the edges of the zone results in a concave (convex) exchange
rate curve at the upper (lower) edge of the zone. Hence, as the exchange rate
approaches the upper limit of the zone, an appreciation of the currency is ex-
pected, and as it approaches the lower limit, a depreciation is expected. Thus, in
a fully credible target zone the interest rate di⁄erential displays mean reversion
towards central parity. This relationship has been found empirically to be very
di⁄erent between countries and over di⁄erent periods. Empirical data displays
a positive, zero or a negative correlation between the two (Beetsma and Van
Der Ploeg [4], Bertola and Caballero [2], Flood et al. [7] and Svensson [22]).
Technical analysis The term chartism originally stems from the use of dif-
ferent types of time charts among traders to form expectations about the future
exchange rate. The terms chartism and technical analysis are used interchange-
ably in the paper. Technical analysis1, or chartism, does not rely on any under-
lying economic or fundamental analysis.
Today, a huge variety of di⁄erent tools are used within technical analysis
including both so called trend indicators and oscillating indicators. These indi-
cators involve the use of past exchange rates, traded volumes, and the volatility
of past exchange rates, which chartists extrapolate into the future. Both types
of tool are used for the purpose of trying to predict trends and trend rever-
sals in the exchange rates. Hence, technical analysis may cause the exchange
1 For a brief description of technical analysis, the reader can turn to Neely [18].Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 5
rate to deviate from its fundamental value. There is some empirical evidence
for so-called bandwagon expectations (i.e., expectations of further appreciations
/depreciations of the currency of a greater magnitude than before) on the for-
eign exchange market (for example Ito [9]) which could very well be the result
of the use of technical analysis.
The length of the time horizon in currency trade has been shown to be
a decisive factor for the choice of trading techniques among foreign exchange
traders. Taylor and Allen [24] conducted a questionnaire survey for the Bank
of England on the foreign exchange market in London in November 1988. This
survey was the ￿rst to ask, speci￿cally, about the use of technical analysis or
chartism among currency traders and the results were striking. Two percent of
the respondents reported that they never used fundamental analysis in forming
their exchange rate expectations, while 90 percent of the respondents reported
placing some weight on technical analysis at the intraday to one week horizon.
At longer time horizons, Taylor and Allen [24] found that the importance of
technical analysis declined. Later surveys by, for example Cheung and Chinn
[6], Lui and Mole [15], Menkho⁄ [16], and Oberlechner [20] have con￿rmed the
extensive use of technical analysis in currency trade in the Asian, European and
U.S. markets. A general result, found in all these surveys, is an increased reliance
on technical, as opposed to fundamental, analysis for shorter time horizons.
The extensions of the Krugman model [11] discussed above, have all, except
for Krugman and Miller [12], and Kempa and Nelles [10], continued to assume
homogeneity, in spite of heterogeneity among traders having been well estab-
lished by surveys (see referenced surveys above) of the foreign exchange market.
Although Frankel and Froot, as early as in 1986 [8], o⁄ered chartists trading
as a plausible explanation to the U.S. Dollar￿ s extreme deviation from its fun-
damental value during the 1980￿ s, and Taylor and Allen [24] showed already
in 1992, that technical analysis is extensively used in foreign exchange trading,
there has been no attempt (to our knowledge) to introduce chartists in a target
zone framework.
Approach The present paper follows the Krugman [11] approach and intro-
duces heterogeneity in the market in the form of two di⁄erent types of traders,6 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
chartists and fundamentalists. The weight of chartists and fundamentalists is
determined by the length of the time horizon in currency trade (i.e., the length of
time on which traders intend to trade). The Krugman model [11] is augmented
with realignment expectations where these depend on the weight of chartists in
the market. Thus, realignment expectations are independent of the level of the
exchange rate in the zone. When the time horizon in trade is in￿nitely long, i.e.,
when the weight of chartists is zero, the model is equivalent to the Krugman
model. Thus, the augmented model will nest that of Krugman [11].
A speci￿c purpose of this paper is to theoretically implement a chartist-
fundamentalist set-up in a target zone framework. The qualitative results of
this model will then be compared with empirical facts, and with the qualitative
results of the Krugman model. In the present paper, the fundamental is a
composite term that is partly a process controlled by the monetary authority,
as in the Krugman model, and partly stochastic processes driven by the currency
trade among chartists and fundamentalists.
The implementation of a chartist-fundamentalist set-up with realignment
expectations in the spirit of Krugman￿ s [11] target zone model is, as far as we
know, a complete novelty within the target zone literature. The way in which
realignment expectations, and chartist and fundamentalist traders are imple-
mented in this model is also, as far as we know, completely novel. The paper
also contains an attempt to produce a more explicit and stringent mathemati-
cal derivation of the explicit solution for the exchange rate path within a target
zone than that o⁄ered by for example Krugman [11].
The main questions in focus are: how are the dynamics of the exchange
rate and the interest rate di⁄erentials within the zone a⁄ected when chartism
is introduced into a target zone model? How does chartism a⁄ect the correla-
tion between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate? In summary,
will including heterogeneous traders in the model create a better ￿t to stylized
empirical ￿ndings?
Main ￿ndings The introduction of chartist and fundamentalist traders in
the Krugman model [11] does create a better empirical ￿t with regard to the
correlation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate and withChartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 7
regard to exchange rate volatility. The correlation may be both positive and
negative and the volatility increases when the exchange rate is further from cen-
tral parity. Allowing for positive realignment expectations is also an empirical
improvement as is allowing for expectations to be heterogeneous.
However, due to the use of in￿nitesimal marginal interventions in the model,
the relationship between the exchange rate and fundamentals is still, even with
the market completely dominated by chartists, somewhat S-shaped. When fun-
damentals are equal to central parity there is a reversed "honeymoon e⁄ect"
inherent in the present model. This e⁄ect does not completely disappear when
the market is completely dominated by chartists, but it is diminished for larger
deviations of the fundamentals and has a reversed e⁄ect for fundamentals equal
to central parity. Because of the use of in￿nitesimal marginal interventions in
the model, the exchange rate distribution is still strongly U-shaped. Thus, it
does not create a better ￿t with empirical data with regard to the exchange rate
distribution.
The mathematical derivations, of the solution for the model, suggest an-
other notation for the expected depreciation of the exchange rate than the one
commonly used in the literature. The interpretation of this term as the ex-
pected depreciation of the exchange rate may also be a little misleading, rather
it should be interpreted as a deterministic measure of the expected depreciation
of the exchange rate. If there are no chartists, the measure of the expected
depreciation of the exchange rate is the deterministic expected change in the
composite fundamental deviation from central parity within the zone. If there
are chartists, it is the deterministic expected change in the composite funda-
mental deviation from central parity and the expected change in central parity
(i.e., the expected realignment).
Outline The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The benchmark
model is outlined in Section 2. The formal analysis of the model is carried out in
Section 3, starting with the behavior of the exchange rate in subsection 3.1 and
then continuing with the interest rate di⁄erentials in subsection 3.2. Section
4 contains some concluding remarks and the Appendix presents proofs of the
propositions.8 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
2 The model
2.1 The exchange rate
Basically, the benchmark model is a log-linear monetary model of the exchange
rate in line with Krugman [11]. All variables, except the interest rate, are
in natural logarithms and Greek letters denote positive structural parameters.
Speci￿cally, the spot exchange rate, s(t), which is de￿ned as units of the do-
mestic currency per unit of the foreign currency, is
s(t) = x(t) + ￿E (t); (1)
where ￿ is the semi-elasticity of the money demand2 with respect to the interest
rate, E (t) is a deterministic measure of the expected instantaneous deprecia-
tion of the exchange rate at time t, and x(t) denotes the composite monetary
fundamentals in the model. Speci￿cally, the composite monetary fundamental
is
x(t) = m(t) + v(t): (2)
The two parts of x(t) are the domestic money supply controlled by the monetary
authority, m(t), and a composite currency demand shock term, v(t). Henceforth,
monetary policy is assumed to be passive unless needed to maintain the target
zone. Thus, m(t) is a process controlled by monetary authority, to be further
explained below. The shock term, v(t), is assumed to be an exogenous sto-
chastic process driven by two independent Wiener processes, Wf (t) and Wc (t),
which stem from the impact of fundamentalist and chartist currency trade in
the model, again these will be explained further later.3
Note that Krugman [11] uses the term E [ds]=dt without further ado, whereas,
in the present paper, we use the notation E (t) as the measure of the expected
instantaneous depreciation of the exchange rate at time t: The term E [ds]=dt
2 The semi-elasticity of the money demand stems from the home and foreign money market
equilibrium used to derive the benchmark model, i.e., equation (1).
3 Equation (2) is equvalent to that in Krugman￿ s model [11]. However, in his model the shock
term, v(t), represents velocity of money.Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 9
is a mathematically dubious notation4. However, since Krugman [11] does not
produce a formal proof of his solution for the exchange rate within the band,
it is hard to know the formal de￿nition of E [ds]=dt, and whether or not it
corresponds to the formal de￿nition of E (t); as shown in the Appendix in the
present paper.5
2.2 Exchange rate trading
According to questionnaire surveys carried out previously, the relative impor-
tance of technical versus fundamental analysis in the foreign exchange market
depends on the time horizon in currency trade. For shorter time horizons, more
weight is placed on technical analysis, while more weight is placed on funda-
mental analysis for longer time horizons. In the present model, this observation
is formulated as
v (t) = ! (￿)yf (t) + (1 ￿ ! (￿))yc (t); (3)
where ! (￿) is a weight function that depends on the time horizon in currency
trade, ￿. Speci￿cally, the weight function 6 is
! (￿) = 1 ￿ e￿￿: (4)
Thus, the stochastic term, v (t), re￿ ects changes in the money supply due to
currency trade and is driven by fundamentalists￿and chartists￿trading strate-
gies. The trading strategies of fundamentalist and chartist traders in the foreign
exchange market are represented by yf (t) and yc (t), respectively.
Fundamental analysis is based on macroeconomic fundamentals only. Specif-
ically, fundamental analysis is driven by a Brownian motion with a zero drift
and a di⁄usion term, ￿f (t), according to
dyf (t) = ￿f (t)dWf (t); (5)
4 The term E [ds]=dt denoting the expected instantaneous depreciation of the exchange rate
has become standard within the target zone literature.
5 For more details, see the Appendix, proof of Proposition 1.
6 Note that the weight function used in the present paper is inspired by the weight function
used in Bask [1].10 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
where Wf (t) is a Wiener process.7 The economic intuition behind this rep-
resentation is that the Gaussian disturbance term, ￿f (t)Wf (t), re￿ ects the
stochastic changes in liquidity needs and the zero drift re￿ ects the assumed
unchanged money supply. Thus, fundamentalists add volatility to the process,
v (t).
Technical analysis is based on past history that is extrapolated into the
future. Speci￿cally, technical analysis is driven by a Brownian motion with a
positive drift and a di⁄usion term, ￿c (t), according to
dyc (t) = ￿ (yf (t) ￿ yf (t ￿ ￿))dt + ￿c (t)dWc (t); (6)
where ￿ > 1 is the "trend coe¢ cient" in the drift term ￿ [yf (t) ￿ yf (t ￿ ￿)],
￿c (t)Wc (t) is the Gaussian disturbance term, and Wc (t) is the Wiener process.8
Note that ￿Et [yf (t) ￿ yf (t ￿ ￿)]dt = 0, and thus, the trend component in the
chartist strategy actually vanishes when solving the model, and the true im-
pact of chartists in the model is to increase volatility in the process, v (t), via
the Gaussian disturbance term, ￿c (t)Wc (t). The economic intuition behind
this representation is that chartists use the Wiener process, that the fundamen-
tals follow, to extrapolate a trend from (see the ￿rst term of the right hand
side of (6)), since the model is driven by fundamentals. The Gaussian distur-
bance term, ￿c (t)Wc (t), re￿ ects the fact that this type of extrapolating strategy
causes bandwagon expectations, which, in turn, are volatility enhancing. Thus,
chartists also add volatility to the process, v (t).
Hence, v (t) in (3) and, thus, x(t) in (2), are driven by the two independent
Wiener processes, Wf (t) and Wc (t). Speci￿cally, dv (t) will take the form
dv (t) = ! (￿)dyf (t) + (1 ￿ ! (￿))dyc (t): (7)
The relative importance of the di⁄erent Wiener processes is determined by the
length of the market￿ s time horizon in currency trade. If the time horizon in
7 Or, equivalently, yf (t) =
t Z
0
￿f (s)dWf (s), where the right hand side is an Ito integral (i.e.,
a stochastic integral).
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currency trade is myopic, the weight of chartists is high, and thus, the impact of
dyc (t) is high. On the other hand, if the time horizon is farsighted, the weight
of fundamentalists is high, and thus, the impact of dyf (t) is high.
If traders￿trading strategies in the foreign exchange market were homoge-
nous (i.e., if there were only fundamentalist traders in the market), x(t) would
only be driven by dyf (t), and the model would be equivalent to the Krugman
model [11]. However, since there are now also chartist traders in the market, the
exchange rate is driven by the additional stochastic component, dyc (t), stem-
ming from chartist trading. Chartists will, through the composite shock term,
dv (t), only have second order importance on the exchange rate path.
This is the ￿rst of two ways, in which, chartists a⁄ect the exchange rate
in this model, the second way is through the realignment intensity, which will
be further explained below. Chartists will increase volatility in the model, via
the composite shock term, and chartists will push the exchange rate away from
fundamentals, but only via the realignment intensity.
2.3 The target zone
The target zone is de￿ned over fundamentals and the monetary authority sets
the central parity and the upper and lower bounds for the fundamentals, which




where c(t) is the central parity, and x(t)
upperand x(t)
lower are the upper and
lower bounds for the target zone. The upper and lower bounds for fundamentals
correspond to an upper and a lower bound for the exchange rate, s(t)
maxand
s(t)
min. Assuming symmetry in the model, the upper and lower bounds are
of equal length from central parity. The monetary authority is assumed to
intervene in the domestic monetary market to maintain the target zone for the
exchange rate. In other words, the monetary authority is prepared to decrease
(increase) the money supply in order to prevent the exchange rate from rising
above (falling below) some upper (lower) bound. As long as the exchange rate
is within the target zone, the money supply remains unchanged.12 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
In￿nitesimal interventions are used at the edges of the zone to prevent the
exchange rate from moving outside the band. The regulators L (lower) and U
(upper) represent these interventions and, consequently, dL(t) is positive only
when x(t) = x(t)
lowerand dU (t) is positive only when x(t) = x(t)
upper(i.e.,
when the fundamentals reach their upper or lower bounds)
dm(t) = dL(t) ￿ dU (t): (9)
Thus, the composite monetary fundamental follows the stochastic process
dx(t) = ! (￿)dyf (t) + (1 ￿ ! (￿))dyc (t) + dL(t) ￿ dU (t): (10)
Inside the zone, dm(t) = 0, which gives the following expression for the com-
posite monetary fundamental within the zone
dx(t) = ! (￿)dyf (t) + (1 ￿ ! (￿))dyc (t): (11)
2.4 Realignment expectations
In the model, there is a constant probability of a realignment of the target
zone, i.e., a shift in the central parity, c(t), as well as a shift in the upper and
lower bounds of the fundamentals, x(t)
upperand x(t)
lower. In the present pa-
per, expectations of a realignment are modelled as depending on the weight of
chartists in the market. Thus, the shorter the time horizon in currency trade,
i.e., the more weight that is put on chartists, the higher the realignment inten-
sity. The intuition is that because chartist trading is volatility increasing and
thus destabilizing, an increase in chartist traders will also increase expectations
of a realignment. Hence, this is the second impact of chartists in this model.
The expected realignment is not explicitly a function of the exchange rate
level within the zone and is thus a constant. Realignment expectations will,
therefore, not a⁄ect the slope of the exchange rate function.9 Modeling realign-
ments as also depending on the level of fundamentals within the band, does not
9 In Neely et al. [19], for example, the probability of realignment increases when output moves
away from full employment. In Werner [26] the probability of realignment increases with the
distance of the fundamentals from central parity, and in Svensson [22], [23] and Bertola and
Svensson [3] realignments follow a Poisson process.Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 13
change the results to any great extent. The only e⁄ect is to cause the slope
of the exchange rate function to become steeper and, thus, further diminish
the honeymoon e⁄ect. It does not improve the empirical ￿t with regard to the
exchange rate distribution or the S-shaped exchange rate curve either. To iso-
late the impact of chartists with regard to realignment expectations, these are
modeled as depending on the weight of chartists only.
In the present paper, realignment expectations are modeled as a hazard
function10 that is increasing with the weight of chartists in the market, as a
percentage of the width of the zone. Hence,
￿dt =
￿(1 ￿ ! (￿))
￿
dt; (12)
where ￿ is a constant that a⁄ects the size of the realignment, ￿ is the width of
the band de￿ned over fundamentals according to ￿ = x(t)
upper ￿x(t)
lower, and
where ￿ is a constant that can be interpreted as a hazard rate. The interpreta-
tion of ￿dt is the probability of a realignment on the interval dt, conditional on
that there has been no realignment up till t.
￿dt =
f (t)dt
1 ￿ F (t)
: (13)





and integrating (14), yields
￿￿t + C = lnG(t); (15)
where C is a constant. Taking the antilog, gives
G(t) = Ce￿￿t: (16)
Thus,
10The Hazard function used to model realignment probability in this paper is similar to that of
Tristani [25] and Werner [26].14 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
1 ￿ F (t) = e￿￿t = e￿
￿(1￿!(t))
￿ t; (17)
which means that realignment expectations in this model can be interpreted as




￿; x(t) > c(t)
￿￿; x(t) < c(t):
(18)
Thus, the expected realignment is
E (c(t)) =
￿￿(1 ￿ ! (￿))
￿
: (19)
Hence, when the exchange rate is in the upper (lower) half of the target zone,
there is a positive (negative) expected realignment (i.e., an expected devaluation
(revaluation)). The probability of a realignment increases the greater the weight
of chartists in the market and, when a realignment takes place, both the central
parity and fundamentals undergo a discrete change and the upper and lower
bounds for the exchange rate are rede￿ned.
The measure of the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, E (t),
will, thus, depend both on the expected depreciation of the fundamentals inside
the target zone, and the expected depreciation of the central parity (i.e., the
realignment intensity), see equation (21) below. Note that the realignment
intensity is a constant that will push the exchange rate closer to the bounds of
the zone. Accordingly, expectations of a realignment are higher the closer the
exchange rate is to the bounds of the target zone. This is the case even though
the realignment expectations are not a function of the level of fundamentals
within the band.
3 Formal analysis of the model
In the formal analysis, both the exchange rate and the term structure of the
interest rate di⁄erentials within the target zone will be analyzed with respect
to the implications of chartist trading in the Krugman model [11].
11Note that F (t) follows the exponential distribution, where E (t) = 1
￿ and V (t) = 1
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3.1 The exchange rate within the target zone
In the formal analysis, it is more convenient to work with the deviations of





s(t) = e s(t) + c(t)
x(t) = e x(t) + c(t);
(20)
i.e., e s(t) and e x(t) are the deviations of the spot exchange rate and the monetary
fundamentals, respectively, from central parity. In the formal analysis, it is
also convenient to work with the positive part of the zone. However, as the
target zone is symmetric, the qualitative results of the formal analysis hold
with opposite sign for the negative part of the zone.
By assuming (20) and that the exchange rate￿ s position within the target
zone is unchanged after a realignment, the measure of the expected instanta-
neous depreciation of the exchange rate is a composite term of both the expected
depreciation of fundamentals inside the target zone, and the expected depreci-
ation of central parity. Hence,
E (t) = e E (t) + E (c(t)); (21)
substituting the weight function (4) into (21), we have






￿ e￿￿ is the expected depreciation of the central parity (i.e., the re-
alignment intensity), and e E (t) is the measure of the expected instantaneous
depreciation of the exchange rate inside the target zone.
Then, by combining (1, 4, 20 and 22), the exchange rate within the zone,
e s(t), is
e s(t) = e x(t) +
￿￿￿
￿
e￿￿ + ￿ e E (t): (23)
This expression for the exchange rate within the band is similar to that of
Krugman [11] except for the term
￿￿p
￿ e￿￿, which is the realignment intensity
that depends on the weight of chartists in the market. Also note that the term16 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
e x(t) includes the impact of both chartist and fundamentalist trading. Applying
Ito￿ s lemma on (23) and solving the resulting di⁄erential equation gives equation
(24) in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The solution to (23) is a function of the composite fundamental



























Proof. See the Appendix for a proof.12
The term, (￿￿￿=￿)e￿￿, is the realignment intensity, that decreases with the
width of the zone, ￿, and increases with, ￿￿￿e￿￿, where ￿ is the semi-elasticity of
money demand with respect to the interest rate, ￿ is the size of the realignment
when it occurs, and ￿ is a constant that ampli￿es the size of the realignment,
and ￿nally, where, e￿￿, is the weight of chartists in the market. The constant
A depends on the root, r, of the di⁄erential equation (24), and on the bounds
of the zone e x￿ (t), where, e x(t)
lower = ￿e x(t)
upper = e x(t)
￿. The root, r, depends
on ￿, the weight of fundamentalists and chartists in the market (i.e., of 1￿e￿￿
and e￿￿), and their respective trading strategies (i.e., of ￿2
f and ￿2
c).
The solution of (23) nests that of a fully credible target zone. This is because
when there are no chartists in the market the second term (￿￿￿=￿)e￿￿ = 0,
and the expression for the root reduces to r =
q
2=￿￿2
f. In this case, the
equations in Proposition 1 reduce to those of a perfectly credible target zone,
and become equal to those of the Krugman model [11]. In this case, the exchange
12The model has also been derived with a drift term included in the Wiener process for funda-
mentals to represent a positive monetary growth rate. This augmented version of the model
makes it a bit more complicated since it becomes unsymmetrical, but it does not qualitatively
change the results of the model to any great extent. The augmented version of the model is
available on request from the author.Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 17
rate function forms the familiar S-curve, as can be seen in Figure 1, and the
distribution of the exchange rate, as in the Krugman model [11], becomes U-
shaped (see Figure 2).13





























Figure 1: The exchange rate plotted against fundamentals, when there are only fun-
damentalists in the market (i.e., for ￿ = 1000).
However, when there are chartists in the market, i.e., when the realignment
intensity, (￿￿￿=￿)e￿￿ 6= 0, and the root expression includes two volatility coef-
￿cients that are weighted with the time horizon in trade, ￿, the exchange rate
function has a double kink when fundamentals are equal to central parity (see
Figure 3). In this case, the exchange rate function is always closer to the bounds
of the target zone, and the root, as well as the realignment intensity, now makes
13The parameter values used in Figures 1-6 are chosen solely for expositional purposes and the
model is simulated 2000 times for the following parameter values: ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 1:9, ￿ = 1,
￿ = 0;1000, ￿f = ￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:95 and e x￿ (t) = 0:95. The model is sensitive to the choise
of ￿ and ￿ with regard to the size of the realignment intensity, the smaller ￿ and ￿ are the
lesser the impact of the realignment intensity. The parameter ￿ also e⁄ects the slope and the
linearity of the exchange rate curve. The smaller ￿ is the more linear and the steeper the
exchange rate curve becomes. Matlab routines are available on request from the author.18 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
the model di⁄erent from the Krugman model [11].
The U-shaped distribution is due to the in￿nitesimal interventions used at
the edges of the zone. These cause the derivative of the exchange rate to vanish
at the edges of the zone, i.e., they ￿ atten the exchange rate curve. Because the
curve is ￿ attened at the edges, a large number of outcomes for the fundamentals
become concentrated to a small number of outcomes for the exchange rate. In
other words, the long-run density of fundamentals is positive at the edge of
the zone and therefore as the derivative of the exchange rate vanishes, the
distribution tends therefore to spike at these points. Accordingly, the U-shape
will be evident in the model when chartists also dominate the market. The
inclusion of chartists in the model actually makes the exchange rate distribution
more U-shaped (see Figure 4). This is because chartists push the exchange
rate function closer to the bounds of the target zone, via the increase in the
realignment intensity term. The spikes of the exchange rate density at the
edges of the zone increase and thus make the distribution become more strongly
U-shaped.
When there are chartists in the market, i.e., when ￿ is ￿nite, the term,
(￿￿￿=￿)e￿￿, in (24) makes the exchange rate function lie partly above (below)
the 45-degree line that represents the free-￿ oat (see Figure 3). This means that
the "honeymoon e⁄ect", that Krugman [11] found, diminishes when the weight
of chartists increases in the market. Proposition 2 presents the condition for
this to be true. When the fundamentals equal central parity, chartists actually
reverse the "honeymoon e⁄ect" and, for small deviations of the fundamentals
from central parity, the "honeymoon e⁄ect" is still present up to a limit deviation
lower than the bound for the fundamentals. In the case of deviations of the
fundamentals greater than this limit, the exchange rate deviates outside of the
zone.
The "honeymoon e⁄ect" diminishes in the sense that the discrepancy be-
tween the exchange rate and the fundamentals increases and the exchange rate
falls closer to the bounds of the target zone. It also diminishes in the sense that
it is only present for a short range of values for the fundamentals. However,
the slope of the exchange rate function in this model, as in the Krugman model
[11], is ￿ atter than the 45-degree line (except when the fundamentals are equalChartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 19






















Figure 2: Exchange rate deviations from central parity when there are only funda-
mentalists in the market, derived from the same simulation as for Figure 1.
to central parity), and in that sense the "honeymoon e⁄ect" is still present.
Hence, the "honeymoon e⁄ect" has not completely vanished in this model, and
the target zone still has a stabilizing e⁄ect on the exchange rate. However,
chartists cause the exchange rate to be closer to the bounds of the target zone
and, thereby, diminish the "honeymoon e⁄ect".
In Proposition 2, the target zone exchange rate is compared to the free-
￿ oat exchange rate (the 45-degree line) to show the impact of the model on the
"honeymoon e⁄ect". Proposition 2 derives the length of the time horizon that
causes the exchange rate function to lie above the 45-degree line, representing
the free-￿ oat (below the 45-degree line in the negative part of the model).
Proposition 2 The exchange rate function is above the 45-degree line, within













ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿
!
(27)20 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model





























Figure 3: The exchange rate plotted against fundamentals, when there are only
chartists in the market (i.e., for ￿ = 0).
Proof. See the Appendix for a proof.
Hence, for the exchange rate function to be above the 45-degree line and
diminish the "honeymoon e⁄ect", depends entirely on the size of the realignment
intensity, which in turn, depends on the time horizon in currency trade ￿ and,
thus, the weight of chartists. The smaller ￿ is, the larger is the weight of
chartists, and thus, the more likely it is that the exchange rate function is above
the 45-degree line (see Figures 1 and 2). Proposition 2 is derived through the
comparison of e s(t) and e x(t) evaluated at e x(t) = e x￿ (t). Thus, if e s(t) > e x￿ (t)
the exchange rate will, for all e x(t) inside the band, be above (below) the 45-
degree line. Furthermore, its maximum deviation will be greater than the width
of the band.
The result of Proposition 2 is not, however, as strong as it might seem as the
second term on the right hand side of (27) also contains the time horizon, ￿. It
is, however, necessary that ￿, is small for the exchange rate function to be aboveChartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 21




















Figure 4: Exchange rate deviations from central parity when there are only chartists
in the market, derived from the same simulation as for Figure 3.
(below) the 45-degree line. To see this it may be easier to look at the following
inequality:
￿￿￿
￿ e￿￿ > e
re x(t)￿e
￿re x(t)
r(ere x￿(t)+e￿re x￿(t)). From this inequality it is evident that
the smaller ￿ is, the larger is the realignment intensity, and the more probable
it is that the exchange rate curve is above the 45-degree line.
3.2 The interest rate di⁄erential within the target zone
This section will analyze the implications of the use of chartism in currency
trade for the behavior of the interest rate di⁄erentials, in other words, it will
consider the di⁄erence between the domestic and foreign interest rates for bonds
of equal maturities, with regard to the level of the exchange rate inside the
band. The S-shaped exchange rate curve of the Krugman model [11] implies
a U-shaped distribution of the exchange rate within the band, which in turn,
implies a hump-shaped distribution of the interest rate di⁄erential. Assuming
that UIP holds inside the zone, implies a negative relationship between the22 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
interest rate di⁄erential and the fundamentals. This is due to the negative
relationship between the expected exchange rate and the exchange rate within
the zone. Hence, under the assumption of UIP in the Krugman model [11], there
is a negative correlation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange
rate within the band. Thus, if the currency is weak, the interest rate di⁄erential
is negative, (i.e., if the foreign interest rate is higher than the domestic interest
rate), and the exchange rate is expected to fall, i.e., the domestic currency
is expected to appreciate. Interpreted another way, when the exchange rate
approaches the upper (lower) bound of the zone, expectations of interventions
will predict a fall (rise) in the exchange rate.
3.2.1 The instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential
Assuming UIP in the model, the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential is equal
to the expected depreciation of the exchange rate, and it is negatively corre-
lated with the exchange rate within the band (which is the same result as in
the Krugman model [11]), if there are no chartists in the market, i.e., if the
realignment intensity,
￿￿
￿ e￿￿, in (28) is zero. This is shown in Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 3 Assume that i(t) and i￿ (t) are the domestic and foreign instan-
taneous interest rates, respectively. The instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential
is, then, given by




ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)
r￿
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿ (28)
Proof. See the Appendix for a proof.
The interest rate di⁄erential has been found empirically to have both a
positive and negative correlation with the exchange rate within the band. The
empirical correlation has varied with countries and periods analyzed (Bertola
and Caballero [2], Flood et al. [7], and Svensson [22]). This ambiguity may
possibly be explained by the type of traders dominating the market. When the
time horizon in currency trade is short, i.e., when chartists dominate the market,
the correlation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate insideChartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 23
the band may become positive. In this case, expectations of a realignment
dominate over expectations of monetary interventions in order to defend the
zone, indicating market expectations of a further fall (rise) in the exchange rate
(i.e., a further appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency).
Proposition 4 shows a bound on the time horizon for which the correla-
tion between the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate
becomes positive.
Proposition 4 The correlation between the instantaneous interest rate di⁄er-








ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)
r￿
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿
!
: (29)
Proof. See the Appendix for a proof.
Again, this result is not as strong as it might at ￿rst seem, since the second
term on the right hand side of (29) also contains the time horizon, ￿, via the
root, r. However, it does show the need for ￿ to be small for the correlation
between the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate to
become positive. To see this, it may be easier to look at the following inequality
￿￿
￿ e￿￿ > e
re x(t)￿e
￿re x(t)
r￿(ere x￿(t)+e￿re x￿(t)), which states the necessary condition for the interest
rate di⁄erential to become positive.14
To see how the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential changes when the
time horizon, ￿, increases, it is necessary to calculate the partial derivative of
the interest rate di⁄erential with regard to ￿. Since ￿ appears not only in the
expression for the realignment intensity but also in the expression for the root,
the the derivative is very di¢ cult to interpret. However, via visual inspection
of Figures 5 and 6, it is evident that the instantaneous interest di⁄erential is
decreasing with the time horizon in the following sense; when the time horizon
increases, the correlation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange
rate within the band decreases and eventually becomes negative. Hence, the
more fundamentalists there are in the market, the more likely it is that the cor-
relation between the interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange rate is negative.
14See the Appendix for more details.24 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
In other words, the more likely it is that the market expects the exchange rate
to fall (i.e., the domestic currency to appreciate) when the interest rate di⁄eren-
tial is negative (i.e., when the foreign interest rate is greater than the domestic
interest rate) and the exchange rate is near the upper bound of the zone.
Figures 5 and 6 show the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential plotted
against the fundamentals (i.e., the measure of the expected exchange rate de-
preciation) according to the relationship shown in (28). In Figure 5, there are
only fundamentalists in the market and in Figure 6, there are only chartists in
the market.










The instantaneous interest rate differential
































Figure 5: The interest rate di⁄erential plotted against fundamentals, when there are
only fundamentalists on the market (i.e., for ￿ = 1000).
To see how the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential alters with changes
in fundamentals, e x(t), the partial derivative of the interest rate di⁄erential
with respect to fundamentals is calculated. The instantaneous interest rate
di⁄erential is decreasing in e x(t) when e x(t) < e x￿ (t) according to
@ (i ￿ i￿)
@e x(t)
= ￿
ere x(t) + e￿re x(t)
￿
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿: (30)Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 25










The instantaneous interest rate differential
































Figure 6: The intereste rate di⁄erential plotted against fundamentals, when there are
only chartists on the market. (i.e., for ￿ = 0).
When e x(t) = e x￿ (t) (i.e., when fundamentals are equal to its bounds), the
instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential is constant and equal to ￿1=￿. This re-
sult corresponds to the result in Krugman [11] and is una⁄ected by the weight
of chartists in the market. The fact that this result also holds in the model with
positive realignment expectations is because the realignment intensity does not
depend on fundamentals, and will, therefore, not in￿ uence the interest rate
di⁄erential when fundamentals change. Thus, the instantaneous interest rate
di⁄erential is decreasing in e x(t) when e x(t) < e x￿ (t) because, when fundamen-
tals increase, the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate decreases
regardless of which type of traders dominate the market. The reason is that
chartists have second order importance with regard to the exchange rate and
only a⁄ect the realignment intensity, which is independent of the position of the
exchange rate within the band. Accordingly, chartists are not able to reverse
expectations of a depreciation when fundamentals increase.26 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
3.2.2 The long-term interest rate di⁄erential
Assuming UIP in the model, the long-term interest rate di⁄erential is equal to
the measure of the expected depreciation of the exchange rate divided by the
time to maturity. The Krugman model [11] implies that the long term-interest
rate di⁄erential equals zero within the band. However, realignment expecta-
tions that are independent of the level of fundamentals inside the band, i.e.,
realignment expectations reoccurring at a constant probability throughout the
band, change this result. The interest rate di⁄erential for long-term maturities
is derived in the Appendix15 and presented in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 The interest rate di⁄erential for long maturities is a constant
equal to the expected realignment caused by chartists, i.e., the realignment in-
tensity
￿ (e x;c;1) = lim
T!1




Proof. See the Appendix for a proof.
In a target zone model with a realignment intensity independent of the level
of fundamentals or the level of the exchange rate, the interest rate for long
maturities does not approach zero. Instead, it approaches the rate of expected
realignment, which can either be positive, if a revaluation is expected, or nega-
tive, if a devaluation is expected. This result is in line with Svensson [22], where
the realignment probability is also independent of the fundamentals but reoc-
curs at constant probability throughout the band. Proposition 5 also implies
that if there are no chartists in the market, the interest rate di⁄erential would
approach zero for long maturities and this result is in line with that of Krugman
[11].
4 Concluding remarks
To summarize, the model presented in this paper implements some of the stylized
empirical ￿ndings, mentioned in Section 1, that are lacking in Krugman￿ s model
15The derivations of the long-term interest rate di⁄erential follow those in Svensson [22].Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 27
[11]. The empirical ￿nding, ascertained by means of questionnaire surveys of the
foreign exchange market, that the use of fundamentalism and chartism depend
on the time horizon in currency trade, has been included in the model. To our
knowledge, it is the ￿rst time heterogenous traders are introduced in the form
of a chartist-fundamentalist setup, in an exchange rate target zone framework.
The present paper also implements realignment expectations and relaxes the
assumption of a fully credible target zone, another empirically realistic extension
of the Krugman model [11].
Implementing chartist and fundamentalist trading in the model does not
change all of the general results of Krugman￿ s target zone model [11]. The
exchange rate curve keeps its S-shape inside the band, and the distribution of
the exchange rate is still U-shaped. However, when the market is completely
dominated by chartists, the "honeymoon e⁄ect" highlighted by Krugman [11]
diminishes, and the exchange rate stays much closer to the bounds of the target
zone. The slope of the exchange rate function remains ￿ atter than that of the
45-degree line, which still leaves some domestic monetary policy freedom. Thus,
although the model includes chartist traders the "honeymoon e⁄ect" does not
completely vanish.
By making these extensions to Krugman￿ s model [11], i.e., including chartist
trading and a realignment intensity depending on the weight of chartists, the
model in the present paper, allows for the possibility of either a negative or
a positive correlation between the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential and
the exchange rate within the band, another stylized empirical ￿nding. This
ambiguity can, in this model, be explained by the type of traders dominating
the market, i.e., the length of the time horizon in currency trade. If chartists
completely dominate the market, the realignment intensity may cause the cor-
relation between the instantaneous interest rate di⁄erential and the exchange
rate inside the band to become positive. The interest rate di⁄erentials for long
maturities are also a⁄ected by chartists via the realignment intensity, which
makes the long maturity interest rate di⁄erential di⁄erent from zero.
Moreover, this way of modeling heterogeneity still allows for an explicit
solution of the model and results in, from a number of respects, an empirically
more realistic model compared to Krugman [11]. The Appendix is an attempt28 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
to produce a more explicit and stringent mathematical derivation of the solution
of the exchange rate path within a target zone framework. It shows the formal
de￿nition of the measure of the expected exchange rate depreciation, as it must
be, for a proper mathematical derivation of the solution for the exchange rate
path.Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 29
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that the general solution for the di⁄erential
equation for the exchange rate is given by
e s(t) = h(e x(t)); (A 1)
i.e., a function of fundamentals. Assuming that h(e x(t)) is well-behaved and
twice di⁄erentiable, a Taylor expansion of h(e x(t)) including second order terms,
gives
dh(e x(t)) = he xde x(t) +
1
2
he xe xd(e x(t))2; (A 2)
Using Ito￿ s formula, gives









2 + 2! (￿)(1 ￿ ! (￿))dyf (t)dyc (t)






dyf (t) = ￿f (t)dWf (t); (A 4)
and
dyc (t) = (￿ (yf (t) ￿ yf (t ￿ ￿))dt + ￿c (t)dWc (t)); (A 5)
where
(dyf (t))
2 = (￿f (t))
2 dt; (A 6)
and
(dyc (t))
2 = (￿c (t))
2 dt; (A 7)
Finally, assuming that Wf (t) and Wc (t) are independent, we have that
dyf (t)dyc (t) = ￿f (t)dWf (t)[(￿ (yf (t) ￿ yf (t ￿ ￿))dt + ￿c (t)dWc (t))] = 0:
(A 8)
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As e s(t) = h(e x(t)) we have
h(e x(t)) ￿ h(e x(0)) =
t Z
0
















f (t) and ￿2
c (t) are deterministic and taking expectations of (A
10), we get, by construction and the fact that the expectation of an Ito integral
is zero, that















Di⁄erentiating (A 11) with regard to t gives
d
dt














According to equation (23) in the main text, we have
h(e x(t)) = e x(t) +
￿￿￿
￿
e￿￿ + ￿ e E (t) (A 13)
Now, de￿ning e E (t) formally as16
e E (t) =
d
dt
E [h(e x(t))] (A 14)
we have






E [h(e x(t))]: (A 15)
16The proper de￿nition of e E (t) for this argumentation is e E (t) = d
dtE [h(e x(t))]. Hence, E (t) =
e E (t) +
￿￿
￿ e￿￿ = d
dtE [h(e x(t))] +
￿￿
￿ e￿￿ = d
dtE [(x(t))] ￿ d
dtc(t) +
￿￿
￿ e￿￿, inside the band.34 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model
Combining (A 12) with (A 15) gives

































5 = 0 (A 17)
Equation A(17) implies a restriction on h(e x(t)), and (A 16) holds if the inte-
grand is zero partwise, i.e., if

















is true, for ￿xed t at every e x 2 R. This implies that for ￿xed t,
















Thus, by the assumption of symmetry in the model, i.e., that the bounds of the
target zone are of equal length from central parity, i.e., e s(t)
min = ￿e s(t)
max,
and e x(t)
lower = ￿e x(t)
upper = e x(t)
￿ the general solution to the second order
di⁄erential equation (A 19) is





ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)
￿
; (A 20)


























To solve for the constant A, we use the smooth pasting conditionChartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 35






ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿: (A 24)
Substituting this result into the general solution (A 18), we have that





ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)￿
r
￿














and the proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition 2. To establish whether or not the S-curve of the ex-
change rate is above (below) the 45-degree line, i.e., to see whether e s(t) > e x(t),
we need to evaluate the exchange rate function using this inequality. How-
ever, since e s(t) is increasing e x(t) we can evaluate the exchange rate function at
e x(t) = e x￿ (t), and thus if e s(t) > e x￿ (t) the exchange rate will, for all e x(t) in-
side the band, be above (below) the 45-degree line. Furthermore, its maximum
deviation will be greater than the width of the band. Thus,













































ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿
!
; (A 29)36 Chartist Trading in an Exchange Rate Target Zone Model












thus the inequality (A 29) is not as strong as it may seem. However, trying to
solve completely for ￿ is not fruitful since the resulting expression is too complex
to interpret.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assuming UIP in the model, i.e., that the instan-
taneous interest rate di⁄erential is equal to the expected depreciation of the
exchange rate, then from equation (1) in the main text, where E (t) is the mea-






and thus, inside the band
i(t) ￿ i￿ (t) =











ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)￿
￿r
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿ ￿
e x(t)
￿
Assuming (20), and substituting the solution for the exchange rate (24) into (A
31), we get




ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)
r￿
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿ Q 0; (A 32)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the instantaneous interest di⁄erential derived
in the proof of Proposition 3, it is easy to see that for the interest rate di⁄erential
to have a positive correlation with the expected exchange rate depreciation, the
￿rst term on the right hand side of (A 32) must be greater than the second term





ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)￿
r￿
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿; (A 33)

















ere x(t) ￿ e￿re x(t)￿
r￿
￿
ere x￿(t) + e￿re x￿(t)￿
!
; (A 35)











and thus the inequality (A 35) is not as strong as it may seem. However, trying
to solve completely for ￿ is not fruitful since the resulting expression is too
complex to interpret.
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume uncovered interest parity and let i￿ (T;t)
be the foreign nominal interest rate of a pure discount currency bond, purchased
at time t for term-T. That is, the bond is maturing at time t + T with T > 0.
Let i be the domestic nominal interest rate when fundamentals are equal to x.
Then, the term-T interest rate di⁄erential, denoted ￿ (x;c;T), given the current
level of fundamentals and expected realignment during term-T, is given by
i(x;t;T) ￿ i￿ (t;T) = ￿ (x;c;T) =
Et[E (t + T) j x(t) = x] ￿ E(t)
T
; (A 36)
i.e., the measure of the expected depreciation of the exchange rate divided by
the time to maturity.
Since the exchange rate and the fundamentals are Markov processes, the
interest rate di⁄erential will only depend on the level of the fundamentals at
the time of purchase, x(t); and the term-T: Hence, the interest rate di⁄erential
will not depend on the time of the purchase of the bond, i.e., of t. This implies
that we can set the purchase time equal to zero and the exchange rate as a
function of x and T only. Now, the measure of the expected exchange rate
is, in this model, a sum of two components; the expected depreciation of the
exchange rate within the band and the expected realignment of the band, i.e.,




e E (T) j e x(0) = e x;c(0) = c
i
￿ e E (0)
T
+




The second term in (A 37) is the expected change in central parity. Since
the parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿ are assumed to be constant, and unchanged by
realignment, and since e￿￿ is determined exogenously, the second term in (A
37) is simply






Let f (e x;T) be the expected change of the exchange rate inside the band, (i.e.,
f (e x;T) = E0
h
e E (T) j e x(0) = e x;c(0) = c
i
￿ e E (0)), (A 37) can be written







since the numerator of the ￿rst term in (A 39) is bounded,
f(e x;T)
T approaches
zero for long maturities, i.e., when T ! 1. Thus,
￿ (e x;c;1) = lim
T!1
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Abstract
Using a chartist-fundamentalist set-up, the present paper derives the ef-
fects on the current exchange rate of central bank intervention. Funda-
mentalists have rational expectations and chartists use a technical trading
strategy which involves the use of so called support and resistance levels
for the exchange rate. Chartists￿trading technique results in two di⁄erent
types of expectations for chartists; bandwagon expectations and regres-
sive expectations. These expectations give rise to a variety of e⁄ects on
the current exchange rate when the central bank intervenes in the for-
eign exchange market. Chartists may enhance or suppress the e⁄ect of
intervention depending on their expectations. The results of this paper
indicate that a chartist channel exists that central banks may be able to
exploit when intervening in the foreign exchange market.
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1 Introduction
Background The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system forced central
banks to seek new ways of managing the exchange rate since then, central bank
foreign exchange intervention has been in focus. In particular, attention has
been paid to the much disputed e⁄ects on the exchange rate of sterilized inter-
vention. Sterilized intervention is most easily described as central banks buying
(selling) domestic currency on the foreign exchange market at the same time as
they make an o⁄setting sell (buy) of domestic currency for domestic bonds on
the domestic monetary market. In this way money supply remains unchanged
and only the stock of worldwide private holdings of domestic bonds changes.
Sterilized intervention is, however, a controversial policy tool. According to
traditional monetary models, it will be ine⁄ective because it does not change
monetary fundamentals. Never the less, just because sterilized intervention does
not a⁄ect monetary fundamentals, it does not mean that it is not an appealing
tool to use in exchange rate policy.1 It may, for example, be e⁄ective in manag-
ing the exchange rate. If this is the case, it may be possible for the central bank
to use sterilized intervention to manage the exchange rate without a⁄ecting do-
mestic policy objectives. Indeed sterilized interventions are frequently used by
a number of central banks in Asia. The Bank of Japan, for example, openly
admits to using interventions when conducting exchange rate policy (Dooley et
al. [13] and Dooley et al. [14]).2
The e⁄ectiveness of sterilized intervention is connected to its capacity to
in￿ uence the level or volatility of the exchange rate. Central banks may for
instance, use sterilized intervention to correct a perceived exchange rate mis-
alignment (such as when the exchange rate has deviated from fundamentals or
from an explicit or implicit target for the exchange rate), or to decrease the
volatility of the exchange rate. When the central bank is attempting to pursue
a target rate or correct a misalignment, it may intervene in the foreign exchange
market in order to reinforce or reverse an existing trend in the exchange rate. If
1 Given that the redistribution of wealth, arising from the sterilized intervention, does not a⁄ect
the demand for goods or the output, so that in￿ation changes.
2 See also the o¢ cial website for the Bank of Japan.2 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
the central bank acts to reinforce an existing trend, it adopts a "leaning with the
wind" strategy (i.e., sell (buy) when the exchange rate is depreciating (appreci-
ating)). If, instead, the central bank acts to reverse an existing trend, it adopts
a "leaning against the wind" strategy (i.e., to sell (buy) if the currency is appre-
ciating (depreciating). Note that, a "leaning with the wind strategy" increases
exchange rate volatility whereas a "leaning against the wind" decreases it. The
e⁄ectiveness of using a "leaning against the wind" strategy in order to correct a
misalignment has, however, been questioned both empirically and theoretically.
The main criticism has been on the basis of the smallness of the central banks￿
trading volumes in comparison with the daily turnover in the foreign exchange
market (Humpage [19]).
There are two dominating explanations as to why sterilized intervention may
have an e⁄ect on the exchange rate level, even though monetary fundamentals
remain unchanged. These are ￿rstly, through the signalling channel and sec-
ondly, through the portfolio balance channel. A third explanation has also been
suggested, a chartist channel. The chartist channel has, however, received much
less attention, despite some empirical support for its existence. The empirical
evidence supporting the two dominating channels is mixed and the controversies
surrounding sterilized intervention have, not yet, been solved satisfactory and
much work remains.
The signalling channel The signalling channel was ￿rst proposed by Mussa
[26] and the hypothesis is fairly straightforward; the central bank conveys, i.e.,
signals, its intentions about future monetary policy through sterilized foreign
exchange interventions. Assuming that expectations about the future spot ex-
change rate a⁄ect the current spot exchange rate and that the market believes in
the central bank￿ s intervention signal, a sterilized intervention has an e⁄ect on
the spot exchange rate because it alters markets expectations about the future
spot exchange rate.
The idea of central banks being able to signal future monetary policy through
interventions implies that they have private information about future funda-
mentals, and that interventions are followed by changes in monetary policy.
Kaminsky and Lewis [22] empirically examined the presumption that interven-Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 3
tions are followed by changes in monetary policy. They found that interventions
were informative about future monetary policy, but most often in the opposite
direction from the signalling hypothesis (i.e., the selling (buying) of domestic
currency was followed by a decrease (increase) in money supply). Humpage [19]
tested for the existence of private information within U.S. monetary authorities,
via testing the superiority of their forecasting skills. He found no evidence of
private information, suggesting that interventions could not be used as a means
of signalling new information to the market. Furthermore, central banks are
known to often use covert sterilized interventions, which is in strict contrast to
the operating of the signalling channel. Dominguez [11] and Hung [20] show
that covert sterilized interventions do actually a⁄ect both the volatility and the
level of the exchange rate, which speaks against the signalling channel.
The portfolio balance channel The portfolio balance channel suggests that,
if foreign and domestic bonds are considered imperfect substitutes (Ricardian
equivalence does not hold), and portfolio managers are risk averse and choose
their optimal portfolio according to a mean-variance behavior, sterilized inter-
ventions will a⁄ect the exchange rate when portfolio managers readjust their
portfolios according to changes in the relative supply of foreign and domestic
bonds. The strongest support for the portfolio balance channel was presented
by Dominguez and Frankel [12],who found empirical evidence of this hypothesis
during the mid 1980￿ s. On the other hand, controlling for the possibility of sig-
nalling, Gosh [18] ￿nds no supportive evidence for the portfolio balance channel
for a sample covering roughly the same sample period. A major issue regarding
the e⁄ectiveness of this channel is that it, theoretically, requires the size of in-
terventions to be rather large in order to have an impact on the relative supply
and demand for domestic and foreign bonds. This is because daily turnover in
trade volume is much larger in comparison with intervention volume.
Technical trading According to questionnaire surveys, technical analysis is
widely used among traders in the foreign exchange market when forming expec-
tations about future exchange rates (Cheung and Chinn [9], Lui and Mole [24],
Menkho⁄ [25], Oberlechner [29] and Taylor and Allen [32]). Technical analysis,4 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
or chartism, does not rely on any underlying economic or fundamental analysis.
Technical analysis involves the use of past exchange rates, traded volumes, and
the volatility of past exchange rates. Chartists extrapolate these into the future
and use them to try and predict trends and trend reversals within the exchange
rates.
The term chartism originally stems from traders￿use of di⁄erent types of time
charts when applying technical analysis to form expectations about the future
exchange rate. Today, a huge variety of di⁄erent tools are used within technical
analysis including both trend indicators and oscillating indicators based on ei-
ther the exchange rate itself, its variance, volatility or the traded volume of the
currency. All these di⁄erent tools are used to detect trends and predict trend
reversals in the exchange rate.3
The chartist channel The chartist channel has received little attention so
far in the literature. However, Hung [20] concludes that the presence of non-
fundamentalist traders, what she calls noise traders (i.e., chartists), whose be-
havior is more or less predictable, constitutes a channel through which sterilized
intervention can be e⁄ective. Furthermore, Hung [20] argues that central banks
can, through covert interventions and a "leaning with the wind strategy", cause
noise traders to believe in a trend reversal and make them act accordingly. If
noise traders dominate the market, or the market is thin enough, this strat-
egy may result in central banks e⁄ectively managing the exchange rate through
covert sterilized interventions. Hung [20] also tests whether or not sterilized
intervention has resulted in increased volatility in the exchange rate, indicating
the use of a "leaning with the wind strategy" and ￿nds supportive empirical
evidence for this hypothesis during parts of the sample period. Dominguez [11],
although not testing the same hypothesis, also found that covert central bank in-
tervention increased volatility whereas open intervention was found to decrease
volatility. Interpreting Dominguez￿ s [11] results in the spirit of Hung [20], would
provide support for the chartist channel and the hypothesis that central banks
may, under some circumstances, use chartists in their exchange rate policy.
3 For a more thorough, but still brief, description of technical analysis the reader can turn to
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However, it would appear that the chartist channel is not an independent
channel as it is necessary for central bank￿ s sterilized intervention to move the
exchange rate, at least initially, so that chartist traders have something to react
on. The chartist channel explains way sterilized intervention may have a greater
e⁄ect on the exchange rate than in a situation where there are no chartists in
the market, and how it possibly has a little more persistent e⁄ect than other-
wise. Through the chartist channel, chartists may act to reinforce a trend or to
cause a trendreversal in the exchange rate, arising from central bank sterilized
intervention.
Previous research There are a few papers, within this are of literature, which
adopt a chartist-fundamentalist set-up in modelling central bank intervention.
However, these papers rely more on a type of fundamentalist channel than on
the chartist channel proposed by Hung [20], when analyzing the e⁄ectiveness of
sterilized intervention.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi [10] use a chartist-fundamentalist model where the
sterilized central bank intervention strategy is known to the market and imple-
mented by fundamentalists in their trading strategy. The central bank￿ s target
rate for the exchange rate is equal to the fundamental value and the central
bank adopts a "leaning against the wind" strategy in interventions to correct
misalignments in the exchange rate. Fundamentalists implement the central
bank￿ s interventions in their trading strategy and increase mean reversion in
the exchange rate. In this way fundamentalists cause chartist trading strategies
to become less pro￿table and, since the weight between chartists and funda-
mentalists depends on the pro￿tability of their respective trading strategies,
the amount of chartists will decrease with intervention. In this way, interven-
tion becomes e⁄ective in reducing misalignments, as it decreases the amount of
chartists in the market and increases the mean reversion of the exchange rate.
Thus, the e⁄ectiveness of sterilized interventions rely on the fact that the central
bank has a target for the exchange rate that is equal to its fundamental value,
and that fundamentalists incorporate the central bank￿ s intervention strategy
into their trading strategy and thereby act to reinforce the e⁄ect of intervention.
Kubelec [23] uses a similar model to that of De Grauwe and Grimaldi [10],6 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
but also incorporates the evolutionary ￿tness measure, developed in a series of
papers by Brock and Hommes ([5], [6], [7], [8]), in determining the weights be-
tween chartists and fundamentalists. This evolutionary ￿tness measure is based
on the pro￿tability of the di⁄erent trading strategies, which in turn depends on
the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value. The weight of
the fundamentalists increases when the deviation of the exchange rate from the
fundamental value of the exchange rate increases. This is because the expected
loss of a chartist strategy, in case of a busting bubble, increases when the de-
viation of the exchange rate from its fundamental rate increases. In Kubelec
[23] central bank interventions are also sterilized and follow a "leaning against
the wind" strategy, making chartist trading rules less pro￿table and, hence, de-
crease the amount of chartists in the market. The decrease in chartist traders
has the e⁄ect of driving the exchange rate closer to fundamentals and of burst-
ing bubbles caused by chartists. Thus, once again the e⁄ectiveness of sterilized
interventions depends on the behavior of the fundamentalists rather than on the
behavior of the chartists.
The intervention strategies used in both of these papers are focused on ex-
ploiting fundamentalists. In De Grauwe and Grimaldi [10] they are used to
drive the exchange rate towards fundamentals, and in Kubelec [23] to correct
misalignments. However, if the central bank has a target for the exchange rate
that is not equal to fundamentals, it would not be able to exploit fundamen-
talist behavior, since fundamentalists would then act opposite to central bank
intervention.
Schmidt and Wollmersh￿user [30] also model sterilized interventions in a
chartist and fundamentalist set-up. In their model, the weights between chartists
and fundamentalists are ￿xed and equal. Schmidt and Wollmersh￿user [30]
assume that the central bank, through covert intervention, tries to exploit
chartists. They use simulations to test di⁄erent strategies that the central bank
can use for their interventions. These are: a targeting strategy, a trend reverting
strategy, and a smoothing strategy. The targeting strategy implies intervening
when the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental value, the trend revert-
ing strategy uses a moving average rule which implies to sell (buy) when the
exchange rate is above (below) the moving average, and the smoothing strat-Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 7
egy implies going against the wind on an everyday basis. The strategies are
evaluated in terms of an intertemporal loss function in which the loss increases
the greater the exchange rate deviation from target and the higher the cost
of intervention. The trend reverting strategy is most e⁄ective in dampening
misalignments followed by the targeting strategy. Smoothing the day-to-day
movements in the exchange rate is less e⁄ective in correcting misalignments
and, with a more aggressive intervention rule, also increases the variance and
thereby the loss. Schmidt and Wollmersh￿user [30] argues that their results
support the existence of a chartist channel.
Approach The present paper takes a portfolio balance framework approach
and incorporates a chartist channel into a monetary model for the foreign ex-
change market. In particular, the chartist channel consists solely of the behavior
of chartists in the market. The portfolio balance approach is, in this context,
necessary to theoretically derive any e⁄ects of sterilized intervention through a
chartist channel. Although the portfolio balance channel has not received much
empirical support it is the most reasonable channel to combine with the chartist
channel. This is because it does not require interventions to be open, in con-
trast to the signaling channel. Further, even though weak, the portfolio balance
channel has received more empirical support than the signaling channel.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model for central bank
intervention in which it is possible to explicitly derive the e⁄ects of di⁄erent
types of intervention on the current exchange rate in the case of both homoge-
neous and heterogeneous expectations (i.e., without and with chartists), and to
compare the e⁄ects of intervention on the current exchange rate in the di⁄erent
cases. More speci￿cally, the aim is to analyze whether there is a chartist chan-
nel through which chartists may enhance, suppress or even reverse the e⁄ect
of intervention, i.e., to examine the theoretical support for the existence of a
chartist channel. Accordingly, it is not necessary to model an explicit policy
objective or exchange rate target for the central bank in order to be able to
analyze the questions in focus for the present paper. However, a benchmark
model is required with which the e⁄ects of intervention can be compared when
a chartist channel is incorporated. Chartists must also be allowed to have a8 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
trading strategy that results in a change in expectations concerning the future
exchange rate, depending on how chartists value the current exchange rate. For
the purpose of the paper and for reasons of mathematical tractability, it is un-
necessary to derive central bank intervention through optimization behavior.
The same is true for the monetary model used in the paper, which is based on a
few equilibrium conditions and is not derived from an explicit optimizing micro
foundation. The same monetary approach is used in Kubelec [23] to model the
foreign exchange market.
The heterogeneous expectations model will o⁄er a chartist channel through
which sterilized central bank interventions are able to a⁄ect the level of the
current exchange rate. Traders in the benchmark model have rational expec-
tations, and in the heterogeneous expectations model, expectations are based
on fundamental and technical analysis. Short-term expectations are based on
technical analysis and long-term expectations on fundamental analysis. Tech-
nical analysis is implemented in such a way, that short-term expectations can
vary depending on how the current exchange rate is valued by chartists and
fundamental analysis is implemented as rational expectations.
Main ￿ndings The present paper ￿nds support for the existence of a chartist
channel. However, the stability restrictions on the model in the heterogeneous
expectations case dampen the e⁄ect of chartists. Although they may indeed
enhance or suppress the e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the current exchange
rate, they can not, in this model, reverse the e⁄ect of intervention. This is, again,
solely because of the stability conditions that restrict the weight of chartists and
the strength of their expectations. There is also a trade-o⁄ between the weight
of chartists and the strength of chartist expectations in the stability condition
for the model. In other words, if the weight of the chartists is low enough, their
expectations may be explosive, whereas if their expectations are non-explosive,
they may dominate the market.
The e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the current exchange rate may be
greater in the heterogeneous expectations model than in the benchmark model
when chartists act to reinforce the e⁄ect of intervention, i.e., when chartists have
bandwagon expectations. The e⁄ect of intervention on the current exchange rateSterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 9
may also be less in the heterogeneous expectations model than in the bench-
mark model when chartists act to oppose intervention, i.e., when chartists have
regressive expectations. Thus, the results indicate the existence of a chartists
channel through which central banks may be able to e⁄ectively manage the ex-
change rate. However, in this model, this postulates a portfolio balance behavior
among traders, i.e., that traders are risk averse, and that foreign and domestic
bonds are imperfect substitutes.
Outline The rest of the paper is as follows, the benchmark model is out-































Figure 1: The di⁄erent types of intervention in the benchmark and heterogeneous
expectations models. Table 1 in subsection 2.1 presents the size of the e⁄ects of the
di⁄erent types of intervention in the benchmark model, shown in Figure 1, third row.
Tables 2A and 2B in subsection 3.3 present the size of the e⁄ects of the di⁄erent types
of intervention in the heterogeneous expectations model, shown in Figure 1, last row.10 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
model are presented in subsection 2.1. Subsection 2.2 compares the di⁄erent ef-
fects of intervention in the benchmark model. The heterogeneous expectations
model is outlined in Section 3, where expectation formations are presented in
subsection 3.1 and the heterogeneous expectations model is formally presented
in subsection 3.2. The e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of intervention in the hetero-
geneous expectations model are presented in subsection 3.3 and subsection 3.4
compares the di⁄erent e⁄ects of intervention in the heterogeneous expectations
model. As can be seen from Figure 1, a huge variety of possible comparisons can
be made. However, not all of these are of interest for this paper. Accordingly,
the comparisons will be limited to the following: comparisons of the e⁄ects of
intervention when the type and character of intervention are held constant (i.e.,
sterilized or non-sterilized, temporary or permanent) and chartist expectations
are of di⁄erent types (i.e., bandwagon or regressive), and comparisons of the ef-
fects of the di⁄erent types of intervention (i.e., sterilized or non-sterilized) when
chartist expectations and the character of the intervention are held constant.
Finally, Section 4 compares the di⁄erent e⁄ects of interventions in the di⁄erent
models and Section 5 summarizes and draws conclusions. The Appendix de-
rives the benchmark and heterogeneous expectations models and the e⁄ects of
the di⁄erent types of intervention in the two models.
2 The benchmark model
Basically, the benchmark model is a two-country monetary model (where the
foreign economy is regarded as the rest of the world) of the exchange rate in
which interventions are introduced via a portfolio balance view. The model is
based on an interest rate parity condition, a purchasing power parity condition
and money market equilibrium conditions.
The formal structure of the model is presented below, all variables, except
the interest rate, are in natural logarithms and Greek letters denote structural
parameters.
The interest rate parity condition is formulated as
it ￿ i￿
t = se
t+1 ￿ st + ￿(c + bt ￿ b￿
t ￿ st); (1)Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 11
where it ￿ i￿
t is the interest rate di⁄erence between the domestic and foreign
market and se
t+1 ￿ st is the expected change of the exchange rate, where s is
de￿ned as the domestic price of foreign currency and the superscript e denotes
expectations. The term ￿(c + bt ￿ b￿
t ￿ st) is the linearized risk premium on
foreign government bonds derived by Flood and Marion [15], and ￿ = ￿￿2, where
￿ is a measure of risk aversion and ￿2 is the variance of the future exchange
rate (where exchange rate variance is assumed constant). Hence, ￿ shows how
investors desired bond holdings are in￿ uenced by risk. The worldwide private
holdings of domestic and foreign bonds, expressed in domestic currency, are
bt and b￿
t + st, respectively, and c is a positive constant that ensures that the
risk premium increases, when ￿ increases. Thus, the term ￿(c + bt ￿ b￿
t ￿ st)
summarizes traders attitude to risk.4
The portfolio balance interest rate parity condition is necessary to derive the
e⁄ects of sterilized interventions. Note that without the assumption of di⁄erent
risks for home and foreign bonds the e⁄ect of non-sterilized intervention on
the current exchange rate would equal one, (i.e., the change in the monetary
fundamentals would equal the change in the current exchange rate), put another
way the elasticity would equal one. Of course, in this case, there would be no
e⁄ect at all of sterilized intervention.
The purchasing power parity condition states that the exchange rate is equal
to the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign price levels according to the
following equation
st = pt ￿ p￿
t; (2)
where pt and p￿
t are the domestic and foreign nominal price levels.
The domestic and foreign money markets are in equilibrium when their re-
spective real money supply is equal to real money demand
mt ￿ pt = ￿￿it; (3)
and
4 The risk premium derived by Flood and Marion [15] is based on a model where a foreign
investor maximizes his welfare, that depends positively on future real wealth and negatively





where m, p and i and are the domestic money supply, the domestic price level,
and the nominal interest rate, respectively, and y is the natural level of output
that has been normalized to 1 before taking logartihms. m￿, p￿and i￿ represent
the foreign counterparts. ￿ is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect
to the interest rate and is assumed to be equal between countries. For reasons
of stability, it is necessary to restrict ￿ according to ￿ 6 1. Assuming ￿ to be
smaller than one does not necessarily have to be so restrictive since empirical
estimates of ￿ in monetary models are most often smaller than one (Gosh [18],
Najand and Bond [27], Schr￿der and Dornau [31]).
Combining (1)-(4), the exchange rate is given by








In the benchmark model we assume that traders are homogeneous and have
rational expectations about the future exchange rate, thus
se
t+1 = Et [st+1jIt]; (6)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations and It is the information set
available at time t, which includes information on the complete model and the
values of the di⁄erent variables up till time t. Substitution of (6) into (5), gives
st = mt ￿ m￿
t + ￿ (Et (st+1) ￿ st + ￿(c + bt ￿ b￿
t ￿ st)): (7)
After solving the model forward, the current exchange rate in the benchmark




















where the di⁄erence in monetary fundamentals is given by
fm
t ￿ mt ￿ m￿
t; (9)
5 For a more detailed derivation of the benchmark model see Appendix A.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 13
and the di⁄erence in outstanding bonds, plus a constant, is given by
fb
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The parameters in the quotient x1;bm summarize the e⁄ect on the exchange rate
due to a change in monetary fundamentals and, the parameters in the quotient
x3;bm summarize the e⁄ect on the exchange rate resulting from a change in
outstanding bonds. This can be shown by di⁄erentiating (8) with regard to
fm
t , fb
t respectively, when k = 0: These e⁄ects are also shown in the Appendix
where the e⁄ects of non-sterilized and sterilized interventions of a temporary
character are derived. The treatment of x4;bm as a convergent in￿nite geometric
series means that the parameters in the quotient x4;bm summarize the enhanced
e⁄ect on the exchange rate if the intervention is permanent and, thus, changes
market expectations. The total e⁄ect in such a case is multiplied by either
x1;bm or x3;bm depending on the type of fundamentals that change. These
e⁄ects are derived for the case of non-sterilized and sterilized interventions of a
temporary and a permanent character in the Appendix. Finally, the subscript
bm denotes the benchmark model. Thus, the current exchange rate depends
solely on expectations of future fundamentals (see the two terms on the right
hand side of (8) in the benchmark model). Since expectations in the benchmark
model are rational and forward looking, the e⁄ects of intervention on the current
exchange rate will di⁄er depending on whether intervention is perceived by the
market as being of a temporary or a permanent character.
The distinction between interventions of a temporary and a permanent char-
acter, is made because, even if the central bank does not announce its intentions,
fundamentalists may perceive the intervention to be either of a temporary or a
permanent character. The e⁄ect on the current exchange rate of intervention
will, of course, be di⁄erent if intervention is of a permanent character than if14 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
it is of a temporary character. In the former case, the fundamentalist expec-
tations on future monetary fundamentals will change, (see equation (8) for the
current exchange rate), and, if the intervention is of temporary character, the
fundamentalist expectations on future fundamentals will, of course, not change.
Henceforth, the type of intervention referred to will always be in italics for easier
reading. We are now ready to analyze the e⁄ects of intervention on the current
exchange rate in the benchmark model.
2.1 The e⁄ects of intervention in the benchmark model
The e⁄ects on the current exchange rate of the di⁄erent types of intervention
in the benchmark model are derived formally in the Appendix and presented in
Table 1 below.








￿￿+1 < 1 0 < 1
￿￿+1 < 1
Note that the e⁄ect on the current exchange rate of a temporary intervention
may be interpreted as the short-term elasticity of the exchange rate with regard
to fundamentals, and the e⁄ect on the current exchange rate of a permanent
intervention may be interpreted as the long-term elasticity of the exchange rate
with regard to fundamentals.
2.1.1 Sterilized intervention
Sterilized intervention is characterized by the central bank buying (selling) do-
mestic currency for foreign currency on the foreign exchange market and o⁄set-
ting the e⁄ect on the money supply by completing the opposite type of transac-Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 15
tion on the domestic monetary market, selling (buying) domestic currency for
domestic bonds.
In the benchmark model, when the foreign exchange market is completely
dominated by fundamentalists with rational expectations, the e⁄ect on the cur-
rent exchange rate of a sterilized intervention of a temporary character, is less
than one. The e⁄ect of a sterilized intervention of a permanent character is
greater than the e⁄ect of a temporary change, but is also less than one (See



















Non-sterilized intervention is equivalent to a change in money supply, but in-
stead of completing the transaction in the domestic monetary market, the cen-
tral bank completes its transactions on the foreign exchange market, where the
central bank buys (sells) domestic currency for foreign currency. The e⁄ect on
the current exchange rate of a non-sterilized intervention of a temporary char-
acter is less than one. The e⁄ect of a non-sterilized intervention of a permanent
character has a greater e⁄ect than an intervention of a temporary character but
















The fact that the e⁄ect is less than one, when the change in the money supply
is permanent is due to the inclusion of risk aversion in the model. If traders are
risk neutral, (i.e., ￿ = 0), the e⁄ect of an intervention of a permanent character
will have a one-to-one e⁄ect on the current exchange rate (see the e⁄ect of an
intervention of a permanent character in Table 1).6
6 Note that, the e⁄ects of intervention derived in this model are derived when output is held
constant (at its natural level), and thus, there are no real e⁄ects of intervention. If output is
a⁄ected by intervention the e⁄ects may be di⁄erent.16 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
2.2 Comparing the di⁄erent e⁄ects of intervention in the
benchmark model
The size of the e⁄ect of intervention on the current exchange rate in the non-
sterilized and sterilized cases will di⁄er only with regard to parameters ￿￿ which
appear in the numerator of the terms representing the e⁄ects of sterilized inter-
vention (see Table 1). The comparison of non-sterilized and sterilized interven-
tions of a permanent character is qualitatively the same as the comparison of
non-sterilized and sterilized interventions of a temporary character (see Table
1).
Thus, comparing the e⁄ects of intervention when intervention is non-sterilized
and sterilized gives the following ambiguous result: if ￿￿ > 1, sterilized interven-
tion has a greater e⁄ect on the exchange rate than non-sterilized intervention;
if ￿￿ < 1, non-sterilized intervention has a greater e⁄ect on the exchange rate
than sterilized intervention; and ￿nally if ￿￿ = 1, the e⁄ect of non-sterilized

















































Hence, under certain circumstances, sterilized intervention may have a greater
e⁄ect on the current exchange rate than non-sterilized intervention. This am-
biguity depends on the size of the risk premium, i.e., on ￿ and on how sensitive
money demand is to the interest rate, i.e., on ￿. The more risk averse investors
are, and the more sensitive money demand is to the interest rate, the more
likely it is that sterilized intervention has a greater e⁄ect on the exchange rate
than non-sterilized intervention. However, note that a stability condition on
the model is that ￿ < 1. Thus, for ￿￿ to be greater than one it is necessary
that ￿ is greater than one, i.e., it is necessary that traders are rather risk averse.
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that ￿￿ 6 1, and that, the e⁄ect on theSterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 17
current exchange rate of sterilized intervention is, at most, equal to the e⁄ect
of non-sterilized intervention.
Note also that if traders are risk neutral, (i.e., ￿ = 0), there is no e⁄ect on
the current exchange rate of sterilized intervention.
3 Heterogeneous expectations
In accordance with De Grauwe and Grimaldi [10], Kubelec [23] and Schmidt and
Wollmersh￿user [30], the heterogeneous expectations model in this paper has a
chartist-fundamentalist set-up. In the mentioned papers, the weight function
between chartists and fundamentalists is a function of the pro￿tability of the
respective chartist and fundamentalist trading strategy. In the present paper,
the weight function in the heterogeneous expectations model is, instead, a func-
tion of the time horizon in currency trade which, according to questionnaire
surveys on the foreign exchange market, is the major determining factor for the
choice of trading strategy (see for example Cheung and Chinn [9], Lui and Mole
[24], Menkho⁄ [25], Oberlechner [29] and Taylor and Allen [32]). Furthermore,
in the present model, the central bank does not, unlike the above mentioned
papers, have an explicit (or implicit) target rate for the exchange rate equal
to fundamentals, which is crucial for the ability of the central bank to exploit
fundamentalists when intervening. Moreover, within the present model, chartist
expectations are also allowed to change with the level of the exchange rate which
according to the di⁄erent trading tools within technical analysis is characteristic
for chartist behavior.
3.1 Expectations formation
In the heterogeneous expectations model, we assume that traders have hetero-
geneous expectations in the form of chartist and fundamentalist expectations.
According to questionnaire surveys (see references in Section 3), the relative
importance of technical versus fundamental analysis in the foreign exchange
market depends on the time horizon in currency trade. For shorter time hori-
zons, more weight is placed on technical analysis, whereas more weight is placed18 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
on fundamental analysis for longer time horizons. In this paper, this empirical
observation is formulated as
se
t+1 = ! (￿)se
f;t+1 + (1 ￿ ! (￿))se
c;t+1; (12)
where se
t+1 denotes the market expectations of the future spot exchange rate,
and se
f;t+1 and se
c;t+1 are the expectations formed by fundamentalists and char-
tists, respectively. In (12) chartist and fundamentalist expectations are weighted
according to a weight function that depends on the time horizon in the currency
trade, ￿. More speci￿cally, the weight function is
! (￿) = 1 ￿ e￿￿; (13)
where the time horizon ￿ is exogenously given in the model7
3.1.1 Technical analysis
According to questionnaire surveys and empirical studies, short term trading is
mainly based on technical analysis, and often results in expectations of static,
extrapolative, regressive or bandwagon type (Allen and Taylor [1], Frankel and
Froot [16], Frankel and Froot [17], Ito [21]). Technical analysis, or chartism, is
based on past exchange rates in order to detect patterns that are extrapolated
into the future. Typically, trend indicators and oscillating indicators are used
conjunctively to help predict trends and trend reversals in the exchange rates.
Oscillating indicators are constructed to oscillate within a speci￿c interval
restricted by so called "oversold" and "overbought" limits. These limits are con-
structed for the purpose of detecting when the market is oversold or overbought
in a currency (indicating that the currency is undervalued or overvalued). When
the indicator oscillates outside of the interval it is interpreted as a signal of a
trend reversal.
Trend indicators are usually a smoothed version of the exchange rate (most
commonly a type of moving average). These are often used in conjunction with,
so called support and resistance levels (alternatively two di⁄erently smoothed
7 Note that the weight function used in the present paper is inspired by the weight function
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versions of the exchange rate are used to identify crossovers), to help detect
trendreversals.
In the present paper, technical analysis is based on the use of such an in-
terval, delimited by a type of support and resistance levels. This means that if
the exchange rate moves outside the interval a trend reversal is expected. More
speci￿cally, if the exchange rate is above the support level, the currency is con-
sidered to be "undervalued" and is expected to appreciate and, if the exchange
rate is below the resistance level, the currency is considered to be "overvalued"
and is expected to depreciate. Thus, the support and resistance levels are set
with the purpose of identifying trend reversals in the exchange rate path, and
in the present paper, the support and resistance levels are assumed to be ￿xed.
Hence, chartists expectations will become regressive, when the exchange rate
is outside the interval delimited by the support and resistance levels. This means
that, if the exchange rate is depreciating, it is expected to start appreciating,
and vice versa. When the exchange rate is in between the support and resistance
levels, expectations are of bandwagon type, meaning that, if the exchange rate
is depreciating (appreciating) it is expected to keep depreciating (appreciating).
This is an extremely trivial type of trading rule and is constructed for simplicity
and tractability. However, it mimics a simple version of the chartist trading rules
most commonly used by the traders included in the survey carried out by Taylor
and Allen [32], i.e., moving averages, oscillators and momentums.
Let S and R be the support and resistance levels for the exchange rate
and assume for simplicity that they are set exogenously. Speci￿cally, chartist





c;t+1 = ￿￿st; if R < st < S; where 0 < ￿
￿se
c;t+1 = ￿￿￿st; if st 6 R; or if st > S; where 0 < ￿:
(14)
Hence, if the exchange rate is in between the interval delimited by the support
and resistance levels, (i.e., if R < st < S), chartist expectations are of band-
wagon type. This means that if ￿st < 0, then ￿se
c;t+1 < 0 and the exchange
rate is expected to further depreciate, and if ￿st > 0, then ￿se
c;t+1 > 0 and the
exchange rate is expected to further appreciate. If the exchange rate is outside20 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
this interval, (i.e., if st < R; or st > S), chartist expectations shift and become
regressive. Thus, if ￿st < 0, then the exchange rate is expected to start appreci-
ating, and if ￿st > 0, then the exchange rate is expected to start depreciating8.
Hence, chartists act to reinforce or reverse trends in the exchange rate.
Note that there is a stability condition in this model that restricts ￿ according
to ￿e￿￿ 6 1 ￿ e￿￿. Accordingly, there is a trade-o⁄ between the weight of
chartists and the size of ￿ in the model.9 Put another way, the stability condition
restricts the time horizon in currency trade according to; ￿ > ln(1 + ￿). Thus,
the time horizon in currency trade may not become too myopic, i.e., the weight
of chartists may not become too high. However, how high depends on the size
of ￿.
According to the conventional de￿nition of bandwagon expectations, the
parameter ￿ in (14) above is de￿ned as ￿ > 1. Thus, chartists expectations are,
in this model, of bandwagon type. However, they do not necessarily have to be
bandwagon expectations, since, in this model 0 < ￿. Nevertheless, they will,
henceforth, be referred to as bandwagon expectations. Further, even though
chartist expectations are referred to as regressive in this model, it does not
mean, as it generally does, that the exchange rate is expected to regress to
its fundamental value. Instead it means that the exchange rate is expected to
regress back between the chartist support and resistance levels. Nevertheless,
this type of expectations will, henceforth, be referred to as being regressive.
3.1.2 Fundamental analysis
According to questionnaire surveys, medium to long term trading is mainly
based on fundamental analysis. Two empirical papers providing support for the
use of monetary fundamentals (monetary models) in forecasting exchange rates
in the medium to long run10 are Najand and Bond [27] and Schr￿der and Dornau
[31]. In the present paper, fundamental analysis is based on rational expecta-
tions, i.e., the fundamentalists know the complete monetary model for exchange
8 Hence, we can view the switch from bandwagon expectations to regressive expectations as a
multiplication of ￿ with ￿1.
9 See Appendix A for more details.
10Six months in Schr￿der and Dornau [31] and 12-36 months in Najand and Bond [27].Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 21
rate determination. Speci￿cally, fundamentalist expectations are formulated as
se
f;t+1 = Et [st+1jIt]; (15)
where Et (st+1) is the mathematical expectation of st+1 based on the informa-
tion set available at time t, which includes information on the complete model
and the values of the di⁄erent variables up till time t. Thus, the fundamentalists
take chartist trading into account when forming their expectations about the
future exchange rate.
3.2 The heterogeneous expectations model
The heterogeneous expectations model, with both chartists and fundamentalists
in the market, becomes rather complicated. The Appendix presents a deriva-
tion of the solution of the heterogeneous expectations model presented in (16)
below. However, in simple terms, the model is solved forward by the use of the
undetermined coe¢ cient method and by combining equations (5) and (12)-(15).
The solution below is given for when chartists have bandwagon expectations
(i.e., when the exchange rate is in between the chartist support and resistance
levels). When chartist expectations change and become regressive (i.e., when
the exchange rate is outside of the chartist interval restricted by the support and
resistance levels) the root expression in (17) changes, but otherwise (16) remains
unchanged. In the heterogeneous expectations model, the current exchange rate
is given by
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where j￿1j < 1. The characteristic equation, and thus, the root expression
changes slightly depending on chartists￿type of expectations. Given that char-
tists have bandwagon expectations, the stable root, ￿
bw
1 , is positive and <1
and, given that chartists have regressive expectations, the stable root, ￿
reg
1 ,
is negative and >-1.11 The parameters in the x1;hm, x2;hm, x3;hm and x4;hm
quotients are
8
> > > > > > > <

















t in (16) are given by (9) and (10), respectively. The subscript
hm denotes the heterogeneous expectations model.
The xhm-parameters in the heterogeneous expectations model are similar to
the xbm-parameters in the benchmark model but di⁄er with regard to both the
weight of chartists and fundamentalists, and the chartist expectations, which
are included in the xhm-parameters but not in the xbm-parameters. In the
heterogeneous expectations model, the xhm-parameters do not appear single-
handedly but are combined in the quotients in equation (16). However, the
interpretation of the quotients including the xhm-parameters in (16) are equiv-
alent to the xbm-parameters in equation (8) for the current exchange rate in the
benchmark model. The quotients also include the stable root ￿1, which results
in a saddle path solution for the model. We are now ready to analyze the e⁄ects
of intervention on the current exchange rate in the heterogeneous expectations
model.
3.3 The e⁄ects of intervention in the heterogeneous ex-
pectations model
Tables 2 and 3 present the e⁄ects of non-sterilized and sterilized intervention on
the current exchange rate in the heterogeneous expectations model. The e⁄ects
of intervention are derived formally in the Appendix.
11For more detailed expressions see Appendix A.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 23
Table 2: The e⁄ects of intervention in the heterogeneous expectations model
















Table 3: The e⁄ects of intervention in the heterogeneous expectations model





















The e⁄ect of a temporary sterilized intervention on the current exchange rate
is positive and less than one regardless of the type of expectations held by
chartists. The e⁄ect of a permanent sterilized intervention on the current ex-
change rate may also be less than one (see Tables 2 and 3) but larger than the








































Note that when chartists have regressive expectations, the e⁄ect on the current
exchange rate of both types of intervention becomes smaller the greater the
weight put on chartists, i.e., the smaller ￿, the time horizon in trade, becomes.
The opposite is true for when chartists have bandwagon expectations, that is, the
greater the weight put on chartists, the larger the e⁄ect of intervention. Hence,
when chartists have bandwagon expectations, they act to increase the e⁄ect of
intervention on the current exchange rate and, when chartists have regressive
expectations, they act to decrease the e⁄ect of intervention. The stronger the
chartists￿expectations are, i.e., the larger ￿ is, the more emphasized these e⁄ects
become. This result is in line with the workings of the chartist channel as it
was described in the introduction.
3.3.2 Non-sterilized intervention
The analysis of the e⁄ects of non-sterilized interventions, is similar to the analy-
sis of the sterilized interventions both in the case of a temporary and a permanent




































Note that it is also possible that the e⁄ects on the current exchange rate of a
permanent intervention, in both the sterilized and non-sterilized cases, may be
larger than one (i.e., a long-term elasticity of the exchange rate with regard to
fundamentals greater than one). The greater the weight put on chartists, when
they have bandwagon expectations, the more likely it is that the e⁄ect will be
larger than one (see the expressions for permanent sterilized and non-sterilized
intervention in Tables 2 and 3). Again, ￿ works to emphasize these e⁄ects.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 25
3.4 Comparing the di⁄erent e⁄ects of intervention in the
heterogeneous expectations model
3.4.1 Comparing the e⁄ects of non-sterilized and sterilized interven-
tion
Given that chartist expectations are held constant and that interventions are of
the same character (temporary or permanent), this comparison is qualitatively
equivalent to the comparison of non-sterilized and sterilized intervention in the
benchmark model. Thus, whether the e⁄ect on the current exchange rate is
greater in the case of non-sterilized intervention or not, depends on whether
￿￿ 7 1. If ￿￿ < 1, the e⁄ect of intervention on the current exchange rate is
greater in the non-sterilized case and vice versa if ￿￿ > 1. The e⁄ects are of the




















































Again, this result is due to the portfolio balance approach used in the model
and is independent of chartist expectations. Accordingly, for a more detailed
interpretation of these results the reader can turn to the comparison of the
e⁄ects of non-sterilized and sterilized intervention in the benchmark model.
3.4.2 Comparing the e⁄ects of intervention when chartist expecta-
tions are di⁄erent
Given that the type and character of the intervention (permanent or temporary
and sterilized or non-sterilized) are qualitatively identical in both cases, it is
possible to compare the e⁄ects of intervention on the current exchange rate
when chartist expectations are of di⁄erent type. Whether or not the e⁄ect of an
intervention on the current exchange rate is greater when chartist expectations26 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
are of bandwagon type than when they are of regressive type, hinges, in all





is derived from the di⁄erence between the denominators of the expressions in
Tables 2 and 3 for bandwagon and regressive expectations, where the ￿rst term
is negative and the second term is positive as 0 > ￿
reg
1 > ￿1. Thus in the case of




1 ) < 0, the e⁄ect on the
current exchange rate of sterilized intervention is greater when chartists have





1 ) > 0, the e⁄ect on the current exchange rate of sterilized
intervention is greater when chartists have regressive expectations than if they




1 ) = 0
the e⁄ect on the current exchange rate of sterilized intervention is the same in
























































































It is clear that the e⁄ect of intervention on the current exchange rate is larger
in the case of bandwagon expectations when these are strong (i.e., if ￿ is
large) and the weight on chartists is high (i.e.,if ￿ is small). The size of ￿e￿￿





1 ) < 0 to hold.12 This result truly lends support to the ex-
istence of a chartist channel. Thus, depending on their expectations, chartists
may act to increase or decrease the e⁄ect of intervention on the current ex-
change rate, but they can not reverse the e⁄ect of intervention. Given that the
12For simplicity lets assume that ￿e￿￿ =
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿
, i.e., that the stability condition is at its









1 ) < 0, because the roots are both
in absolute values smaller than one. Simulation show that the inequality remains robust for
most values of ￿e￿￿ under the stability condition.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 27
exchange rate is in between chartist support and resistance levels, chartists will
act to increase the e⁄ect of intervention and, given that the exchange rate is
outside this interval, they will act to decrease the e⁄ect of intervention.
Note that the stability condition used in the model is a su¢ cient condition,
and given that the weight of chartists is low enough, it is not necessary for ￿
to be smaller than one. On the other hand, if the weight of chartists is higher
than the weight of fundamentalists, it is necessary for ￿ to be smaller than one.
Thus, when the model is stable, it is possible to include chartists with explosive
bandwagon expectations given that the weight of chartists is low enough, or
alternatively, it is possible to have chartists dominating the market given that
their expectations are not explosive.
Now, the reader may wonder what will happen if the intervention causes
the exchange rate to fall outside the chartist interval (i.e., to cross either the
support or the resistance level). We have not been able to derive this e⁄ect as
it would require a two period model. However, a reasonable guess would be
that, in the ￿st period, chartists would enhance the intervention and push the
exchange rate rather far outside the interval and in the next period they would
(given that the weight of chartists is high enough for them to a⁄ect the level
of the current exchange rate) cause a trend reversal in the exchange rate path.
A comprehensive theoretical model is required, however, in order to be able to
further investigate this issue.
4 Comparing the benchmark model to the het-
erogeneous expectations model
Comparing the results of the di⁄erent models gives an indication of how chartists
may in￿ uence the e⁄ects of intervention on the exchange rate. We have already
noted that the e⁄ects of sterilized and non-sterilized intervention are qualita-
tively the same in the di⁄erent models (again see Tables 1, 2 and 3). The
results of the comparisons show that the e⁄ect of intervention on the current
exchange rate is more likely to be greater in the heterogeneous expectations
case when chartist expectations are of bandwagon type and, in the homogenous28 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
expectations case, when chartist expectations are regressive.
We start by looking at temporary intervention. In this case, it is clear
that the e⁄ect of intervention on the current exchange rate is greater in the
heterogeneous expectations model if chartists have bandwagon expectations.
If chartist expectations are regressive the e⁄ect of intervention on the current
exchange rate is likely to be smaller in the heterogeneous expectations model































Looking at interventions of a permanent character, the result is more ambiguous.
However, if bandwagon expectations are strong in the heterogeneous expecta-
tions model, i.e., ￿ is large, or if the weight of chartists is high, i.e., ￿ is small,
(although within the assumed limit of the model), the e⁄ect of a permanent
intervention is larger in the heterogeneous expectations model. On the other
hand, if regressive expectations are strong in the heterogeneous expectations


































The model￿ s stability conditions which restrict the size of ￿ and the weight of
chartists e￿￿ mean that chartists are not able to reverse the e⁄ect of interven-
tion on the current exchange rate, i.e., cause a so called perverse response to
intervention, when their expectations are regressive. A perverse response to
intervention is when traders act to cause the domestic currency to depreciate
(appreciate) when the central bank intervenes to decrease (increase) the money
supply. Note that, the stability condition used in the model is a su¢ cient condi-
tion and, depending on other parameter values, we could have a stable solution
even when ln(1 + ￿) > ￿. In this case a perverse response is highly likely,
especially if, as Hung [20] argues, the market is thin enough.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 29
5 Concluding remarks
The main purpose of the present paper was to establish whether or not there
exists a chartist channel through which sterilized intervention may be e⁄ective.
The results of the benchmark and heterogeneous expectations models clearly
show that sterilized intervention may have a greater e⁄ect on the current ex-
change rate than non-sterilized intervention. In the benchmark model, this
result is due to the portfolio balance framework, whereas, in the heterogeneous
expectations model, it also depends on how the market perceives the central
bank￿ s intentions with intervention and on market expectations about the fu-
ture exchange rate. The results of the heterogeneous expectations model lend
support to the existence of a chartist channel which central banks may be able to
exploit. Earlier theoretical papers within this area have not, to our knowledge,
been able to show any clear indication of the existence of a chartist channel.
However, as is clearly shown in the present paper, the chartist channel does not
appear to be an independent channel. Traders have to be risk averse in order
for a sterilized intervention to have an e⁄ect on the current exchange rate, i.e.,
a "portfolio balance behavior" among traders is required.
Within the heterogeneous expectations model, technical and fundamental
analysis, as well as the weight function between chartists and fundamentalists
are modelled with the aim of mimicking real behavior among traders such as that
described in the results of questionnaire surveys on the foreign exchange market
(see previously mentioned surveys). To be able to support a chartist channel it
appears to be necessary to allow chartists to act on the foreign exchange market
either to reinforce or reverse trends in the exchange rate. As sterilized central
bank interventions are often small in volume compared with the daily market
turnover and, given that they have an e⁄ect, they are only likely to change
the current exchange rate slightly. Nevertheless this may be su¢ cient to cause
chartists to act on a trend or a trend reversal in the exchange rate. In this way,
the e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the current exchange rate may become
signi￿cant.
In the present paper, chartist expectations are formulated with su¢ cient
￿ exibly to allow for variations in behavior among chartists and they may both30 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
enhance and suppress the e⁄ects of intervention depending on their type of ex-
pectations. If chartist have bandwagon expectations, they act to increase the
e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the current exchange rate whereas, if their
expectations are regressive, they act to decrease its e⁄ect. Thus, the e⁄ect of
sterilized intervention may indeed be larger (smaller) in the case of heteroge-
neous expectations, when chartist expectations are of bandwagon (regressive)
type than in the case of homogeneous expectations. The greater the weight on
chartists, the more likely it is that the e⁄ect of sterilized intervention on the
current exchange rate will be larger in the heterogeneous case when chartists
have bandwagon expectations.
However, the model￿ s stability condition means that chartists cannot cause
a perverse response to intervention. An interesting path to pursue in future
research would be to explore whether, and under what circumstances, chartists
are able to reverse the e⁄ect of intervention. Empirically perverse responses
to intervention have been documented, by for example, Kaminsky and Lewis
[22]. Perverse responses to intervention also coincide well with how Hung [20]
explains the operation of a chartist channel. Another interesting extension to
this paper would be to include a reason for the central bank to intervene in the
foreign exchange market. This could, for example, be a policy objective for the
central bank which is implemented through a loss function. The gains and losses
occurring to the central bank as a consequence of its intervention could also be
considered. If, for example, chartists cause a perverse response to intervention
and the central bank tries to use this fact, it will result in losses in wealth for
the central bank. However, implementing the type of chartist behavior used
in this model is rather complicated and requires a fairly simple model to be
(mathematically) computational. Including policy objectives, a loss function,
and maybe some type of budget restriction on central bank interventions, tend
to complicate matters when chartists are incorporated in the model in this way.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 31
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Appendix
Derivation of the benchmark model
Combining (7 and 6) we get
st = mt ￿ m￿
t + ￿ (Et (st+1) ￿ st + ￿(c + bt ￿ b￿
t ￿ st)): (A 1)
Hence, the current exchange rate is now given by
st = x1;bmfm
t + x3;bmfb
t + x4;bmE (st+1): (A 2)
where
8
> > > <










and where the di⁄erence in monetary fundamentals are given by
fm
t ￿ mt ￿ m￿
t; (A 4)
and the di⁄erence in outstanding bonds is given by
fb
t ￿ c + bt ￿ b￿
t: (A 5)
Iterating (A 2) one period ahead and substituting back into the last term on
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4 E (st+kmax+1) = 0: (A 8)




















which completes the derivation of the benchmark model given in (8)-(11) in the
main text.
The e⁄ects of intervention in the benchmark model
The following computations derive the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types intervention on
the current exchange rate in the benchmark model. The e⁄ects are derived
under the assumption that the current exchange rate is given by (8)-(11) in the
main text and that central bank intervention that takes place at time t = t0.
All the e⁄ects derived below are presented in Table 1, subsection 2.1.






















1 + ￿ (1 + ￿)
< 1: (A 12)

















13If the transversality condition does not hold, there exists a rational bubble. However, in this
paper, we concentrate on the stable solution.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 37
which, since x4;bm =
￿




may be calculated as a convergent


























< 1: (A 15)
The e⁄ect on the current exchange rate of a non-sterilized intervention of a
temporary character, is
dst0 = x1;bmdfm




















1 + ￿ (1 + ￿)
< 1: (A 18)

















which, since x4;bm =
￿




may be calculated as a convergent


























< 1: (A 21)38 Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel?
Derivation of the heterogeneous expectations model
From (7) in the main text, we have








Combining (A 22) with market expectations (12) in the main text gives
st = x1;hmfm
t ￿ x2;hmst￿1 + x3;hmfb
t + x4;hmE (st+1); (A 23)
where 8
> > > > > > > <

















t are given by (A 4) and (A 5), respectively. Following the
method of undetermined coe¢ cients (the UC method), (Blanchard and Khan
[4], Blanchard and Fisher [3]), the form of the general solution for the model,
based upon repeated substitution, is

















The UC method requires ￿nding values of ￿; ck; dk that make (A 25) a solution
to (A 23). We start by iterating (A 25) one step ahead, to get an expression for
Et (st+1)








































t :Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 39


































For (A 25) to be a solution to (A 23), then (A 28) must be equal to (A 25),
i.e., the coe¢ cients before the variables s; fb; fm must be equal in both equa-
tions. Thus, setting (A 25) equal to (A 28) and solving for the undetermined













= 0; (A 30)













Depending on the type of chartist expectations, the roots change slightly. Specif-




1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿)




1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿)








1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿)




1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿)




1 ￿ e￿￿ ;




1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)




1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)








1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)




1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)




1 ￿ e￿￿ ;
where the superscript REG denotes regressive expectations. Given that ￿e￿￿ 6


















1 ￿ e￿￿ > 1 + A (A 33b)
A2 +
￿e￿￿
1 ￿ e￿￿ > 1 + A2 + 2A
￿e￿￿
1 ￿ e￿￿ > 1 + 2A;














1 ￿ e￿￿ 6 ￿1 (A 34a)




1 ￿ e￿￿ 6 ￿(1 + B) (A 34b)
B2 ￿
￿e￿￿
1 ￿ e￿￿ 6 1 + B2 ￿ 2B
￿
￿e￿￿
1 ￿ e￿￿ 6 1 ￿ 2B
1 +
￿e￿￿
1 ￿ e￿￿ > 2B
which is a contradiction given that ￿e￿￿ 6 1 ￿ e￿￿, and that ￿ 6 1, since
B =
1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)
2￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)
> 1; if ￿ 6 1;
1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)
2￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)
￿ 1 > 0
1 + ￿(1 ￿ e￿￿ + ￿ + ￿e￿￿)
2￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)
￿
2￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)
2￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)
> 0
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿ + ￿￿ + ￿￿e￿￿ ￿ 2￿ + 2￿e￿￿
2￿ ￿ 2￿e￿￿ > 0
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿e￿￿ + ￿￿ + ￿￿e￿￿
2￿ ￿ 2￿e￿￿ > 0:
Assuming ￿ = 0, and disregarding the denominator as it is positive, we have
1 + ￿(e￿￿ + ￿e￿￿ ￿ 1) > 0
thus, if ￿ 6 1, this inequality holds.
Accordingly, the root ￿
REG
1 is stable and
￿1 < ￿
REG
1 < 0: (A 34c)





2 < ￿1: (A 35)
To continue solving the undetermined coe¢ cients, the rest are as follows:
- For fm



































Substituting the expressions for the new coe¢ cients into the solution for (A 23),
i.e., into (A 25), and using the stable root ￿1, gives






























Equation (A 37) is the solution of the model when there are both chartists
and fundamentalists in the market, i.e., the heterogeneous expectations model.
Thus, the derivation of the heterogeneous expectations model given in (16)-(18)
in the main text is completed.Sterilized Intervention - A Chartist Channel? 43
The e⁄ects of intervention in the heterogeneous expecta-
tions model
The following computations derive the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of intervention
on the current exchange rate in the heterogeneous expectations model. It is
assumed that the current exchange rate is given by (16)-(18), and that the
central bank intervention takes place at time t = t0. In the heterogeneous
expectations model, the e⁄ects of intervention will di⁄er depending on which
type of expectations chartists have when the intervention takes place. Thus,
the e⁄ects of intervention are presented separately in each case for di⁄erent
type of expectations. Henceforth, BW denotes bandwagon expectations and
REG denotes regressive expectations among chartists. All the e⁄ects derived
below are presented in Tables 2A and 2B, subsection 3.3.
















































1 ) < 1
(A 41)
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since x4
(1+x4￿1) = ￿ 1
￿2 and j￿2j > 1, x4

























































































and thus, depending on the type of chartist expectations
14Since ￿1 + ￿2 = ￿ 1
x4 , which gives ￿2 = ￿ 1
x4 ￿ ￿1, and ￿￿2 =
1+x4￿1





























1 ) < 1
(A 48)

















and again, since x4
(1+x4￿1) = ￿ 1
￿2 and j￿2j > 1, x4
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is threefold: (i) to investigate if there is a unique REE
in the small open economy in Galí and Monacelli [10] that is augmented with
technical trading in the foreign exchange market; (ii) to investigate if the unique
REE is adaptively learnable in recursive least squares sense; and (iii) to inves-
tigate if the unique and adaptively learnable REE is desirable in an in‡ation
rate targeting regime in the sense that a low and not too variable CPI in‡ation
rate in equilibrium is achieved. The monetary authority is using a Taylor rule
when setting the nominal interest rate, and we investigate the properties of the
model developed numerically. A main conclusion is that the monetary authority
should increase the interest rate when the CPI in‡ation rate increases and when
the currency gets stronger to have a desirable rule that is robust with respect to
the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange market. Thus, the value
of the currency is a better response variable than the output gap in the most
desirable parametrizations of the interest rate rule.
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1 Introduction
Background During the last two decades, a new paradigm in monetary policy
has evolved. This paradigm concerns independent central banks, openness and
in‡ation rate targeting. In other words, monetary policy is conducted by the
central bank without political in‡uence, with the purpose of creating price-
stability and credibility to evade the time-inconsistency problem. Further on,
monetary policy is conducted through interest rate managing with an explicit
target for the in‡ation rate. This new paradigm has been developed almost
without any guidance from the academic literature (see p. 3 in Woodford [21]).
However, since this practise nowadays is established among central banks of the
industrialized countries, the literature within this area is ‡ourishing.
In 1993, John B. Taylor [16] demonstrated that the monetary policy of the
Federal Reserve could be described by the following interest rate rule
 =0 04 + 15( ¡ 002) + 05( ¡ ) (1)
where  is the Federal Reserve’s operating target for the funds rate,  is the
in‡ation rate according to the GDP de‡ator,  is the logarithm of real GDP,
and  is the logarithm of potential real GDP. This kind of rule has been the
center of attention within the monetary policy literature since it was presented
and is often referred to as a Taylor rule. In particular, the Taylor rule in (1)
prescribes setting an operating interest rate target in response to the in‡ation
rate and the (output) gap between the logarithm of real GDP and the logarithm
of potential real GDP.
The key question in the literature is whether this type of interest rate rule,
which does not incorporate a target path for the monetary aggregates, can
control the price level and create price-stability. In other words, the success of
this type of monetary policy rule hinges on the central bank’s ability to shape
market expectations of future interest rates, in‡ation rates and income levels.
It is, therefore, important for the central bank to commit to the rule, be as
transparent as possible in its decision making, and make the correct policy-
decisions as often as possible. Taylor [17] also argues that since the interest rate
rule in (1) describes the Federal Reserve’s policy during a successful period, one2 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
should adopt a rule like this in policy-making in which the interest rate is set
in response to the in‡ation rate and the output gap.
However, since most countries trade extensively with other countries, and,
therefore, should be considered as open economies, one might ask whether some
exchange rate index also should be included in the monetary policy rule. Taylor
[18] does not think so, and the reason is that
“... rules that react directly to the exchange rate ... sometimes work
worse than policy rules that do not react directly to the exchange
rate” (p. 267, italics added).
Instead, Taylor [18] argues that the indirect e¤ect that exchange rates have on
monetary policy, via its e¤ect on the in‡ation rate and the output gap, is to
prefer since it results in fewer and less erratic changes in the interest rate.
Our model In this paper, two types of Taylor rules are embedded in a the-
oretical framework consisting of a dynamic IS-type equation, a new Keynesian
Phillips curve, and a parity condition at the international asset market. The
…rst rule is a contemporaneous data speci…cation of the output gap, the in‡ation
rate and the change in an exchange rate index (that, in the analysis below, con-
sists of a single exchange rate), whereas the second rule is a contemporaneous
expectations speci…cation of the same variables. Further on, technical trading
is incorporated into the foreign exchange market in the form of extrapolation
of trends in the exchange rate index, and the reason is that several question-
naire surveys made at currency markets around the world con…rm that technical
trading, or chartism, is extensively used in currency trade.
Examples of questionnaire surveys include Cheung and Chinn [7], who con-
ducted a survey at the U.S. market; Lui and Mole [11], who conducted a survey
at the Hong Kong market; Menkho¤ [13], who conducted a survey at the German
market; Oberlechner [14], who conducted surveys at the markets in Frankfurt,
London, Vienna and Zurich; and Taylor and Allen [19], who conducted a sur-
vey at the London market. An extensive exploration of the trading behavior at
the foreign exchange market is also found in Oberlechner [15] that is based on
surveys conducted at the European and the North American markets.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 3
Thus, we include the change in an exchange rate index into the monetary
authority’s interest rate rule, even though Taylor [18] claims that this kind of
rule might worsen the outcome of monetary policy. However, as also is argued
in Taylor [18], more research is needed to investigate whether this claim holds
in all types of models, and our contribution to the literature is to examine to
what extent monetary policy is and should be a¤ected when currency trade is
partly driven by chartism.
Our approach It is well-known that models in economics and …nance, in
which agents have rational expectations regarding some of the variables in the
model, may exhibit a multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria (REE).
This is problematic. For instance, without imposing additional restrictions into
s u c ham o d e l ,i ti sn o tk n o w ni na d v a n c ew h i c ho ft h eR E Et h a tt h ea g e n t s
will coordinate on, if there will be any coordination at all. To give an example,
the e¤ects of monetary policy is not known beforehand: is it the case that the
agents will coordinate on an equilibrium that has undesirable properties, like a
too high in‡ation rate, or an equilibrium with a low in‡ation rate?
Therefore, after augmenting the small open economy in Galí and Monacelli
[10] with technical trading in the foreign exchange market, we explore for which
parameter values we have Taylor rules that give rise to determinacy, i.e., a
unique REE. Further on, which is a self-evident fact, but often neglected in the
literature, is that a unique REE is not the same as a desirable REE. For this
reason, we check whether the REE is desirable in an in‡ation rate targeting
regime. In other words, is the unique in‡ation rate low enough and not too
variable in equilibrium?
In between the questions on determinacy and the desirability of the in‡ation
rate in equilibrium, we investigate if the REE is adaptively learnable in recursive
least squares sense. The reason is that rational expectations is a rather strong
assumption since it assumes that agents often have an outstanding capacity
when it comes to deriving equilibrium outcomes of the variables in a model. This
assumption has, therefore, in the more recent literature, been complemented by
an analysis of the possible convergence to the REE (see Evans and Honkapohja
[9] for an introduction to this literature).4 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
To be more precise, it is assumed that expectations are formed by a correctly
speci…ed model, i.e., a model that nests the REE, but without having perfect
knowledge about the parameter values in the model. However, using past and
current values of all variables in the model, the parameter values are learned
over time since the beliefs are revised as new information is gained. Thus, the
question in focus is this: will the agents learn the parameter values in the model
that corresponds to the unique REE?
Even though questionnaire surveys made at foreign exchange markets around
the world demonstrate that technical trading techniques are used extensively in
currency trade, it is not obvious to what extent these techniques are used at
each moment in time. Clearly, the aforementioned surveys reveal an inverse
relationship between the extent of chartism and the time horizon in currency
trade, but the exact proportion of technical trading is still not known when
conducting monetary policy. Therefore, to …nd robust parametrizations of the
Taylor rules, the desirable properties of a rule should be relatively una¤ected
by the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange market.
Finally, since the model developed is too large for theoretical analysis, we
have to illustrate our …ndings numerically.1 Speci…cally, we use calibrated values
of the structural parameters in our model that are found in other papers within
this research area (see Bullard and Mitra [4] and references therein).
Relation to the literature To slightly simplify the picture, there are two
strands of literature that explore the e¤ects of monetary policy in the new
Keynesian framework. In the …rst strand of literature, an optimal policy rule
for the monetary authority is derived via optimization of a welfare function, but
the conditions for determinacy and adaptive learnability of the REE are often
neglected (see, e.g., Galí and Monacelli [10]). In the second strand of literature,
the focus is on …nding parametrizations of Taylor rules that give rise to a unique
REE that also is adaptively learnable in recursive least squares sense. However,
the interest rate rules that satisfy these criteria are not evaluated using a welfare
function as the metric (see, e.g., Bullard and Mitra [4]).
Our paper …lls the gap between the two aforementioned papers since we, like
1 MATLAB routines for this purpose are available on request from the authors.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 5
Bullard and Mitra [4], search for Taylor rules that are associated with a unique
and an adaptively learnable in‡ation rate in equilibrium, but also, like Galí
and Monacelli [10], evaluate this equilibrium using a loss-function. However, a
discrepancy between our paper and papers in which optimal monetary policy
rules are derived is that we restrict the search for the most desirable rules among
those rules that give rise to determinacy and adaptive learnability of the REE.
The loss-function that we make use of in the analysis concerns the expected
in‡ation rate and the conditional volatility of the in‡ation rate in equilibrium.
Our main …nding Contrary to what Taylor [18] claims, we …nd parametriza-
tions of interest rate rules with robust and desirable properties that include the
change in an exchange rate index. Further on, these rules do not include the
output gap, which might be an advantage since it comes closer to the reality
of central banking. To be more speci…c, due to data revisions, it is often the
case that policy-makers do not have the correct information on a variable such
as real GDP when needed. This is even more true when it comes to a variable
s u c ha sp o t e n t i a lr e a lG D P .
Of course, one should not take our …nding that the Taylor rule should include
the change in an exchange rate index to be robust and desirable too literally
since this result relies on calibrated values of the structural parameters in the
model. Instead, our message is this, if we travesty the quote by Taylor [18]:
Monetary policy rules that react directly to the exchange rate, or an
exchange rate index, sometimes work better than policy rules that
do not react directly to such quantities.
It is self-evident that future research should explore the robustness of our …nding.
Ac a v e a t There are not too many papers that incorporate chartism in a
foreign exchange model, and we believe there are two reasons for this. The
…rst reason is that many researchers do not believe that currency traders using
technical analysis can survive in the market, and the second reason is that even
if some of these researchers are aware of the use of chartism in currency trade,6 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
most of them argue that it is of uttermost importance to explain why these
traders survive in the market.
We are sympathetic to this standpoint, but we also believe that this may be
a hindrance to a better understanding of the e¤ects of technical trading in the
foreign exchange market since it is not easy to develop theoretical models that
satisfactorily explain human behavior at the currency market or at any …nancial
asset market.
Outline of the paper The theoretical framework is outlined in Section 2,
whereas the search for robust Taylor rules with desirable properties is in focus
in Section 3. The paper is concluded in Section 4, and the Appendix contains
technical details.
2 Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework consists of three parts: (i) the small open economy in
Galí and Monacelli [10], which is our baseline model; (ii) equations that describe
the trading behavior at the foreign exchange market; and (iii) a Taylor rule for
the monetary authority. Due to the …ndings in Bullard and Mitra [4], two types
of Taylor rules are investigated: (i) a contemporaneous data speci…cation; and
(ii) a contemporaneous expectations speci…cation. Speci…cally, these two types
of Taylor rules have appealing properties in a closed economy, and our aim is
to investigate if these rules still have appealing properties in an open economy.
The three parts are outlined in Sections 2.1-2.3, respectively.
2.1 Baseline model
Basically, the Galí and Monacelli [10] model is a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. In their
model, the world economy is represented by a continuum of in…nitely small
economies, meaning that since each economy is of measure zero, its policy deci-
sions do not have any impact on the rest of the world. Consequently, there is no
room for strategic behavior in monetary policy-making. It is also assumed thatRobust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 7
the economies share identical household preferences, …rm technology and mar-
ket structure, while di¤erent economies are subject to correlated productivity
shocks. Finally, …rms set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo [6].
After extensive derivations, the Galí and Monacelli [10] model can be reduced














where  is the output gap,  is the nominal interest rate,  is the domestic
in‡ation rate, and  is the natural rate of interest. To be more speci…c, the
output gap is the deviation of output from its natural level, where the latter is
output in the absence of nominal rigidities. The domestic in‡ation rate is the
rate of change in the index of domestic goods prices, and the natural rate of
interest is the real interest rate that is consistent with output’s natural level.
Finally, the superscript  denotes expectations. (In Section 2.2, we will discuss
how expectations are formed in the model.)
For our purpose, (2) is not in an appropriate form since there are no expected
exchange rate terms in the equations. These terms are necessary when modeling
the trading behavior at the foreign exchange market. It is, however, possible
to use the following equations, which are derived in Galí and Monacelli [10], to




 =  + ¢


 =  + ¤
 ¡ 
(3)
where  is the CPI in‡ation rate, 
 is the terms of trade,  is the nominal
exchange rate (or, more broadly, an exchange rate index), ¤
 is the index of
foreign goods prices, and  is the index of domestic goods prices. Speci…cally,
the terms of trade is the relative price of the home country’s import goods in
terms of its domestically produced goods, and the CPI in‡ation rate is the rate
of change in the index of goods prices. Thus, the di¤erence between the two
measures of the in‡ation rate,  and , is that the former measure is based
on all prices for domestically produced goods, whereas the latter measure is8 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
based on all prices within the home country, imported goods included. CPI is
also an abbreviation for consumer price index. Finally, the asterisk denotes a
foreign quantity.
Now, if we rewrite the equations in (2) with help of those in (3), we get two


































where the superscript  denotes (aggregated) expectations at the foreign
exchange market. The third equation in the baseline model, which also is derived






Thus, (5) is a parity condition at the international asset market. Finally, we
assume that the natural rate of interest is governed by the following stochastic
process
 = ¡1 +  (6)






To sum up, (4)-(6) is the complete baseline model that will be augmented with
equations that describe the trading behavior at the foreign exchange market
as well as a Taylor rule for the monetary authority. Note that the stochastic
process in (6) also is assumed to hold in Bullard and Mitra [4].
At this stage, let us say a few words about the structural parameters in our
baseline model. 	0 is the discount factor that is used when the representative
household in the home country maximizes a discounted sum of instantaneous
utilities derived from consumption and leisure.  2 [01] is the share of con-
sumption in the home country allocated to imported goods, meaning that  is
an index of openness of the economy. For example, the equations in (4) reduces
to those in Bullard and Mitra [4] when  =0since the home country is a closed
economy in this case.
2 See the Appendix for the derivation of (4).Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 9
The other two parameters in the model,  and 
, are not that easy to inter-
pret since they are functions of structural parameters in the Galí and Monacelli
[10] model. Shortly,  depends on four parameters: (i) the openness index, ;
(ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption; (iii) the elastic-
ity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in consumption; and (iv)
the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods in consumption. Moreover,

 depends on  as well as three other parameters: (i) the discount factor, 	; (ii)
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply; and (iii) the share
of …rms that set (new) prices in each time period (see Calvo [6]).
Since we investigate the properties of the model developed numerically, we do
not need to emphasize the exact relationships between the structural parameters
in our baseline model and the structural parameters in the Galí and Monacelli
[10] model. Of course, to fully grasp the micro-foundations in the baseline
model and their relationships with the dynamic IS-type equation and the new
Keynesian Phillips curve in (4) as well as the UIP condition in (5), it is necessary
to consult Galí and Monacelli [10].
2.2 Trading behavior at the foreign exchange market
There are two types of traders in the foreign exchange market; (i) agents who
use chartism, or technical analysis, in their trade, meaning that they utilize
past exchange rates to detect patterns that are extrapolated into the future;
and (ii) agents who use fundamental analysis in their trade, meaning that they
have rational expectations regarding the next time period’s exchange rate, or,
as in our model, the next time period’s change in the exchange rate. Thus,
these agents know that there are agents who use technical trading techniques
in currency trade, and they take this into account when forming their exchange
rate expectations.




+1 =¢  (7)
i.e., the chartists expect that the nominal exchange rate will continue to increase
(decrease) in the next time period, if it has increased (decreased) in the current10 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
time period. To be more speci…c, if the exchange rate increased (decreased)
between time periods  ¡ 1 and , the chartists believe that the exchange rate
also will increase (decrease) between time periods  and  +1 .M o r e o v e r , t o
keep the structural parameters in the model developed as few as possible, it is
assumed that these two consecutive increases (decreases) in the exchange rate
are of the same size. Finally, the superscript  denotes chartist expectations.
Then, if we move on to the fundamentalists, it is assumed that they have






which means that the expected change in the exchange rate is equal to the
mathematically expected change in the exchange rate, conditioned on all in-
formation available to this type of currency trader. This information includes
the structure of the complete model as well as past and current values of all
variables in the model, meaning that the dating of expectations is time period
. (However, as will be discussed in Section 3.2.2, when a contemporaneous
expectations speci…cation of the Taylor rule is used by the monetary authority,
we assume that the dating of expectations is time period  ¡ 1.) Finally, the
superscript  denotes fundamentalist expectations.
The expected exchange rate terms that appear in (4)-(5) are aggregated
expectations at the foreign exchange market. Speci…cally, these expectations









= ¢ +( 1¡ )¢
+1
where  2 [01] is the proportion of chartists in currency trade. Thus, aggre-
gated expectations are a weighted average of the current change in the exchange
rate and the next time period’s mathematically expected change in the exchange
rate. Consequently, as long as there are chartists present in the foreign exchange
market, aggregated expectations do not coincide with rational expectations.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 11
2.3 Taylor rules
We will investigate the properties of the complete model using two speci…ca-
tions of the Taylor rule: (i) a contemporaneous data speci…cation of the rule;
and (ii) a contemporaneous expectations speci…cation of the rule. Moreover,
since the nominal exchange rate or the change in this exchange rate may a¤ect
the economy’s outcome in equilibrium, a term including the latter variable is
included in both types of rules
 = 	 +  +  + ¢ (10)
and






where also a constant has been added. (In Section 3.3.1, it will be shown
that this constant is equal to the foreign nominal interest rate.) Thus, in the
Taylor rule in (11), the monetary authority has rational expectations regarding
the change in the exchange rate since it is assumed that they behave as the
fundamentalists.
3 A unique and desirable REE that is learnable?
Now, after having completed the description of our theoretical framework, we
will investigate the properties of the model developed: (i) is there a unique
REE in the model?; (ii) is the unique REE characterized by recursive least
squares learnability?; and (iii) is the unique and adaptively learnable REE de-
sirable in an in‡ation rate targeting regime in the sense that the in‡ation rate
is low enough and not too variable in equilibrium? All three questions will
be answered, for both speci…cations of the Taylor rule in (10)-(11), in Sections
3.1-3.3, respectively.
3.1 Determinacy
Let us begin with the question if there are any parametrizations of the Taylor
rules in (10)-(11) that give rise to a unique CPI in‡ation rate in equilibrium.12 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
3.1.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
If the Taylor rule in (10) is used when the monetary authority is setting the
nominal interest rate, meaning that they respond to current data of the out-
put gap, the CPI in‡ation rate and change in the nominal exchange rate, the
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Thus, to have a unique and stable REE, all three eigenvalues of the following
coe¢cient matrix must be inside the unit circle since ,  and ¢ are free
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However, deriving necessary and su¢cient conditions for determinacy is not
meaningful for practical reasons since these expressions would be too large and
cumbersome to interpret. Consequently, we adopt the strategy in Bullard and
Mitra [4], and illustrate our …ndings for determinacy using calibrated values of
the structural parameters.
3 See the Appendix for the derivation of (12).Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 13
To be more speci…c, the following parameter values, or range of values, are






 =0 024 =0 2
 =0 35 0 ∙  ∙ 4 0 ∙  ∙ 10 ¡5 ∙  ∙ 5
(14)
Of course, the parameters ,  and  do not appear in Bullard and Mitra [4]
since their model is for a closed economy. The index of openness of the economy
is  =0 2. However, to perform a sensitivity analysis of the numerical …ndings,
we will also investigate the case when this index is  =0 4.4 In the former case,
the index is slightly larger than the import/GDP ratio in the U.S., and in the
latter case, which is the parameter setting in Galí and Monacelli [10], the index
corresponds roughly to the import/GDP ratio in Canada and Sweden.
In all …gures below5, the regions in the parameter space of ()
for which we have a unique REE are shown. Speci…cally, since  and  are
given, it is the combinations of  and  that are in the light areas in the
…gures that give rise to determinacy. In Figure 1, there is no technical trading
in the foreign exchange market (i.e.,  =0 ), meaning that all currency trade is
guided by fundamental analysis, and the monetary authority does not take into
account the output gap when setting the interest rate (i.e.,  =0 ).6 In Figures
2 a-b, the proportion of chartists in currency trade has increased to 25 percent,
meaning that 75 percent of the trade is guided by fundamental analysis, and
the parameter value in the Taylor rule that describes the output gap reaction
is  =0and  =2 , respectively. A visible result in Figures 2 a-b is that the
region for a unique REE decreases when the monetary authority reacts stronger
to the output gap. This is also true when there is no chartism in currency trade,
even though we do not show this result explicitly (since there are no determinacy
regions for  ¸ 2, which also is true for  =4when  =0 25). Moreover,
4 Detailed results are available on request from the authors.
5 Figures and Tables are shown after the Appendix.
6 To keep the number of …gures in the paper at a minimum, the regions in the …gures are not
only the regions for determinacy, but also the regions for adaptive learnability. Thus, as also
will be clear in Section 3.2.1, when there is unique REE, the agents that use fundamental
analysis, which also includes the monetary authority, will learn this REE.14 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
if we compare Figure 1 and Figure 2 a, the determinacy region is larger when
there is technical trading in the foreign exchange market.
In Figures 3 a-c, half of the trade in the foreign exchange market is driven
by technical analysis, whereas in Figures 4 a-c, chartism is used in 75 percent
of the trade. Finally, in Figures 5 a-c, all trade in foreign exchange is based
on technical analysis, meaning that no trade is guided by fundamental analysis.
In all these …gures, the parameter value that describes the output gap reaction
is  =0 ,  =2and  =4 , respectively. When at least half of the trade
in the foreign exchange market is driven by technical analysis, the region for
a unique REE increases when the monetary authority reacts stronger to the
output gap, which is in contrast with the result in Figures 2 a-b. Moreover,
given the output gap reaction in the Taylor rule, the determinacy region gets
larger when the proportion of chartists in currency trade increases (even if it
seems that the size of the regions are the same in Figure 4 c and Figure 5 c).
What is the intuition behind the result that an increase in technical trading
induces a larger determinacy region? There is a similar result in Bullard and
Mitra [5] who investigate the conditions for determinacy (and learnability that
we will discuss in Section 3.2.1) in a closed economy like the one in Bullard and
Mitra [4], where the monetary authority uses a Taylor rule that is augmented
with a term that includes the previous time period’s nominal interest rate to
have policy inertia. Bullard and Mitra [5] conclude that policy inertia helps to
alleviate the problem with a multiplicity of REE, and the similarity with our
model is that an increase in chartism is a form of increased inertia since there
is a larger emphasize on the current exchange rate change instead of the next
time period’s (mathematically) expected exchange rate change.
We will restrict our discussion about the …ndings in the …gures to the results
previously mentioned, and the reason is that we save the conclusions till after
we have investigated the robustness and desirability of a speci…c REE in the
perspective of an in‡ation rate targeting regime. It might, for example, be
tempting to conclude that the monetary authority should not react to exchange
rate changes, if the reaction to the output gap is strong enough and at least
half of the trade in foreign exchange is based on chartism (that is a reliable
assumption according to questionnaire surveys). However, as will be clear inRobust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 15
Section 3.3.1, it is not a favorable approach to restrict the parameter  in the
Taylor rule to 0 since there are several parametrizations of the rule that give
rise to a better outcome in equilibrium in terms of the expected in‡ation rate
and the conditional volatility of the in‡ation rate when   0.
Sensitivity analysis When the index of openness of the economy increases
from  =0 2 to  =0 4, none of the …ndings are a¤ected. That is, when at
least half of the trade in the currency market is driven by technical analysis, the
determinacy region increases when the monetary authority reacts stronger to
the output gap, whereas the opposite is true when less than half of the trade is
driven by chartism. Moreover, given the output gap reaction in the Taylor rule,
the determinacy region gets larger when the proportion of chartists in currency
trade increases. Finally, since we will learn in Section 3.3.1 that robust and
desirable Taylor rules do not include a reaction to the output gap, we observe
that the determinacy region is smaller when the economy is more open when
 =0 .
3.1.2 Contemporaneous expectations in the Taylor rule
If the Taylor rule in (11) is used when the monetary authority is setting the
nominal interest rate, meaning that they respond to current expectations of the
output gap, the CPI in‡ation rate and change in the nominal exchange rate,
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The dating of current expectations in (15) is time period  ¡ 1, meaning that
the monetary authority has rational expectations regarding the variables in the
interest rate rule, conditioned on all information available in the previous time
period.










0 + ² (16)
where ² is a vector with error terms. Consequently, to have a unique and stable
REE, all three eigenvalues of the same coe¢cient matrix as in Section 3.1.1 must
be inside the unit circle since ,  and ¢ are free (see (13)).8 Therefore,
we refer to Figures 1-5 and the discussion around them for the regions in the
parameter space of () for which we have a unique in‡ation rate in
equilibrium.9
Sensitivity analysis Obviously, we get exactly the same results when in-
creasing the index of openness of the economy from  =0 2 to  =0 4 as
when increasing the same index when a contemporaneous data speci…cation of
the Taylor rule is used by the monetary authority. This is because the same
coe¢cient matrix determines the conditions for determinacy for both types of
interest rate rules (see (13)).
8 See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.
9 That is, the regions in Figures 1-5 are the determinacy regions when a contemporaneous
expectations speci…cation of the Taylor rule is used, even if it is written “contemporaneous
d a t as p e c i … c a t i o no ft h eT a y l o rr u l e ”i ns o m eo ft h e… g u r e s( s e eF i g u r e1 ,F i g u r e2a ,F i g u r e
3 a, Figure 4 a and Figure 5 a). In fact, it will turn out in Section 3.2.2 that there are
parametrizations of the contemporaneous expectations speci…cation of the interest rate rule
that give rise to a unique REE that is not adaptively learnable.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 17
3.2 Least squares learning
The assumption in (8) is that when fundamental analysis is used in currency
trade, the agents have rational expectations in the sense that the expected
change in the exchange rate is equal to the mathematically expected change
in the exchange rate, conditioned on all information available to the currency
trader. Thus, since this information not only includes past and current values
of all variables in the model, but also a perfect knowledge about the structure of
the model, rational expectations is a rather strong assumption. This assumption
has, therefore, in the more recent literature, been complemented by an analysis
of the possible convergence to the REE.
It is assumed that expectations are formed by a correctly speci…ed model,
i.e., a model that nests the REE, but without having perfect knowledge about
the parameter values in the model. However, using past and (depending on
the dating of expectations) current values of all variables in the model, the
parameter values are learned over time since the beliefs are revised as new
information is gained. To be more precise, we will examine if the unique REE
is characterized by recursive least squares learnability. But since expectational
stability, or E-stability, implies learnability (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja
[9]), the focus in the analysis will be on E-stability. This is because the latter
concept is easier to handle mathematically.
W h e nt h e r ei sau n i q u eR E Ei nt h em o d e l ,w em a k eu s eo ft h em i n i m a ls t a t e
variable (MSV) solution, which is the solution of a linear di¤erence equation
that depends linearly on a set of variables such that there does not exist a
solution that depends linearly on a smaller set of variables (see McCallum [12]).
This is also the approach taken in Bullard and Mitra [4].
Finally, recall that the agents that use technical analysis do not learn any-
thing since they use a mechanical rule in their trade in foreign exchange.
3.2.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
Let us start with the contemporaneous data speci…cation of the interest rate
rule as it is presented in (10).
First, using matrices and vectors, the model in (12) can be written as follows18 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
¥ ¢ y = ¦ + § ¢ y
+1 + ¨ ¢  (17)
where y =[  ¢]
0 is the state of the economy. A suggested MSV solution
of the model in (17) is, therefore,
y = b £ + b ¤ ¢  (18)
where b £ and b ¤ are parameter vectors to be determined with the method of
undetermined coe¢cients. Hence, calculate the mathematically expected state
of the economy in the next time period
y
+1 = b £ + b ¤ ¢ 
+1 (19)
= b £ + b ¤ ¢ 
where (6) is used in the second step in (19), and the dating of expectations is
time period . Thereafter, substitute (19) into the model in (17)
¥ ¢ y = ¦ + § ¢
³
b £ + b ¤ ¢ 
´
+ ¨ ¢  (20)
or, if solved for the contemporaneous values of the model’s variables,
y = ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ + ¥¡1 ¢ § ¢
³
b £ + b ¤ ¢ 
´
+ ¥¡1 ¢ ¨ ¢  (21)
= ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ + ¡ ¢
³
b £ + b ¤ ¢ 
´
+ ¥¡1 ¢ ¨ ¢ 
= ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ + ¡ ¢ b £ +
³
¡ ¢ b ¤ ¢  + ¥¡1 ¢ ¨
´
¢ 
where ¡ = ¥¡1 ¢ §. Finally, by comparing the parameters in (18) and (21), we
can solve for the MSV solution
y =( I ¡ ¡)
¡1 ¢ ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ +( I ¡ ¡ ¢ )




b £ = ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ + ¡ ¢ b £
b ¤ = ¡ ¢ b ¤ ¢  + ¥¡1 ¢ ¨
(23)
where I is the identity matrix.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 19
Now, is the MSV solution in (22) characterized by recursive least squares
learnability? To have a REE that is learnable, the parameter values in the
perceived law of motion (PLM) of the economy have to converge to the parame-
ter values in the economy’s actual law of motion (ALM) (see, e.g., Evans and
Honkapohja [9]). In fact, the suggested MSV solution in (18) is also the PLM
of the economy (which is emphasized by the “hat”-symbol since £ and ¤ are
parameter vectors that are estimated), and the solution in (21) is the ALM of
the economy.
To be more precise, to have the ALM of the economy, a possibly non-rational
forecast of the next time period’s state of the economy should be substituted
into the model in (17) allowing for non-rational expectations. However, since
the mathematical expression in (21) would not be a¤ected by this substitution,
(21) is also the ALM of the economy. (In Section 3.2.2, when a contemporaneous
expectations speci…cation of the Taylor rule is used by the monetary authority,
we will partly focus the presentation on the derivation of the economy’s ALM.)
Observe that there is a mapping from the parameter values in the PLM to








¥¡1 ¢ ¦ + ¡ ¢ b £
¡ ¢ b ¤ ¢  + ¥¡1 ¢ ¨
!
 (24)




















¥¡1 ¢ ¦ + ¡ ¢ b £








where  is “arti…cial” time. Then, the MSV solution in (22) is E-stable, if the
parameter vectors b £ and b ¤ are locally asymptotically stable under (25). This
is also the case if all eigenvalues of the following matrixes have negative real















b ¤ = ¡ ¢  ¡ I
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Since 0 ∙ 1, we can limit our attention to the …rst row in (26).
It is clear that when there is a unique REE and the state of the economy is in
the neighborhood of the REE, the agents that use fundamental analysis, which
also includes the monetary authority, will learn this REE. To see this result
explicitly, note that the characteristic equation for the determinacy problem is
(see Section 3.1.1)
j¡ ¡  ¢ Ij =0  (27)
where  is the eigenvalue (that has three solutions), and that the characteristic
equation for the learnability problem is
j¡ ¡ I ¡  ¢ Ij = (28)
j¡ ¡ (1 + ) ¢ Ij =0 
where  is the eigenvalue (that also has three solutions). Thus,
Re()=R e(  ¡ 1) (29)
which means that when  is inside the unit circle,  has a negative real part.
Therefore, we refer to Figures 1-5 and the discussion around them for the regions
in the parameter space of () for which we have a unique and an
adaptively learnable in‡ation rate in equilibrium. Be aware that even though
there is a REE that is adaptively learnable in recursive least squares sense, this
REE does not have to be unique.
It is not easy to give the intuition behind the result that an increase in
technical trading induces a larger learnability region. However, there is a similar
result in Bullard and Mitra [5] that we discussed in Section 3.1.1. Speci…cally,
policy inertia not only induces a larger determinacy region in their model, it also
induces a larger learnability region. Thus, since chartism is a form of inertia, it
is reasonable to expect a larger learnability region when the degree of technical
trading in the foreign exchange market increases.
Sensitivity analysis Since a unique REE always is adaptively learnable, we
get the same general results when the index of openness of the economy increases
from  =0 2 to  =0 4 as when increasing the same index when we investigated
the conditions for determinacy.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 21
3.2.2 Contemporaneous expectations in the Taylor rule
Let us continue with the contemporaneous expectations speci…cation of the in-
terest rate rule as it is presented in (11).
First, using matrices and vectors, the model in (15) can be written as follows
¥0 ¢ y = ¦ + ¥1 ¢ y
 + § ¢ y
+1 + ¨ ¢  (30)
where ¥0 ¡ ¥1 = ¥. Therefore, and guided by structure of the model’s MSV
solution, we assume that the PLM of the economy is
y = b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1 + © ¢  (31)
from which we calculate the mathematically expected state of the economy in
the current time period
y
 = b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1 (32)
as well as in the next time period
y
+1 = b £ + b ¤ ¢ 
 (33)
= b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1
Recall that the dating of expectations in (32) is time period ¡1.M o r e o v e r ,t o
have an exact correspondence with Bullard and Mitra [4], we assume that the
dating of expectations in (33) is also time period  ¡1. (Recall that the dating
of expectations when contemporaneous data are used in the Taylor rule is time
period .)
Then, if we substitute the expected states of the economy in (32)-(33) into
the PLM of the economy in (31), we get the economy’s ALM
¥0 ¢ y = ¦ + ¥1 ¢
³





b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1
´
+ ¨ ¢ 
= ¦ + ¥1 ¢
³





b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1
´
+ ¨ ¢ (¡1 + )22 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
or, if solved for the contemporaneous values of the model’s variables,
y = ¥¡1
0 ¢ ¦ + ¥¡1
0 ¢ ¥1 ¢
³




0 ¢ § ¢
³
b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1
´
+ ¥¡1











¥1 ¢ b ¤ + § ¢ b ¤ ¢  + ¨ ¢ 
´
¢ ¡1 + ¥¡1
0 ¢ ¨ ¢ 
Observe again that there is a mapping from the parameter values in the






























































where the equation’s …x point is the MSV solution of the model in (30). Hence,
if the parameter vectors b £ and b ¤ are locally asymptotically stable under (37),
the MSV solution is E-stable, which is the case when all eigenvalues of the









 b £ = ¥¡1






b ¤ = ¥
¡1
0 ¢ (¥1 + § ¢ ) ¡ I
(38)
Due to the fact that 0 ∙ 1, we can limit our attention to the …rst row in
(38), meaning that the relevant characteristic equation is
¯ ¯¥
¡1
0 ¢ (¥1 + §) ¡ I ¡  ¢ I
¯ ¯ =0  (39)
where  is the eigenvalue (that has three solutions).
It turns out that the regions in the parameter space of () for which
we have a unique and an adaptively learnable in‡ation rate in equilibrium areRobust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 23
not the same as when a contemporaneous data speci…cation of the Taylor rule
is used by the monetary authority. See Figures 2-9. To be more precise, the
learnability regions are exactly the same for both types of rules when   0,
but slightly di¤erent when  =0 . In the latter case, the regions are slightly
smaller when contemporaneous expectations of the variables are used in the
interest rate rule than when contemporaneous data are used in the rule (e.g.,
compare Figure 4 a and Figure 8 as well as Figure 5 a and Figure 9). Since the
determinacy regions for both types of rules are exactly the same, this means that
there are parametrizations of the contemporaneous expectations speci…cation of
the interest rate rule that give rise to a unique REE that is not adaptively
learnable. Note that a factor in common for most of these parametrizations is
that   0.
Sensitivity analysis When increasing the index of openness of the economy
from  =0 2 to  =0 4, none of the …ndings are a¤ected. For both parameter
settings, this means that when at least half of the trade in the currency market is
driven by technical analysis, the learnability region increases when the monetary
authority reacts stronger to the output gap, whereas the opposite is true when
less than half of the trade is driven by chartism. Moreover, given the output
gap reaction in the Taylor rule, the learnability region gets larger when the
proportion of chartists in currency trade increases. Finally, when  =0 ,t h e
learnability region is smaller when the economy is more open.
3.3 Robust and desirable Taylor rules
As already discussed in Section 1, our paper …lls the gap between papers that
derive optimal policy rules in the new Keynesian framework and papers that
focus on determinacy and adaptive learnability of the REE in the same frame-
work. For this task, we use a loss-function as our metric that takes the expected
CPI in‡ation rate and the conditional volatility of the CPI in‡ation rate in equi-
librium as arguments.
Moreover, to …nd robust parametrizations of the Taylor rules, the properties
of a rule should be relatively una¤ected by the degree of technical trading in24 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
the foreign exchange market. That is, the rule should give rise to determinacy,
adaptive learnability of the REE, and a desirable outcome according to the
loss-function for most proportions of chartism in currency trade.
3.3.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
Starting with the contemporaneous data speci…cation of the interest rate rule





¡1 ¢ ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ +( I ¡ ¡ ¢ )




and the conditional volatility of the CPI in‡ation rate in equilibrium is
!" ()=
∙³
(I ¡ ¡ ¢ )




(I ¡ ¡ ¢ )






where (2) and (22) refer to the second element in the vector and the second
element along the diagonal in the matrix, respectively. Thereafter, substitute
the assumed values of the structural parameters and the exogenous variables in
the model into the expressions in (40)-(41). Thus, we make use of the parameter
values in (14) in the evaluation of the model’s outcome in equilibrium.





. In addition, we treat  as an exogenous variable. To make the analysis
as simple as possible, we set ¤
 = 
¤
+1 =0 . Moreover, when the variables in
the Taylor rule are at their target values, i.e.,  =  =¢  =0in (10), and
the economy is in a stationary equilibrium, the domestic interest rate is equal
to the foreign interest rate due to the parity condition in (5) that holds at the
international asset market. Thus, the constant 	 in the Taylor rule must be
equal to the foreign interest rate. Finally, we set   ()=¤
, because the
natural rate of interest is, in a stationary equilibrium, equal to the nominal
interest rate due to the …rst equation in (2), which, in turn, is equal to the
foreign interest rate due to the aforementioned parity condition.
The loss-function that we use as our metric to evaluate the desirability of a
speci…c REE is formulated as follows
# = $ (j  ()j¡001) + $
¡
!" () ¡ 022

¢
 (42)Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 25
where $ (¢) is the Heaviside step function.10 Thus, the loss-function in (42) is
minimized and equal to 0 when the expected CPI in‡ation rate is within § 001,
and the conditional volatility of the CPI in‡ation rate is at most 022
.T h e
motivation of the limits for a desirable in‡ation rate is that they are typical in
established in‡ation rate targeting regimes, whereas the choice of the limit for
the variability of the in‡ation rate is somewhat arbitrary. As an example of an
established in‡ation rate targeting regime, the Swedish Riksbank has de…ned
price-stability as an increase in the CPI of two per cent, but with a tolerance
margin of plus/minus one percentage point around this target.
Needless to say, the interest rate set by the monetary authority must be non-
negative. Moreover, we are searching for robust and desirable parametrizations
of the Taylor rule in the sense that the desirable properties of the rule should be
relatively una¤ected by the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange
market, which implies that a robust parametrization of the rule should satisfy
# =0for a range of values of . This is because the exact proportion of chartists
in currency trade is not known when conducting monetary policy.
In Tables 1 a-c, the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange market
is 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 percent, and the interest rate abroad is 001,
002 and 003, respectively. Moreover, we are performing a grid search for
desirable parametrizations of the Taylor rule in which the parameter values in
the rule are whole numbers. (Throughout this section, the choices of sets of  in
the grid search are to avoid matrices that are singular.) Two results are found
in the tables: (i) the monetary authority should increase (decrease) the interest
rate when the CPI in‡ation rate increases (decreases) and when the currency
gets stronger (weaker), but not care about the output gap, to have a desirable
rule that also is robust; and (ii) the number of interest rate rules with these
properties decreases with increases in the foreign interest rate.
In Tables 2 a-c, we have repeated the same procedure with the exception
that the parameter  in the Taylor rule is restricted to 0. As a consequence,
the proportion of chartists in currency trade is limited to 55, 65, 75, 85 and
95 percent since there are no desirable parametrizations of the rule when the
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proportion is 45 percent or lower, having restricted the parameter values in the
interest rate rule to whole numbers. As before, the number of desirable interest
rate rules that are robust decreases with increases in the foreign interest rate.
Further on, which is true irrespective of whether the parameter  in the Taylor
rule is restricted to 0 or not, the monetary authority should react strongly to
changes in the in‡ation rate to have an outcome that is desirable in terms of
the expected in‡ation rate and the conditional volatility of the in‡ation rate in
equilibrium.
In Tables 3 a-c, the grid search for desirable Taylor rules has been re…ned in
the sense that the parameter values in the rules are multiples of 01.T h i sa l s o
means that we restrict the presentation to the share of rules that satisfy # =0
for di¤erent sets of . Three results are found in the tables: (i) the number of
desirable rules decreases when the range of values of  increases, and irrespective
of whether the value of  is restricted to 0 or not; (ii) the number of robust
and desirable rules decreases with increases in the foreign interest rate, and
also irrespective of the value of  (as also noted above); and (iii) the number of
rules that give rise to a unique and adaptively learnable REE, but not restricted
to # =0 , decreases when the range of values of  increases. Of course, that
the share of rules that are associated with determinacy and learnability is not
a¤ected by the foreign interest rate is not surprising since this variable is not
part of the coe¢cient matrix in (13).
But, then, which parametrization of the Taylor rule is the best rule? When
the interest rate abroad is 001 and 002, respectively, it is the same 16 rules
that satisfy # =0for the set of  that includes 5, 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75,
85 and 95 percent chartism in currency trade. Of these 16 parametrizations of
the interest rate rule, the following rule is desirable down to 2 percent technical
trading in the foreign exchange market
 = ¤
 +9 9 ¡ 32¢ (43)
The Taylor rule in (43) fails to be desirable when the interest rate abroad is
003, and this is because the expected in‡ation rate is not within § 001 when
a large proportion of currency trade is driven by technical analysis. Concerning
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to the sets  2 [001],  2 [9210] and  2 [¡34¡29]. Thus, in principle,
the monetary authority should not care about the output gap when setting the
interest rate since the value of the currency is a better substitute.
Sensitivity analysis We have again performed a sensitivity analysis of the
numerical …ndings in which the index of openness of the economy has been
increased from  =0 2 to  =0 4. Basically, the …ndings that we reported when
this index was equal to 02 are not a¤ected. However, in comparison, the share
of rules that give rise to a unique and adaptively learnable REE is larger when
the smallest proportions of chartism in currency trade is excluded in the grid
s e a r c h ,w h e r e a st h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ew h e n the smallest proportions of technical
trading is included. We also found the same results in our search for desirable
parametrizations of the Taylor rule.
3.3.2 Contemporaneous expectations in the Taylor rule
Continuing with the contemporaneous expectations speci…cation of the interest
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Except for a di¤erence in the dating of expectations, the expected CPI in‡ation
rate in equilibrium in (44) is the same as in (40). This means that it does not
matter if contemporaneous data are used in the Taylor rule or if contemporane-
ous expectations, formed in the previous time period, of the variables are used
in the Taylor rule, the expected CPI in‡ation rate in equilibrium is exactly the
same.
11See the Appendix for the derivations of (44)-(45).28 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
Even though the conditional volatility of the CPI in‡ation rate in equilibrium
in (45) is not the same as in (41), there is a linear relationship between them. To
be more precise, the former quantity can be written as 22
 +2




,w h e r e2
 is the latter quantity, and where we have sub-
stituted the parameter values in (14) into the expression.12 This means that
the ordering from the best interest rate rule to the worst rule is the same, irre-
spective of whether the speci…cation of the rule includes contemporaneous data
or contemporaneous expectations of the included variables.
However, none of the parametrizations of the Taylor rule are satisfactory
from the point of view of the variability of the CPI in‡ation rate. This is because
the conditional volatility of the CPI in‡ation rate in equilibrium always is larger
than (the somewhat arbitrary limit) 022
. Speci…cally, the variability of the
CPI in‡ation rate can never be below 0778942
. Of course, this does not mean
that one should never adopt a contemporaneous expectations speci…cation of the
Taylor rule in monetary policy-making. The reason is that it may be the case
that the contemporaneous data speci…cation of the Taylor rule is not accessible
due to data revisions. Consequently, one is forced to use a rule that includes
contemporaneous expectations of the variables, which also means that one must
accept a higher conditional volatility of the CPI in‡ation rate in equilibrium.
Sensitivity analysis Obviously, the ordering of the Taylor rules are not af-
fected when the index of openness of the economy increases from  =0 2 to
 =0 4. It is also still true that none of the parametrizations of the Taylor rule
are satisfactory from the point of view of the variability of the CPI in‡ation
rate, because this variability can never be below 2




We do not repeat our …ndings in this discussion. Instead, we conclude with a few
remarks on the model developed and shortly discuss the claims in Taylor [18]
that the monetary authority’s interest rate rule should not include a reaction to
an exchange rate index to be favorable, which is in contrast with our …nding.
12See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 29
Our model Firstly, a few words about the technical trading technique in (7)
are in place. It is clear that questionnaire surveys made at currency markets
around the world not only con…rm that chartism is extensively used in currency
trade, but they also con…rm that some variant of a moving average technique is
the most commonly used technical trading technique. This means that exchange
rates in the more distant past also should a¤ect the decision to trade, and not
only the exchange rates in time periods  and  ¡ 1.
In Bask [1], an asset pricing model for the exchange rate is developed in
which the current rate is a¤ected by an exponentially weighted moving average
of all past exchange rates. When analyzing the e¤ects of changes in monetary
fundamentals, it is clear that the exchange rate in time period  ¡ 1 has a
…rst-order e¤ect on the current rate, while rates in the more distant past have a
second-order e¤ect on the current exchange rate. Encouraged be this …nding, we
restricted the technique in (7) to only include the exchange rates in time periods
 and  ¡1. An advantage of this restriction is that the complete model would,
otherwise, be too cumbersome to analyze, even numerically. This is because
we would have to work with extremely large matrixes when investigating if a
certain parametrization of a Taylor rule is associated with a unique, adaptively
learnable and desirable in‡ation rate in equilibrium.
Secondly, we could formulate the interest rate rules in (10)-(11) in terms of
the level of the nominal exchange rate; the actual level of the exchange rate
in (10), and the mathematically expected level of the exchange rate in (11).
However, having in mind that there have been several monetary arrangements
throughout history aiming at achieving less variable exchange rates, we stick
with the formulations of the interest rate rules in (10)-(11) and focus on the
change in the nominal exchange rate. Of course, it is part of future research to
search for robust and desirable parametrizations of the Taylor rules that take
current and past levels of the exchange rate as arguments.
Thirdly, the dating of expectations might be important for the …ndings in this
paper. Recall that when contemporaneous data are used in the Taylor rule as in
(10), the dating of expectations is time period , whereas when contemporaneous
expectations of the variables are used in the Taylor rule as in (11), the dating of
expectations is time period  ¡1. As was explained in Section 3.2.2, the reason30 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
for the latter assumption is that we would like to have an exact correspondence
with Bullard and Mitra [4]. For the same reason, one should also investigate the
case when the Taylor rule is (10) and the dating of expectations is time period
 ¡ 1. In Bullard and Mitra [4], the …ndings are not a¤ected by this change of
dating of expectations.
Finally, the recursive least squares learning algorithm that is used by the
fundamentalists is a decreasing gain algorithm. It would, therefore, be interest-
ing to complement the analysis in this paper with the case in which the learning
algorithm is a constant gain algorithm, especially when the fundamentalists,
including the monetary authority, is using a PLM of the economy that does not
include any REE. This is because it might open up for so-called escape dynamics
in the in‡ation rate from a self-con…rming equilibrium (see, e.g., Cho et al. [8]
and Williams [20] for an introduction to this recent literature, and Bullard and
Cho [3] for an example of escape dynamics in a closed economy like the one in
Bullard and Mitra [4]).
Taylor’s [18] claim The vigilant reader might object that we, in this paper,
are not really meeting the claim in Taylor [18]. This is because we investigate
the properties of the model developed using speci…cations of the Taylor rule that
include the change in the nominal exchange rate, while Taylor [18] is discussing
interest rate rules that include the current and past levels of the real exchange
rate. To be more speci…c, Taylor [18] is discussing the following rule
 = 	 +  +  + % + 0%¡1 (46)
where % is the real exchange rate.
In fact, the investigation in this paper is adequate, and there are two reasons
for this. Firstly, by assuming that 0 = ¡, we turn our focus from levels of
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t et ot h ec h a n g ei nt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e .T h i sa l s om e a n s ,
since the real exchange rate is % =  + ¤
 ¡ ,w h e r e is the CPI, that the
Taylor rule in (46) can be written as follows




 + ¢ + ¤
 (47)
Secondly, since we assume that ¤
 =0in the numerical analysis, the interest
rate rule in (47) is, in principle, exactly the same as the rule in (10). Note thatRobust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 31
the assumption 0 = ¡ is necessary to transform the Taylor rule in (46) to
the rule in (47).32 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
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Appendix
Derivation of (4) Firstly, shift the …rst equation in (3) one time period












































¢ ( ¡  (¢ + ¤
)) (A.4)
Fifthly, substitute (A.3) into the …rst equation in (2), and the …rst equation in
(4) is derived. Finally, substitute (A.3)-(A.4) into the second equation in (2),
solve for , and the second equation in (4) is derived.
Derivation of (12) Firstly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign
exchange market in (9) and the Taylor rule in (10) into the dynamic IS-type
equation in (4), and rearrange terms























Secondly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign exchange market in
(9) into the new Keynesian Phillips curve in (4), and rearrange terms

 ( ¡ 1) +  +  (	 ¡ 1)¢ (A.6)
= 	
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Thirdly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign exchange market in
(9) and the Taylor rule in (10) into the UIP condition in (5), and rearrange
terms
 +  +(  ¡ )¢ =( 1¡ )¢
+1 ¡ 	 + ¤
 (A.7)
Finally, put (A.5)-(A.7) into matrix form, and (12) is derived.
Derivation of (15) Firstly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign
exchange market in (9) and the Taylor rule in (11) into the dynamic IS-type



























Secondly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign exchange market in







 +( 1¡ )¢
+1 ¡ 	 + ¤
 (A.9)
Finally, put (A.6) and (A.8)-(A.9) into matrix form, and (15) is derived. Note
that (A.6) is una¤ected by the type of Taylor rule that is used by the monetary
authority.
Derivation of (13) when the Taylor rule is (11) Substitute (16) into (15),
and note that the coe¢cient matrix for the vector [¢]
0 at the left-hand36 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
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which is the same coe¢cient matrix for the vector [ ¢]
0 at the left-hand
side of (12). Consequently, the relevant coe¢cient matrix when deriving the
conditions for determinacy is (13).
Derivations of (44)-(45) The …x point in (37) is the MSV solution of the








¦ + ¥1 ¢ b £ + § ¢ b £
´
b ¤ = ¥¡1
0 ¢
³




which means that the MSV solution is
y = b £ + b ¤ ¢ ¡1 + © ¢  (A.12)
=( I ¡ ¡)
¡1 ¢ ¥¡1 ¢ ¦ +
(I ¡ ¡ ¢ )
¡1 ¢ ¥¡1 ¢ ¨ ¢ ¡1 + ¥
¡1
0 ¢ ¨ ¢ 
where © = ¥¡1
0 ¢ ¨ follows from comparing the PLM in (31) with the ALM in
(35) since the PLM of the economy is guided by the structure of the model’s
MSV solution. Recall that ¡ = ¥¡1 ¢ § and ¥0 ¡ ¥1 = ¥.T h e r e a f t e r , t a k e
the conditional expectations and volatility of (A.12), note that  ¡1 (¡1)=
 ¡1 () due to the stochastic process for the natural rate of interest in (6),
and (44)-(45) follows.Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy 37
Derivation of the relationship between (41) and (45) Since
¥
¡1
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and the postulated linear relationship between (41) and (45) follows.38 Robust Taylor Rules in an Open Economy
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